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ABSTRACT
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND SCOPE EFFICIENCY
POST GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY
By
YUAN YUAN
July26, 2007
Committee Chair:

Dr. Richard D. Phillips

Major Department:

Risk Management & Insurance

The enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 promised the most fundamental
reform to be made in U.S. financial services regulation in more than half a century. The GrammLeach-Bliley Act (GLB) removed barriers that forced separation between commercial banks,
investment banks, and insurance companies; and it allowed subsidiaries of banks or insurance
companies to engage in a broad range of financial activities that were not permitted for banks or
insurers themselves. Few doubted the potential for GLB to have a profound impact on financial
service providers and on the financial market. However, there is a striking lack of empirical
research on the effects of diversification by financial firms. The first goal of this dissertation is to
identify domestic “assurbanks” (insurers owning banks) and “bancassurers” (banks owning
insurers) and to identify the unique subsidiaries of financial services companies licensed as
commercial banks, thrifts, or insurance companies in the U.S. We construct a unique dataset that
links the banking and insurance regulatory datasets. A second objective is to investigate the
effects of integrating the banking and insurance sectors of the U.S. economy. We evaluate the
market structure and operating performance of financial institutions in the integrated banking and
insurance industry. Gains from exploiting scope economies and product mix efficiencies are

VIII

often cited as motives for financial institution integration. A third objective is to estimate
efficiency effects from the economies of scope across the two formally separate sectors by
estimating multi-product costs, revenue, and profit functions. The final objective is to test
whether scope economies exist for firms that jointly produce financial products across multiple
sectors and to explain the variation of scope economy estimations.
The empirical evidence suggests that both domestic assurbanks and bancassurers are
large in size and count for a significant portion of the banking and insurance market share. These
firms are also more diversified in terms of their traditional products with a focus on personal line
products. Large bancassurers appear more interested in investing in small-size life and propertyliability subsidiaries. Large assurbanks are more interested in acquiring small-size thrifts. Banks
prefer to affiliate with life insurance more than property-liability insurance, and insurers are
more likely to affiliate with thrift saving banks than to affiliate with commercial banks.
Diversified firms have higher profitability in their traditional lines of business. Bancassurers
perform well in the insurance business, but most assurbanks lose money in their banking
division. The scope economy results; investigating consumption complementarities suggests that
a significant number of cost scope diseconomies, revenue scope economies, and weak profit
scope economies exist in the post-GLB U.S. integrated banking and insurance sectors. The scope
economies are variant among firms, and certain firm characteristics (size, business portfolio,
geographic diversification, product mix and diversification, insurance distribution system, and
X-efficiency) are the determinants of scope economies.

IX

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
When the landmark financial service reform legislation, the Financial Service Modernization
Act 1 (known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), was passed in 1999, it was viewed as the
culmination of years of effort to reform the U.S. financial service industry and the most
significant legislation in decades to affect the financial service industry. GLB repealed the 66year old Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) of 1933 2 and eliminated the restrictions on affiliation between
commercial banks and investment banks. GLB substantially modified the 43-year old Bank
Holding Company Act (BHCA) of 1956 3 and removed barriers which forced separation between
commercial banks and insurance companies. It allowed subsidiaries of bank holding companies,
insurance companies, investment banks, and other types of financial institutions to engage in a
broad range of financial activities that were not permitted before.
The potential for GLB to have a profound impact on financial services providers were
great, and as the end of 2003—under the GLB Act—more than 600 companies operated as
Financial Holding Companies (FHC), which represented 78 percent of the total assets of all Bank
Holding Companies (BHC). In addition, more than 1,300 FHCs/BHCs became engaged in
insurance agency or underwriting activities under the Act. In addition, by the end of 2003, more
than 2,500 insurance companies (either through agents or through risk bearing underwriters)
were affiliated with commercial banks and thrift institutions. 4 Today, financial service
consumers can choose from a broadening array of financial tools and from companies either

1

Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
Pub. L. 66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
3
Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956).
4
BHC Statutory Financial Report (multiple years); Federal Reserve Report to Congress, 2003
2

1

aiming to serve their multiple needs or companies specializing in one or two types of financial
products. Thus, looking at GLB on a superficial level, given the changes that had already taken
place, it appears to have produced radical changes in the insurance and banking industries.
When GLB passed, it was expected to spur waves of cross-sector mergers (M&As).
However, massive cross-sector M&As did not occur. Instead, banks bought specialized securities
firms and acquired insurance agencies and brokerages rather than acquiring insurance
underwriting companies as had been predicted. Banks now control some of the largest insurance
brokerages companies. Insurance companies applied for new thrift charters instead of
commercial bank charters. After GLB, some firms even chose to de-converge. In 2002, Citigroup
spun off the property/casualty insurance unit of Travelers, and St. Paul Companies bought the
insurance unit from Citigroup in 2003. Later in 2005, Citigroup announced it was selling
Travelers Life & Annuity to MetLife. The different activities of financial institutions following
GLB and the effects we observed in the market raise important policy and research questions on
the motivations and consequences of integration and the optimal structure of the financial
services industry.
Some of the U.S. financial regulations have resulted mainly from historical circumstance
while others have been designed to attain certain policy objectives. For instance, prior to the
1920s, the free banking approach was dominant in U.S. banking. Commercial banks were
explicitly permitted to engage in security activities until the 1929 stock market. It was argued
that abuse in the securities activities of commercial banks was the primary catalyst behind the
banking industry collapse. The subsequent 1933 Banking Act established a wall between
commercial banking and investment banking after the failure of 11,000 banks. For the past
century, the insurance industry has opposed bank entry into the insurance business. They feared

2

that banks would enjoy unfair competitive advantages since national banks were regulated
federally while insurers were subject to varying state regulations regarding capital and licensing
requirements. Hence, prior to the enactment of GLB, U.S. financial services were statutorily
fragmented into three broad sectors: banking, insurance, and securities.
There have been several historical arguments against U.S. financial services industry
reform. Consumer advocates feared that financial conglomeration would have negative
implications for consumers. For example, they warned that using just one provider would
weaken customer’s power to negotiate and could jeopardize people’s life savings if handled by
inadequately trained salespersons. Thus, one-stop shopping would cost consumers more than it
would save them. Consumer advocates also pointed out the risks of privacy information abuse. In
order to exploit conglomeration synergistic gains, sharing customer information and databases
was expected. It was feared that affiliates would share customer information inappropriately and
without informed consent. If consumers were not provided with some form of protection, they
could be subjected to a heightened risk of unwanted solicitation, credit fraud, and identity theft.
Their concerns were triggered by the loss of existing privacy legislation. For example, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act of 1997 5 allowed affiliates to share information and gave the consumer the
right to “opt-out” of cross-selling arrangements.
Over time, the financial industry headed towards consolidation. Such convergence was
spurred by the changes that had been taking place in the market since the 1980s, including
advancing technology, financial innovations, increased competition, changing customer’s needs,
financial globalization, and deregulation in other industrialized countries. Financial services
institutions wanted to offer a broad array of financial products and services. The products of
banks, insurers and security firms could no longer be functionally separated. The existing
5

15 U.S.C. §§ 6806.

3

regulatory structure needed to be changed as the traditional lines that separated these segments
had been crossed due to the development of new financial products.6 The country advanced
financial reform in spite of the lack of financial modernization legislation. The Office of the
Comptroller of Currency (OCC) began to explore the possible expansions of bank insurance
power. 7 The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) liberally granted thrift charters so that entities
could enlarge their financial service offerings. In addition, industry leaders moved forward on
their own. The merger of Travelers and Citicorp in 1998 increased the pressure on Congress to
pass the financial services modernization act. 8 The anti-affiliation laws were eventually repealed
by GLB in 1999. Privacy advocates successfully petitioned Congress for limits on the use of
nonpublic personal information. Such curbs on the use of this nonpublic personal information are
built into the GLB Act. 9
A debate exists among researchers about the motives for diversification. According to the
theoretical justifications for diversification, the existence of certain imperfections in the product
or capital markets is one set of explanations for a diversification strategy. Diversified production
can provide various potential benefits, such as a reduction in transaction costs (Coase, 1937), the
creation of internal capital markets (Stein, 1997), the expansion of the managerial skills of
managers (Milbourn, Boot, and Thakor, 1999), the increase in operating efficiency through
economies of scope and scale (Teece, 1980), the concentration of market power (Villalonga,
2000), the increase in debt capacity (Lewellen, 1971), and the decrease of expected taxes

6

For example, variable rate annuities incorporate features of both insurance and investment products.
For example, based on Section 92 of the National Banking Act, OCC Interpretive Letter 366 (1986) stated that
national banks may sell insurance to customers residing outside small towns where their main offices or branches
were located.
8
Citicorp and Travelers Group publicly announced their merger on the morning of April 6, 1998. The combined
company was named Citigroup (“Citicorp, Travelers Group to merger,” Dow Jones Newswires, 6 April 1998 at 7:03
a.m.).
9
The privacy provisions of GLB are located in Title V (the Financial Privacy Law). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827
(2000).
7

4

(Flannery, Houston, and Venkataraman, 1993). An alternative explanation assumes conflicts of
interest between managers and shareholders, where managers choose to diversify out of a selfinterest to increase their compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), power and prestige (Jensen,
1986). Diversifying make their positions more secure as they make investments using their
specialized skills (Shleifer and Vishny, 1990a, b); diversifying reduces the risk of their personal
investment portfolios by reducing risk for the firm since the managers cannot reduce their own
risk by diversifying their portfolios (Amihud and Lev, 1981).
Proponents of financial integration claim that it provides discipline to corporate
management, helps corporations restructure more efficiently than stock markets, allows
economies of scale and scope, and promotes financial stability and economic development.
Proponents argue that earnings diversification can lower the cost of capital and raise the debt
capacity of the firm. Internal capital markets are said to be less prone to information asymmetries
and other market imperfections than external markets (Williamson, 1970; Gertner, Scharfstein,
and Stein, 1994). Opponents question the theorized cost advantages, and they believe that
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, as well as, conflicts in market power
concentration may lead to lower efficiency.
Economic and finance theories have discussed the potential effects of diversifying
consolidation, and there exists extensive literature exploring the impact of diversifying
transactions by non-financial firms on firm value (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek,
1995; Servaes, 1996; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Chevalier, 1999; Hyland and Diltz, 2002;
Villalonga, 2004) and on productive efficiency (e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1987; Lichtenberg,
1992; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001, 2002; Schoar, 2002).

5

However, there is a significant lack of empirical research on the effects of diversification
by financial firms. Carow (2001a) and Johnston and Madura (2000) found an increase in the
stock prices of both the acquirer and the target; they noted gains to banks, insurers, and
brokerage firms in response to the Citicorp–Travelers merger, which joined a commercial bank
with an insurer, both of which also conducted securities underwriting. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia
(2000) found significant market value gains associated with M&As between banks and insurers
in Europe. The remaining available research of financial integration, however, has mostly
focused on “within-sector” diversification, e.g., providing deposits and loans by a commercial
bank (Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley, 1996) or providing property-liability and life insurance
products within an insurance group (Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2000). Seven years after
the passage of GLB, the specific ways in which GLB has affected the U.S. financial system are
still widely open to question. There is still no comprehensive study analyzing the effect of GLB
or one investigating the post-GLB market structure and the performance of financial institutions
manufacturing multiple financial products.
One of the important elements in the current debate is the effect integration has on the
efficiency of financial institutions. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide the first set of
evidence to inform this debate. In this research, we estimate economies of scope of the crosssector integration in the post-GLB U.S. financial services industry across costs, revenue and
profit measures. Gains from exploiting scope economies and product mix efficiencies are often
cited as motives for financial institution integration. Scope efficiency gains can be created by
sharing such physical inputs as computers, furniture, or offices; employing common information
systems, distribution systems, advertisement departments, or investment departments; reusing
managerial expertise; obtaining external capital by issuing securities in larger sizes; providing

6

consumption complementarities (“one-stop shopping” convenience) to customers. However,
scope diseconomies may also arise at the same time because of higher administration and
coordination expenses, organizational diseconomies, cross-subsidization in internal capital
markets, or they may arise because of the loss of specialized expertise for customers needing
tailored products.
Since the 1990s, substantial research has been devoted to measuring the productive
efficiency of financial institutions, particularly in commercial banks. Literally hundred of studies
have been conducted to estimate various measures of efficiency of financial institutions located
in more than two-dozen countries. 10 However, there is little research on the efficiency effects of
integrating providers of different categories of financial services into universal-type
organizations. The little evidence that exists is extrapolated either from scope efficiency within
one sector of the financial industry, e.g., the commercial banking (Berger, Hanweck, and
Humphrey, 1987; Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey, 1993; Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley, 1996)
or the insurance industry (Grace and Timme, 1992; Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2000), or
from simulations of risk diversification benefits of diversifying integration in the absence of any
synergistic gains (Kwast, 1989; Boyd, Graham and Hewitt, 1993; Whalen, 1999b; Allen and
Jagtiani, 2000; Lown, Osler, Strahan, and Sufi, 2000). To the best of our knowledge, this
research is the first to evaluate the costs, revenue and profit scope economies resulting from
cross-sector integration in the post-GLB U.S. financial service industry.
We utilize a two-stage econometric method to investigate economies of scope. The
analysis proceeds as follows. We first estimate costs, revenue, and profit scope economy scores
using econometric functions. Then, in the second stage, the scores from the first stage are

10

Berger and Humphrey (1997) critically reviewed more than 130 studies and summarized empirical efficiency
estimates of financial institutions in 21 countries.
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regressed upon a set of variables describing firm characteristics and environments. 11 The second
stage regression allows us to test whether scope economies exist for firms that jointly produced
financial products across multiple sectors and allows us to explain the variation of scope
economy estimations.
A likely reason empirical research on the integration of the banking and insurance sectors
is so scarce is because the regulatory data sets available to study this issue are product specific,
and there is no convenient way to identify companies affiliated with one another across sectors.
Thus, the first effort in our study is to construct a unique dataset which links the insurance
regulatory data sets available from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) with the bank regulatory data sets from the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). The combined
data set exists for of all financial conglomerates (bancassurers and assurbanks), specialist banks,
and specialist insurers in the U.S. banking and insurance industry during the years 2003, 2004,
and 2005. In addition, the existence of the combined data set will facilitate academic research to
document the economic outcomes of combining formerly separate sectors of the financial service
industry.
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the history of U.S. financial
integration and reviews GLB and its effects on the U.S. banking and insurance industries.
Chapter 3 reviews the literature and research on GLB and U.S. financial market integration.
Chapter 4 describes the construction of the dataset. In Chapter 5, we identify the relevant firms in
both the banking and insurance markets. Chapters 6 and 7 present the market analysis and
11

The two-stage procedure used literature explaining the differences in efficiency. Bank studies include Aly et al.
(1990), Berger et al. (1993), Pi and Timme (1993), Kwan and Eisenbeis (1995), Mester (1996), and Berger and
Hannan (1998). Thrift institution studies include Cebenoyan et al. (1993a, 1993b), Mester (1993), and Hermalin and
Wallace (1994). Insurance firm studies include Garder and Grace (1993), Berger et al. (2000), and Cummins et al.
(2003).

8

discuss the results. Chapter 8 discusses the concept of scope economies and reviews the prior
research relevant to the U.S. financial services industry. In Chapter 9, we develop the testable
hypotheses. Chapter 10 explains the estimation methodologies and the data set used and outlines
the estimation of inputs, outputs, and prices. Chapter 11 reports the scope economies estimation
results and discusses the regression results. Chapter 12 offers conclusions.

9

CHAPTER 2
HISTORY OF U.S. FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND GLB ACT
Prior to 1999, U.S. financial services were statutorily separated into three broad sectors: banking,
insurance, and securities. The securities sector was one area of the financial services industry that
exhibited significant crossover with banks. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 established a wall
between commercial banking and investment banking after the failure of 11,000 commercial
banks. The 1933 Act prohibited banks from principally engaging in underwriting securities.
However, in 1986 the FRB eased these restrictions by raising the limits of bank-ineligible
securities activities to less than 5 percent of BHC’s total revenue. The revenue limit was raised to
10 percent in 1989 and to 25 percent in 1996. These securities subsidiaries are called “Section 20
companies.”
Unlike affiliations between banks and securities companies, affiliations between banks and
insurance companies have been highly restricted since the early 1900s. GLB totally lifted
barriers which restricted competition across financial sectors. Because of the lack of data for
security firms relevant to insurance and banking, this dissertation focuses on the integration
across U.S. banking and insurance sectors. In this section, we investigate the background and
regulatory history of financial service integration in the U.S. banking and insurance sectors. We
trace how banks became involved in insurance activities and how insurers have expanded their
traditional business to offer banking products.
2.1. DEFINITION OF BANCASSURANCE AND ASSURBANKING
A financial conglomerate is commonly defined as any group of companies under common
management control that provides services, predominantly in two or more of the three major

10

financial services sectors. 12 In this dissertation, we differentiate between bank-initiated and
insurer-initiated financial conglomerates and, therefore, define bancassurance and assurbanking
as follows: Bancassurance is the process of a bank selling insurance products manufactured by
insurance subsidiaries that are owned by the bank, either through its own distribution channels or
through outside agents. Assurbanking is the process of an insurance company selling banking
products manufactured by banking subsidiaries that are owned by the insurer. Instead of focusing
on distribution and cross-selling, our definition focuses on the manufacturing of cross-sector
financial service product, and encompasses integration of production, management, and
controlling rights.
Thus, we differentiate from other studies that have defined the integration of banking and
insurance in other ways. For example, financial integration has been defined as a financial
service group participating in more than one of the major sectors of the financial service industry
(e.g., commercial banking, insurance underwriting, investment banking) either in-house or in
separately capitalized subsidiaries of the group. 13 Diversification of a financial company occurs
when a financial institution expands beyond its traditional or existing business to new business
activities, either in its primary financial sector (concentric diversification) or in other financial
sectors (conglomerate diversification). 14 In contrast, universal banking is the term commonly
used to refer to diversified bank institutions in the European Union (EU) that manufacture and
distribute diversified cross-sector financial services. 15
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Skipper and Kwon (2007), p. 656.
Financial integration can also be referred as “financial conglomeration” or “conglomerate diversification.”
14
In the literature, “diversification” often refers to geographical diversification, horizontal diversification, vertical
integration, concentric diversification, business diversification, or conglomerate diversification.
15
Unlike universal banks in the other EU countries, German universal banks are allowed to hold equity stakes in
both financial and non-financial firms (Vander Vennet, 2002).
13
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2.2. INSURANCE INVOLVEMENT IN BANKING PRE-GLB
Insurance companies have been highly constrained in their ability to penetrate the banking
market compared to the access of their banking counterparts. In the early 1900s, in New York
(and some other states), policies restricted the ability of insurance companies to invest in
common stocks. Insurance companies were required to divest themselves of bank stocks and
were prohibited from acting as underwriters for securities or engaging in securities syndications.
In competition with banks, insurance companies in the 1950s began entering the home mortgage
market and made loans to corporations. In the 1960s, a series of M&As occurred in the insurance
industry, which sometimes involved non-insurance businesses, including banks and thrifts. In
response, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) approved a model
insurance holding company statue, designed to impose restrictions on companies intending to
acquire insurers and to target companies insurers intended to acquire. The model statue was
subsequently adopted by most states. Under the model statue, the state regulator had the power to
oversee the activities of an insurance holding company and its non-insurance subsidiaries.
Prior to GLB, in an effort to meet bank competition, insurers found ways around the
Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) prohibition of affiliating banking and insurance activities.
The most popular strategy involved insurers acquiring unitary thrift holding companies, nonbank banks, and limited purpose trust companies. The Savings and Loan Holding Company Act
(SLHCA) of 1967 16 provided that a company owning only a single thrift institution was a unitary
thrift holding company and was not subject to any restrictions on other activities undertaken.
Therefore, an insurance company or its holding company could legally purchase a single thrift. A
second strategy allowing insurers to enter banking was to operate non-bank banks. The BHCA of
1956 defined a bank as an institution that “both accepted demand deposits and made commercial
16

Pub. L. 90-255, 82 Stat. 5 (1968).
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loans.” Insurance companies exploited this definition by establishing a non-bank bank that either
accepted saving deposits but not demand deposits, or one that made consumer loans but not
commercial loans. 17 A third strategy was to establish a limited purpose trust company, which
was not considered a bank if it accepted only trust funds (not demand deposits) and did not offer
FDIC insurance on these deposits.
2.3. BANK INVOLVEMENT IN INSURANCE PRE-GLB
From a historical perspective, BHCs, national banks, state-chartered banks and thrift saving
banks have long possessed federal permission to engage in a range of insurance activities. 18 In
this section, we review the regulation and legislation on BHCs, national banks, state banks, and
thrifts, respectively.
In 1916, Congress amended the National Banking Act (NBA) of 1864. 19 Section 92 of
NBA prescribed the legislative scheme for giving national banks the authority to sell insurance.
National banks were empowered to locate and sell insurance in any place with a population of no
more than 5,000 – the famous “place of 5,000” provision. During the era of the Great
Depression, banking and securities activities were separated, and affiliations between
commercial banks and securities companies were prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. 20
For BHCs, Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) of 1956 21 permitted
BHCs to engage in activities of a “financial, fiduciary or insurance nature,” which included
17

In 1987, the Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA), Pub. L. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987), redefined “bank”
to include any institution with FDIC deposit insurance. However, CEBA grandfathered non-bank banks existing
before March 5, 1987, also known as CEBA banks.
18
The banking industry has a dual chartering system and is regulated at both the state and federal levels. The
National Banking Act of 1864 provides for a system of banks to be chartered by the federal or state governments.
State chartered banks may conduct business under the mandates of state law. Nationally chartered banks are
empowered to engage in a specific set of activities under the National Banking Act. Their parent holding companies
are regulated under the BHCA by the Federal Reserve Board. The BHCs and their non-banking subsidiaries business
(such as finance and mortgage companies), before GLB, were also limited to those closely related to banking.
19
Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864).
20
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited banks from being principally engaged in underwriting securities.
21
Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956).
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insurance agency activities. However, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) still did not approve the
general insurance underwriting for BHCs during 1950 to 1970.
In 1971, the FRB first promulgated the list of permissible non-banking activities for
BHCs, including permissible insurance activities in what was known as Regulation Y. However,
a decade later, Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain Act (GSGA) of 1982 22 that rolled back
Regulation Y and prohibited BHCs from providing insurance as principal underwriters, agents or
brokers, with the following exemptions: BHCs could underwrite and sell credit life insurance,
credit accident and health insurance, and mortgage related insurance; BHCs could act as agent or
broker for property insurance on loan collateral; BHCs could sell general insurance in towns of
less than 5,000 inhabitants; small BHCs with total assets of less than $50 million could engage in
any insurance agency activities, except for annuities and life insurance sales; and BHCs engaging
in insurance agency activities engaged in before 1982 were allowed to continue. 23 Under
Regulation K, BHCs were permitted to underwrite or sell any type of insurance overseas without
restriction and were also allowed to own foreign insurance companies. 24
National banks, which are chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), could be owned by a BHC and could exercise the powers contained in the National
Banking Act and the regulations promulgated by the OCC. There are two sources of authority for
national banks to engage in insurance activities: Section 24 of the National Banking Act and the
“place of 5,000” exception in Section 92 of the National Banking Act. Section 24 did not permit
national banks to engage in insurance agency or underwriting business in general. However, the
22

Pub. L. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982).
The Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 grandfathered insurance agency activities specifically engaged in before May
1, 1982, with strict limitation. Insurance agency activities specifically engaged in before January 1, 1971, were fully
grandfathered without limitation of product type or geographic location. However, this grandfather privilege was not
transferable.
24
The FRB intended to improve the international competitiveness of U.S. banking organizations by expanding
permissible activities abroad and by reducing regulatory burden associated with the conduct of such activities.
BHCs, therefore, could establish offshore subsidiaries to engage in insurance abroad.
23
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OCC recognized exceptions to this general rule and approved the underwriting and selling of title
insurance, credit related insurance, 25 and mortgage guaranty reinsurance, as well as acted as an
agent in the sale of municipal bond insurance, mortgage reinsurance, and crop insurance. Since
1986, the OCC expanded national banks’ insurance powers under the “place of 5,000” exception
in Section 92 by allowing national banks or their branches, located in any place with a
population of 5000 or less, to sell insurance to their customers located anywhere in the nation.
State banks are chartered by individual states, and the ability of state banks to diversify
into the insurance industry varies by state. For years, a number of states allowed their state banks
to provide insurance services to their customers. For example, South Dakota and Delaware led
the way in authorizing insurance activities for banks chartered in their states. In 1991, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) 26 limited the activities of
any FDIC-insured state-chartered banks acting as a principal to those activities permissible for
national banks. However, state-chartered banks could still engage in agency activities authorized
by state-chartered authorities. Other insurance activities could be authorized under FDICIA if
permitted under state law. FDICIA specifically prohibited state banks from underwriting
insurance except to the extent permitted for national banks and grandfathered underwriting
activities. By the end of 1998, 40 states allowed state banks to operate insurance agencies,
increasing from 22 states in 1995.
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) is the regulatory supervisor of federally chartered
saving banks and federal and state-chartered saving associations and their holding companies. 27
Since the 1970s, insurance selling has been a pre-approved activity for thrift institutions. Under
25

These products included credit life, health and accident insurance, mortgage life and disability insurance. National
banks were allowed to sell crop insurance through insurance agencies without geographic restriction.
26
Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991).
27
Saving institutions include saving banks and saving associations, and throughout this dissertation we refer to them
as saving institutions or thrift saving banks.
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federal law, thrifts may engage in non-thrift activities through their service corporation
subsidiaries. Multiple savings and loan holding companies 28 were generally limited in their nonthrift activities, but they were permitted to engage in insurance agency business. However, a
unitary savings and loan holding company and its non-thrift subsidiaries were not restricted with
respect to the activities they could engage in. Thus, unitary savings and loan holding companies
could legally own insurance companies (either agents or risk-bearing underwriters). By
purchasing one, and only one, thrift institution, insurance companies could obtain a license with
the OTS as a unitary savings and loan holding company.
In summary, insurance companies in the U.S. have historically had a difficult time
offering a wide range of banking products prior to the passage of GLB. Banks, however, could
act as agents or brokers selling insurance products but were severely limited in what they could
do as far as underwriting insurance products. Given regulations prohibiting most banks from
producing insurance prior to GLB, some U.S. banks attempted to enter the insurance business by
designing new products, which incorporated insurance features. These insurance-like products
included, for example, municipal bond guarantee insurance, which was allowed by the OCC in
1985, and the CD (certificate of deposit) annuity introduced by several small banks, which
permitted the annuitization of an amount deposited into a CD.
2.4. GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999
On November 12, 1999, President Clinton signed into law the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The
law allowed banks of all sizes to be able to offer their customers a wide range of financial
products and services manufactured by the same financial service conglomerate. In addition,
other types of financial companies – insurance and securities companies, or even, financial

28

A multiple savings and loan holding company controls directly or indirectly two or more federally or statechartered thrift institutions insured by FDIC.
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technology companies were able to more readily form into a single financial operation.
Numerous financial products across sectors were now permitted to be manufactured under one
roof.
2.4.1. IMPACT ON BANKS ENTERING INSURANCE
GLB provides two vehicles to allow financial institutions to engage in new types of financial
activities or to affiliate with other financial companies: financial holding companies (FHCs) and
financial subsidiaries. FHCs, the more flexible of the two possibilities, may engage in new
activities that are financial in nature, including banking, merchant banking, securities, insurance
underwriting or agency through a holding company affiliate regulated by the Federal Reserve
Board. BHCs can apply and elect to be FHCs and then conduct all activities permitted under
GLB and BHCA. These activities must be 1) financial in nature or incidental to such financial
activity or 2) complementary to a financial activity and present no substantial risk to the safety or
soundness of the financial institutions or the financial system. As of March 11, 2000, the date
GLB went into effect, the FRB announced the list of the first 117 FHCs. 29
GLB provides banks with the alternative of using a subsidiary rather than an FHC as the
vehicle for conducting new financial activities. A financial subsidiary, which can engage in most
of the newly-authorized activities, must be a direct subsidiary of a bank. The most important
difference between the FHC and the financial subsidiary is that the latter is prohibited from
engaging in certain financial activities as a "principal.” Therefore, there is no requirement that a
bank organization has to be part of an FHC to engage in new activities (except for prohibited
activities 30 ) through a financial subsidiary. Under GLB, neither a national bank nor its
subsidiaries may underwrite insurance unless underwriting was permitted by the OCC rulings
29

Federal Reserve Board statistic release.
The prohibited activities are insurance underwriting and annuity issuance, real estate development or investment,
and merchant banking.
30
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before January 1, 1999. National banks may still act as an insurance agent in offices of the
national bank located in a place of less than 5,000 inhabitants. In general, state banks are
prohibited by the FDICIA from engaging in insurance underwriting even if permitted under state
law, except to the extent that the activity is permitted for national banks. The new insurance
underwriting restrictions for national banks in GLB also restrict the underwriting ability of state
banks. A state bank may also own a subsidiary that engages in activities comparable to those
permitted by GLB for the financial subsidiaries of national banks. 31
The GLB Act substantially expands the ability of a bank to affiliate with any financial
institution, such as an insurance company or a security firm. However, with limited exceptions,
GLB withholds the longstanding prohibition on a bank affiliating with commercial companies.
Recognizing that thrift institutions have become much more like banks, GLB also prohibits a
commercial company from affiliating with a thrift institution and specifically acquiring a thrift
institution through the "unitary thrift holding company" vehicle. 32
2.4.2. IMPACT ON INSURERS ENTERING BANKING
An insurance company and its holding company may take advantage of GLB and apply
to become an FHC so that it may begin manufacturing banking products. If an insurance
company elects to become an FHC, it may continue to engage in all prior lawful non-banking
activities in which it was engaging as of September 30, 1999. In addition, insurance companies
still have the option to expand into the banking industry through the vehicle of saving and loan
holding companies (SLHC). Following GLB, the OTS ruled that SLHCs are eligible under GLB

31

A grandfather provision allows state banks to retain their existing subsidiaries, which may or may not qualify as a
financial subsidiaries, and to continue to engage in activities lawfully conducted before the enactment of GLB.
32
GLB grandfathers any commercial company that was a unitary thrift holding company as of May 4, 1999 or had
an application pending at the OTS to become a unitary thrift holding company as of that date.
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to engage in the same list of financial activities permissible for FHCs. 33 SLHCs generally are
subject to revenue and other restrictions applicable to BHCs and have to abide by conditions
imposed by the Federal Reserve on FHCs.
Since the passage of GLB, the majority of insurers that have entered the banking sector
have done so by using SLHCs instead of FHCs. By 2005, more than 40 insurers were approved
by the OTS as SLHCs and engaged in banking business through their thrift subsidiaries. 34 Only
one insurance company, MetLife, chose to become an FHC and own a small commercial bank.
The most likely reason for this is the regulatory burden. FHCs and commercial banks are
regulated by various regulators. For example, federally chartered commercial banks are regulated
by the OCC; state chartered commercial banks are regulated by the state banking regulatory
authorities; insured commercial banks are also monitored by FDIC, and FHCs are regulated by
the Federal Reserve. However, the only regulator for thrifts and SLHCs is the OTS. In addition,
thrifts have much more freedom in establishing branches and offices nationwide. Thrifts may do
business in any state in the nation without restrictions. In order to expand business to other states,
commercial banks have to meet different requirements imposed by different states, e.g., branch
restrictions.
Another aspect of GLB, which facilitates insurance companies’ entry into banking via an
FHC, is the provision permitting mutual insurance companies to re-domesticate to another state
for the purpose of converting to a stock company. An insurance company organized in a mutual
organizational form may wish to convert to a stock company form to obtain access to equity
capital and related financing alternatives (convertible debentures, warrants, or preferred stock)
from the capital market. These financial alternatives are necessary to expand the financial
33

Federal Register, November 8, 2001 issue.
Thrift Holding Company Structure Report. For example: State Farm owned Sate Farm Bank; Allstate owned
Allstate Bank; American International Group owned AIG Federal Saving Bank.
34
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activities under the new powers (Viswanathan and Cummins, 2003; Butler, Cui, and Whitman,
2000; Cagle, Lippert, and Moore 1996). Such demutualization can also provide enhanced
corporate structure flexibility and make it possible for mutual insurance companies to affiliate
with other financial institutions. GLB eases the process of converting the status of a company by
permitting a mutual insurance company to easily re-domesticate to a state with laws favorable for
conversion to the stock company form of ownership.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
The available research on U.S. financial integration has been limited and mostly focused on the
immediate wealth effects of GLB and on the potential efficiency effects developed from
simulations. Using event-study methodology, Carow (2001a) and Johnston and Madura (2000)
investigated the 1999 merger of Citicorp with Travelers, which signaled impending financial
modernization, and found positive market value gains for the merged entity, life insurers, large
banks, and brokerage firms. Carow and Heron (2002) examined the capital market reaction to
GLB and found that only insurance and investment companies were predicted to benefit from
GLB. Carow (2001b) focused on how a reduction in the insurance industry’s barriers to bank
entry affected the market value of firms in the insurance and banking industry. His evidence
suggested that insurance companies experienced a significant reduction in wealth surrounding
the OCC and Supreme Court rulings 35 while bank stock prices did not change significantly.
However, Mamun, Hassan, and Maroney (2005a) and Neale and Peterson (2005) suggested that
the main winners from GLB were property-liability insurers followed by life insurers, and larger
insurance companies benefited more from GLB than others.
The results of wealth effects on the banking industry are mixed. Akhigbe and Whyte
(2001) also found positive valuation effects of GLB on the banking industry. Hendershott, Lee
and Tompkins (2002), on the other hand, did not find significant wealth effect of GLB on banks.
A recent study by Mamun, Hassan and Maroney (2005b) found the impact of GLB on the
35

The OCC granted national banks the right to sell fixed-rate annuities on April 4, 1985, and variable-rate annuities
on February 12, 1990. Based on Section 92 of the NBA, on August 13, 1986, the OCC ruled that a national bank or
its branch located in a place of 5,000 or less population may sell insurance products to its customers located
anywhere. The 1995 Supreme Court case (NationBank vs. VALIC) and 1996 Supreme Court case (Barnett Bank vs.
FL Insurance Commissioner) upheld the OCC rulings and brought this segment of regulatory change to completion.
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banking industry, including welfare gains by the banking industry and decreased exposures to
systematic risks after passage of GLB.
A second series of papers attempted to estimate the potential efficiency gains of
consolidation. For example, Berger (2000) and Saunders and Walter (1994) argued that allowing
universal banking would enhance the efficiency of the financial service industry, without
increasing the risks to the financial system stability. Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1999)
examined the relationship between diversifying M&As, efficiency, and scale economies in the
U.S. life insurance industry over 1988-1995. They found that diversifying M&As within the life
insurance industry had a beneficial effect on efficiency. 36 Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi
(2000) investigated economies of scope in the U.S. insurance industry by studying diversified
and specialist insurers for the period 1988-1992 and found cost scope economies and revenue
scope diseconomies, as a result of providing life insurance and property-liability insurance
jointly. Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey (1993) showed that joint production was more efficient
for banks in limited branching and statewide branching regulatory environments, and
specialization was more efficient for others in unit banking regulatory environments. Berger,
Humphrey, and Pulley (1996) found little or no revenue scope efficiency between deposits and
loans in term of charging customers for joint consumption benefits.
Although a number of studies have been done across products within a sector, only a
handful of studies exist, which investigate the cross-industry integration of the U.S. financial
service industry and which investigate financial conglomerations. Two exceptions are papers by
Berger (2000) and Malkonen (2004), which theoretically analyzed the efficiency and competitive
implications of financial conglomeration. Berger (2000) suggested that integration across
financial service industries increased the potential for efficiency gains and that integration also
36

Also see Gardner and Grace (1993), Cummins and Zi (1998).
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may bring greater revenue efficiency gains than cost efficiency gains with most of the gains
coming from the benefits of risk diversification. Malkonen (2004) conducted a study on financial
conglomeration driven by cost-efficiency gains and suggested that conglomeration triggers
competition in the credit market and increases profits in insurance. His model showed that costefficiency gains were fully passed to consumers and aggregate risk in the financial markets was
reduced, suggesting lower capital requirements for financial conglomerates.
Meanwhile, there is a significant lack of empirical research on the effects of
diversification by financial firms. Since affiliation across industries was prohibited prior to GLB,
research in this area has only progressed using simulated data. Boyd, Graham and Hewitt (1993)
examined the effect of BHC mergers with non-bank financial firms. Using simulated data, they
found that BHC mergers with life and property/casualty insurance companies reduced risk. Wall,
Reichert and Mohanty (1993) focused on the question of whether deregulating commercial bank
activities would affect a banks’ riskiness by examining the portfolio effects of combining bank
activities with non-bank financial activities. Their results suggested that portfolios, along with
certain industries in which banks have been seeking to remove barriers to growth, offer
significant opportunities for increasing return while lowering risk. Reichert and Wall (2000)
updated and extended the earlier empirical analysis by Wall et al. (1993) and suggested that
efficient diversification may change over time, perhaps due to certain factors, such as the
macroeconomic environments or advancing technologies. Allen and Jagtiani (2000) created a
synthetic financial conglomerate consisting of one bank, one securities firm, and one insurance
company. They showed lower overall risk but higher systematic risk in the banking industry
because of integration.
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Whalen (1999a, 1999b) examined the overseas insurance activities and securities
activities of U.S. BHCs for the period from 1987 to 1997. 37 Whalen found that average returns
on both foreign insurance and securities activities were higher than traditional banking activities
and that the combination of insurance and securities business in banks can noticeably improve a
bank’s risk and return opportunities. He concluded that overseas insurance and securities
activities reduced risk for U.S. banks.
However, to our knowledge, there has been no empirical study available investigating
cross-sector integration in the U.S. financial industry. Only a handful of studies provide some
mixed evidence on universal banking in the European Union. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000)
studied M&As between banks and insurers in Europe and found that many of the events
increased combined value. Lang and Welzel (1998) found scope economies for small German
banks; Allen and Rai (1996) found very small scope economies of universal banking in the EU;
Vander Vennet (2002) showed limited evidence of scope economies of banking in the EU and no
consistent evidence of expansion path subadditivity.

37

U.S. BHCs are allowed to be involved in insurance and securities activities overseas by Federal Reserve
Regulation K. They are required to report separately on foreign bank activities with the Federal Reserve.
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CHAPTER 4
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BANKING/INSURANCE DATABASE
The regulatory data sets in the U.S. covering financial service firms are product specific, with no
convenient way to identify affiliations among companies across different product lines (i.e.,
bancassurers and assurbanks). Thus, one of the main efforts in this dissertation is to construct a
linking variable that allows us to match the unique company identifiers between the insurance
and bank regulatory data sets.
The data come from a variety of sources. The variable we develop links the unique
company identifiers in the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) insurance
data sets together with the identifiers in the Bank Holding Company Financial Report (BHCFR),
the Commercial Banks Call Report (CALL), and the Thrift Financial Report (TFR). These four
data sets contain financial and domicile information for almost all insurance companies, BHCs,
FHCs, commercial banks, and thrifts operating in the United States for our research period over
2003 – 2005. 38
To construct the linking variable, we first identify the list of insurance companies
affiliated with banks, if any, by using key word searches on the Federal Reserve Structure Report
(FEDSR) and the Thrift Holding Company Structure Report (THCFR), and by using selfreported answers to queries posed by insurance regulators as part of the annual oversight process
as reported on the General Interrogatories page of each company’s annual regulatory statements.
With supplementary information from the National Information Center Hierarchy Report
(NICHR), we can tie the BHCFR, TFR and CALL to FEDSR and THCFR by the core linkage
38

These datasets might miss some types of insurers or banks. For example, single-state insurers are not required to
report to the NAIC although some do; prior 2005 state-chartered commercial banks that were not insured by the
FDIC were not required to file CALL reports, but since 2005 all commercial banks are insured by FDIC.
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code assigned by the FRB. In the final step, we match the banking data to the insurance
regulatory data manually using company name, location and other domicile information required
to perform the merge.
Firms under common ownership in the combined data set are aggregated to the group
level. We aggregate separately the data of each group’s life, property-liability, commercial
banks, and saving bank subsidiaries to obtain the divisional totals. A firm is treated as a single
producer with up to four business divisions – life insurance division, property-liability insurance
division, commercial banking division, and thrift division. We eliminate inactive firms with zero
or negative total assets, liabilities, or net worth. Insurance companies with zero premium income
and banks with zero deposits are not viable business entities and, therefore, are also deleted.
After these deletions, the data sets have 90 joint producers, 1,346 insurance specialists, and 7,261
bank specialists for the year 2003. Since almost all joint producers are large, in this study we
focus on large financial institutions licensed as insurers or banks in the U.S. We then further
excluded joint producers with less than $1 billion total assets, banks with less than $1 billion
total assets, and insurers with less than $600 million total assets from the data sample. The final
data sample consists of 88 joint producers, 204 insurance specialists, and 461 bank specialists for
the year 2003.

These firms include 182 life insurers, 191 property-liability insurers, 437

commercial banks, and 185 thrifts. The firms included account for about 98 percent life
insurance industry assets, 94 percent property-liability insurance assets, 88 percent commercial
banks assets, and 81 percent thrifts assets. 39

39

The data shows the similar figures over the three year period 2003 – 2005. For example, the original data contains
90, 86 and 87 joint producers, 1346, 1401 and 1412 insurance specialists, 7261, 7110 and 7046 bank specialists for
the year 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively. The final data sample statistics are shown in Table 16.
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CHAPTER 5
ASSURBANKS AND BANCASSURERS: WHO ARE THEY?
In this section, we identify the major assurbanks and bancassurers in the post-GLB U.S. financial
industry and present summary statistics regarding their operations. Table 1 presents a summary
of assurbanks and bancassurers over the period 2003 – 2005. The statistical pattern seen in Table
1 is similar and stable over the three year period. 40
5.1. ASSURBANKS
By the end of 2003, 44 insurance groups had banking operations and were classified as
“assurbanks.” Table 2 Panel A lists the ten largest assurbanks for the year 2003 in terms of asset
size. MetLife, with $12.1 million net loss from its banking businesses, was the only insurer to
elect to be organized as an FHC under the GLB Act. By the end of 2003, 33 assurbanks utilized
the SLHC vehicle to enter into the banking market. The remaining assurbanks, grandfathered by
various exemption provisions, owned either non-bank banks or trust companies. Among the top
10 assurbanks, only AIG, ING, and Nationwide had net income gains from their banking
activities, with all others reporting losses in their banking subsidiaries. Of the 44 assurbanks
included in the study, 24 out of the 44 had net income gains from banking activities with an
average of 12.4 percent total net income earned from banking business (Table 1) while almost
half earned less than 3 percent profit from banking activities (median 2.3 percent).
ING Direct is a thrift subsidiary of ING Group. Its successful banking operation in the
U.S. makes it stand out from the others. Opened for business in September 2000, ING Direct has
become the country's largest internet-based bank and the fourth-largest thrift bank. As a
40
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standalone thrift division of the Dutch financial service conglomerate, ING Direct USA does not
cross-sell with its affiliates. It is a direct-to-the-customer operation, an internet-based savings
bank. There are no branches, no ATMs, and also no fees, no minimum deposits. Only a limited
number of products are offered: savings accounts, a few certificates of deposit, and a handful of
mutual funds. The simplicity of the model allows them to operate at very low cost. In some parts
of the business, they operate at one-sixth the cost of a conventional bank. Targeting the
homogeneous customers is part of their strategy to keep cost down. Low costs mean that ING
Direct can offer relatively high interest rates on deposits, which in turn attract potential
customers. Although ING Direct is an example of a conglomeration, it is one which affiliates
with various financial institutions but shows no effort to integrate. Instead, their standalone,
simple, straight forward business model creates their success.
5.2. BANCASSURERS
From the enactment date of GLB to the end of 2003, more than 630 BHCs have converted to
FHC status in the banking industry. Although the number of FHCs was much smaller than the
number of BHCs, these FHCs controlled 78 percent of all commercial banking assets as of the
first quarter of 2003. 41 For the year 2003, 44 top tier FHCs/BHCs 42 reported general insurance
underwriting business and 1,251 top tier FHCs/BHCs reported insurance agency business (with
or without insurance underwriting) in their regulatory financial report. Table 2 Panel B lists the
top 10 banking groups in terms of total insurance underwriting income. Not surprisingly,
Citigroup is at the top of the list. It is interesting to note that even though Citigroup spun off its
property-liability segment in 2002 and its life segment in 2005, 7.04 percent of its net income for
2003 was generated from its insurance businesses in the year 2003. Unlike the largest 10
41

Federal Reserve Board Report to Congress, 2003.
Top tier FHCs/BHCs are defined as FHCs or BHCs without parent holding companies, and lower tier
FHCs/BHCs are those owned by top tier FHCs/BHCs.
42
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assurbanks, all the top 10 bancassurers reported gains in their insurance underwriting
subsidiaries in 2003.
Table 1 shows that bancassurers average 19.5 percent of total group net income from
insurance underwriting, but half average less than 3 percent. As fee income has become a more
important source of revenue for banks, these banking groups average 8.09 percent non-interest
income from insurance agency and underwriting income (median 3.99 percent). In addition to
insurance underwriting, many banking groups sell insurance products through agencies they
own. We identify 1,251 FHCs/BHCs that conduct insurance business only as agents. For banks
acting as agents only, their insurance agency business accounts for 5.6 percent of their total noninterest income (median 1.72 percent). For the thrift sector, only 9 thrifts took advantage of the
OTS rules allowing insurance underwriting subsidiaries without becoming an FHC. Except for
Washington Mutual Bank Group, these thrifts are much smaller in size and have inconsequential
effects on the thrift industry. Therefore we do not discuss them here separately.

29

CHAPTER 6
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN INTEGRATION
In this section, we analyze the post-GLB U.S. insurance and banking industries from the aspects
of industry structure and firm performance. Individual insurers are divided into three groups:
Non-affiliated insurance companies (those without any affiliation with banks either through
direct control or through holding companies to which they belong); assurbanking-affiliated
insurance companies 43 (insurers affiliated with banks by either directly owning banks or through
their insurance holding companies); bancassurance-affiliated insurance companies 44 (those
directly owned by banks or owned through their insurance holding companies owned by banks);
and bank-affiliated insurance companies (referring either to assurbanking-affiliated or
bancassurance-affiliated insurance companies.
6.1. MARKET STRUCTURE – DISTRIBUTION AND SIZE OF FIRMS
As reported in Table 3, our data sample contains 36 assurbanking-affiliated life insurance
companies, 36 bancassurance-affiliated life insurance companies, and 110 non-affiliated life
insurance companies for the year 2003. These assurbanking-affiliated life insurance companies
represented 19.8 percent of the life insurers in number, but accounted for 57.7 percent of total
assets, 51.6 percent of premiums written, and 53.4 percent of net income. Representing 19.8
percent of the life insurance companies, the bancassurance-affiliated life insurers accounted for
only 7.3 percent of total assets, 7.0 percent of premiums written, and 9.8 percent of net income.
The 60.4 percent non-affiliated life insurers took the remaining one-third life insurance market
share.
43
44

In other words, assurbanking-affiliated insurance companies are insurance subsidiaries of assurbanks.
In other words, bancassurance-affiliated insurance companies are insurance subsidiaries of bancassurers.
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Table 3.1 shows the distribution of property-liability insurers. In 2003, 25 assurbankingaffiliated property-liability insurance companies represented 13.1 percent of the firms in number
and approximately one-third of industry assets, premiums written and profits. The 22
bancassurance-affiliated property-liability insurers held 3.5 percent property-liability industry
assets. The remaining 144 non-affiliated property-liability insurers controlled an approximate
two-thirds share of the industry assets, premiums written, and net income. This pattern suggests
that banks appear less interested in the property-liability sector compared with the life sector, and
support the argument that banks are more likely to begin their insurance business in the life
sector (Carow, 2001b).
Table 4 and 4.1 show the average firm size in terms of total assets, premiums written, and
net income. Assurbanking-affiliated life and property-liability insurers were significantly larger
than non-affiliated and bancassurance-affiliated insurers regardless of the metric used.
Bancassurance-affiliated life and property-liability insurers were the smallest, but the average
bancassurance-affiliated life insurer was not statistically different from the average non-affiliated
life insurers in terms of total assets and net income.
6.2. FIRM PERFORMANCE
In this section, we first discuss the insurer’s A.M. Best Strength Rating, the business geographic
patterns, and the product mix and diversifications. We then explore the operating performance of
the three insurer groups’ (non-affiliated, assurbanking-affiliated, and bancassurance-affiliated)
by conducting profitability, leverage, and liquidity tests.
6.2.1. A.M. BEST RATINGS
A.M. Best’s Financial Strength Rating is an independent rating based on a comprehensive
quantitative and qualitative evaluation of an insurance company's balance sheet strength,
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operating performance, and business profile.

Best’s ratings scale areas follows: A++, A+

(Superior); A, A- (Excellent); B++, B+ (Very Good); B, B- (Fair); C++, C+ (Marginal); C, C(Weak); D (Poor); E (Under Regulatory Supervision); F (In Liquidation); S (Rating
Suspended). 45 Table 5 Panel A shows that 83 percent of assurbanking-affiliated life insurers had
A.M. Best ratings of A- or higher, compared with 58 percent of bancassurance-affiliated life
insurers and 68 percent of non-affiliated life insurers. For property-liability insurers, 89 percent
of assurbanking-affiliated property-liability insurers, 62 percent of bancassurance-affiliated
property-liability insurers, and 78 percent of non-affiliated property-liability insurers had A.M.
Best ratings of A- or higher (Table 5 Panel B). Thus, insurance companies that have banking
subsidiaries tend to have higher ratings than those owned by banks or non-affiliated insurers.
6.2.2. GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSIFICATION
We now examine insurers’ business geographic patterns by calculating the number of states in
which they are licensed. We can interpret from Table 6 that, on average, assurbanking-affiliated
insurers were more geographically diversified. For example, half of assurbanking-affiliated life
insurers obtained licenses and conducted business in 48 and more states, and similarly half of
assurbanking-affiliated property-liability insurers were licensed and conducted business in 45 or
more states. Bancassurance-affiliated life insurers were the least geographically diversified
compared with non-affiliated and assurbanking-affiliated in 2003.
6.2.3. PRODUCT MIX AND DIVERSIFICATION
We then examine insurers’ product mix and diversifications. We categorize life insurance
products as individual life, individual annuity, credit life, group life, group annuity, and accident
& health insurance; we categorize the property-liability products as personal property, personal

45

Best’s Key Rating Guide, 2004 Edition.
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liability, commercial property, and commercial liability. 46 Table 7 Panel A demonstrates that
bank-affiliated life insurers were more interested in personal products, especially individual
annuities and credit life compared with non-affiliated life insurers. This evidence suggests that
affiliation with banks plays an important role in developing a business portfolio because of
banks’ business in selling annuities and credit life insurance. Bank-affiliated life insurers
accounted for approximately one-third of each product line in number, but their premium income
share was more than 60 percent of each sub-market except for accident & health insurance. For
the property-liability sector, the pattern is that bank-affiliated property-liability insurers were
more interested in personal products than commercial products. Bank-affiliated property-liability
insurance companies represented no more than one-fourth of each property-liability product
market in number, but accounted for about 50 percent of the personal products underwriting and
one-third of commercial products underwriting (Table 7.1).
Since we know bank-affiliated insurance companies are more diversified across
industries, it is interesting to ask whether they are also more diversified on their traditional
products within the insurance sector. Some studies have suggested efficiency gains and
economies of scale and scope in U.S. insurance industry. 47 Such efficiency gains may prompt
these within-industry diversified insurers to extend to the banking industry. The results support
this hypothesis. Table 8 shows the products Herfindahl Index for life and property-liability
insurers. 48 Table 8 Panel A and Panel B show that compared with specialized insurers, bank-

46

Leverty (2005), Cummins and Phillips (2005), Cummins et al. (2003), Berger et al. (2000). Table 15 lists the
detail product and line of business definitions.
47
For the life insurance industry only, see: Cummins and Zi (1998), Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1999),
Cummins and Weiss (2000), Segal (2003). For the property-liability industry only, see: Cummins and Weiss (1993).
For the life and property-liability insurance, see: Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2000), Cummins, Weiss, and Zi
(2003).
48
The product Herfindahl Index for an insurer producing n types of products is measured as (P1^2 + P2^2 + …+
Pn^2 ) / (P1 + P2 + … + Pn)^2, where Pi is the ith product net premium written. Insurance products include
property-liability insurance (personal short-tail lines, personal long-tail lines, commercial short-tail lines, and
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affiliated insurance companies were more diversified within both life and property-liability
insurance markets.
6.2.4. OVERALL PERFORMANCE – ROA, ROE
We use the widely accepted measures return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), to
compare insurers’ overall performance. The results in Table 9 suggest that in the life insurance
sector, assurbanking-affiliated insurers had significantly higher ROE. Among the three insurance
groups, ROA was not statistically significant. In the property-liability sector, interestingly,
bancassurance-affiliated insurers, on average, had the highest ROA and ROE, and the difference
is significant. Assurbanking-affiliated property insurers had significantly higher ROA and ROE
than the non-affiliated. Generally, bank-affiliated insurers had better overall profitability than
non-affiliated insurers in the year 2003.
6.2.5. PROFITABILITY TEST
In this section, we compare the profitability of life insurers using accounting measures of
profitability widely used in the industry and commonly accepted by regulators:
(1)

Total Benefits Paid as a percentage of Net Premiums Written -- Total benefits
paid include death benefits, matured endowments, annuity benefits, accident and
health benefits, disability and surrender benefits, and other miscellaneous
benefits.

(2)

Commissions and Expenses Incurred as a percentage of Net Premiums Written -Commissions and expenses include payments on both direct and assumed
business, general insurance expenses, insurance taxes, licenses and fees, increase
in loading and other miscellaneous expenses, and exclude commissions and
expense allowances received on reinsurance ceded.

(3)

Net Operating Gain (after taxes) as a percentage of Total Assets -- Total assets are
the mean of current and prior year admitted assets; and this ratio measures
insurance earnings in relation to the company's total asset base.

commercial long-tail lines) and life insurance (individual life insurance, individual annuity, group life insurance,
group annuity, and accident and health insurance). The property-liability insurer products and lines of business
definitions are listed in Table 15.
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(4)

Yield on Invested Assets – The ratio of annual net investment income divided by
investment assets. Investment assets are the mean of current and prior year cash
and invested assets plus accrued investment income minus borrowed money.

Table 10.1 Panel A shows that bank-affiliated life insurance companies performed better
in terms of insurance expense ratio and net operating gains to assets. Bank-owned life insurers
had significantly lower investment yield. However, they had a higher benefit incurred ratio than
non-affiliated life insurers. Assurbanking-affiliated life insurers had a significantly higher
investment yield. The difference on the benefits paid as a percentage of net premiums written
was not statistically significant among the life insurers.
For property-liability insurers, we compare five profitability measures:
(1)

Loss Ratio -- The ratio of incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses to Net
Premiums Earned. This ratio measures the company's underlying profitability or
loss experience on its total book of business.

(2)

Expense Ratio -- The ratio of underwriting expenses (including commissions) to
Net Premiums Written. This ratio measures the company's operational efficiency
in underwriting its book of business.

(3)

Combined Ratio -- This ratio is the sum of the Loss Ratio and Expense Ratio. It
measures a company's overall underwriting profitability. A combined ratio of less
than one indicates the company has reported an underwriting profit.

(4)

Yield on Invested Assets -- The ratio of annual net investment income divided by
the mean of cash and net invested assets. This ratio measures the average return
on a company's invested assets, before capital gains or losses and income taxes.

(5)

Return on Policyholders' Surplus (PHS) -- This ratio measures a company's
efficiency in utilizing its surplus on a total return basis. "Return" is calculated as
the overall after-tax profit from underwriting and investment activity, including
unrealized capital gains.

Table 10.1 Panel B summarizes the profitability tests for property-liability insurers. It
shows that bank-affiliated property-liability insurance companies had a significantly lower loss
ratio compared with non-affiliated property-liability insurers. Although their expense ratio was
higher, it was offset by the lower loss ratio and led to lower combined ratios. Similar to
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assurbanking-affiliated life insurers, assurbanking-affiliated property-liability insurers had the
best investment earnings with an average investment yield of 4.6 percent. The ratio of return on
PHS indicated that bank-affiliated property-liability insurers, including both assurbankingaffiliated and bancassurance-affiliated, were more efficient in utilizing their surplus on a total
return basis.
6.2.6. LEVERAGE TEST
Following industry accepted measures of leverage, we compare the following life insurers’
operating leverage measures:
(1)

Net Premium Written to Capital and Surplus -- This ratio reflects the leverage of
the company's current volume of net business in relation to its capital and surplus
after reinsurance assumed and ceded. This test measures the company's exposure
to pricing errors in its current book of business.

(2)

Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) -- The BCAR compares an insurer’s
adjusted surplus relative to the required capital necessary to support its operating
and investment risks. 49

(3)

Capital and Surplus to Liability -- This test measures the relationship of capital
and surplus to the company's unpaid obligations after reinsurance assumed and
ceded. It reflects the extent to which the company has levered its capital and
surplus base. On an individual company basis, this ratio will vary due to
differences in product mix, balance sheet quality, and spread of insurance risk.

(4)

Reinsurance Leverage Ratio -- The relationship of total reserves ceded plus
commissions and expenses due on reinsurance ceded plus other refunds due or
recoverable from reinsurers to total capital and surplus.

Table 10.2 Panel A shows that the ratio of NPW to surplus was statistically lower for
bancassurance-affiliated life insurers than for bancassurance-affiliated and non-affiliated life
insurers in 2003. About 50 percent of assurbanking-affiliated and non-affiliated life insurers had
“strong balance sheet” BCARs (median 174 percent, 163 percent, respectively), while

49

Life insurers with a BCAR score of more than 100 percent are considered to have "adequate" balance sheet
strength, and firms with a BCAR score of more than 175 percent are believed to have a “very strong” balance sheet.
Risk Based Capital ratio is also shown, which shows the consistent results with BCAR.
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bancassurance-affiliated life insurers had much more secure BCARs (median 194 percent). The
evidence suggests that bank-owned life insurers were more securely capitalized. This argument
can also be supported by the capital-to-liability ratio where we see that bancassurance-affiliated
life insurers had significantly higher capital-to-liability ratios compared with assurbankingaffiliated and non-affiliated life insurers. The results of the reinsurance leverage ratio test suggest
that bank-affiliated life insurers used less reinsurance than non-affiliated life insurers. In sum,
assurbanking-affiliated life insurers carried the highest leverage ratio, and bancassuranceaffiliated life insurers were significantly less levered than non-affiliated insurers at the end of
2003.
For property-liability insurers we look at the following industry accepted measures of
leverage:
(1)

Net Premium Written to Policyholders' Surplus -- This ratio measures an insurer’s
net retained premium in relation to its surplus and the company’s exposure to
pricing errors in its current book of business.

(2)

Net Leverage Ratio -- This ratio equals the sum of an insurer's Net Premiums
Written to Policyholders' Surplus Ratio and the Net Liabilities to Policyholders'
Surplus Ratio. It measures the combination of a company's net exposure to pricing
errors in its current book of business and errors of estimation in its net liabilities
after reinsurance, in relation to policyholders' surplus.

(3)

Gross Leverage Ratio -- This ratio equals the sum of Net Leverage and Ceded
Reinsurance Leverage. 50 It measures a company's gross exposure to pricing errors
in the current book of business, to errors of estimating its liabilities, and exposure
to its reinsurers.

(4)

Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) -- The BCAR compares an insurer’s
adjusted surplus relative to the required capital necessary to support its operating
and investment risks. 51

50

Ceded Reinsurance Leverage is calculated as reinsurance recoverable, ceded balances payable and ceded
premiums written, less funds held, divided by policyholders' surplus.
51
Property-Liability insurers are deemed to have "adequate" balance sheet strength if they generate a BCAR score
of over 100 percent, and deemed to have “very strong” balance sheet strength if generating a BCAR score over 200
percent.
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Table 10.2 Panel B shows that bancassurance-affiliated property-liability insurers had the
lowest NPW to PHS ratio. But the difference among insurers was not significant. The bankaffiliated property-liability insurers presented lower net leverage ratio and gross leverage ratio
than non-affiliated insurers, but the gross leverage ratio was not significantly different between
bank-affiliated and non-affiliated property-liability insurers. On average, all the property-liability
insurers had “very strong balance sheet strength” with higher than 200 percent BCAR. However,
the average BCAR for bancassurance-affiliated property-liability insurers was about 50 percent
higher than the average BCAR for assurbanking-affiliated and non-affiliated insurers. In sum,
non-affiliated property-liability insurers were more levered than the bank-affiliated ones, and
assurbanking-affiliated property-liability insurers were more levered than the bancassuranceaffiliated in 2003.
6.2.7. LIQUIDITY TEST
We calculate four liquidity ratios for life insurers:
(1)

Quick Liquidity Ratio -- The ratio of unaffiliated quick assets to liabilities. 52 This
test measures the proportion of liabilities covered by cash and quickly convertible
investments. It indicates a company's ability to meet its maturing obligations
without requiring the sale of long-term investments or the borrowing of money.

(2)

Current Liquidity Ratio -- The ratio of unaffiliated invested assets to liabilities,
excluding mortgages and real estate. It measures the proportion of liabilities
covered by cash, and it measures unaffiliated investment assets holdings.

(3)

Operating Cash Flow to Total Assets -- Operating cash flow is the change in cash
and invested assets attributable to net underwriting and net investment income
after policyholder dividends and federal income taxes. It measures a company’s
ability to meet current obligations through the internal generation of funds from
insurance operations. Negative balances typically indicate unprofitable
underwriting results or low yielding assets.

(4)

Non-Investment Grade Bonds to Capital -- This test measures exposure to noninvestment grade bonds as a percentage of capital and surplus. Generally, non-

52

Quick assets include 80 percent of unaffiliated common stock, cash, short-term investments, Government bonds
maturing in five years or less and all other bonds (excluding affiliates) maturing in one year or less.
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investment grade bonds carry higher default and liquidity risks. The designation
as non-investment grade utilizes the bond quality classifications, which coincide
with different bond ratings assigned by major credit rating agencies.
Table 10.3 Panel A consistently shows that bancassurance-affiliated life insurers had
higher liquidity ratios but lower operating cash flows than their non-affiliated and assurbankingaffiliated counterparts at the year-end 2003. In addition, they invested the least in non-investment
grade bonds. Non-affiliated life insurers had the lowest quick and current liquidity ratios and the
difference was significant.
The liquidity ratios used for property-liability insurers are similar to those used for life
insurers: the quick liquidity, current liquidity, operating cash flow ratio, and ratio of noninvestment grade bonds to PHS. Table 10.3 Panel B shows similar liquidity rations between
property-liability insurers and life insurance companies. Bancassurance-affiliated propertyliability insurers had significantly higher liquidity ratios but lower operating cash flows than
non-affiliated and assurbanking-affiliated property-liability insurers, and they invested the least
in non-investment grade bonds. Non-affiliated property-liability insurers had the lowest quick
and current liquidity ratios, and they invested the most in the non-investment grade bonds. The
evidence suggests that insurance subsidiaries of assurbanks and bancassurers retained more
costly liquid and short-term assets, and showed prudence on settling their outstanding liabilities.
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CHAPTER 7
THE BANKING INDUSTRY IN INTEGRATION
The GLB Act generally creates three main types of banks in terms of cross-industry integration.
Non-affiliated Commercial Banks (CBs) are those without any affiliation (either direct control or
through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies. Bancassurance-affiliated
Commercial Banks (CBs) 53 are those affiliated with insurance companies by directly holding
insurers or through their FHCs/BHCs, which own insurance companies. Assurbanking-affiliated
Commercial Banks (CBs) 54 are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their
FHCs/BHCs, which are owned by insurers. Insurer-affiliated Commercial Banks (CBs) refer to
either assurbanking-affiliated or bancassurance-affiliated commercial banks. Similarly, in the
thrift savings industry, there are Non-affiliated Saving Banks (SBs), Bancassurance-affiliated
Saving Banks (SBs), Assurbanking-affiliated Saving Banks (SBs), and Insurer-affiliated Saving
Banks (SBs).
We identify 110 FHCs/BHCs reporting insurance underwriting income in their required
financial reports to the Federal Reserve Board. However, some of the bancassurers have only inhouse insurance underwriting, such as credit-related insurance and mortgage-related insurance.
Some of these bancassurers have insurance subsidiaries not filing reports with the NAIC, such as
title insurance companies, captive insurance companies, and single state insurers. 55 In addition,
according to Regulation K, banks are allowed to own insurance subsidiaries overseas, which are
not required to file with the NAIC if are not involved in domestic business. Thus, in this section,

53

In other words, bancassurance-affiliated commercial banks are the banking subsidiaries of bancassurers.
In other words, assurbanking-affiliated commercial banks are the banking subsidiaries of assurbanks.
55
For example, Banknorth Group owned Northgroup Captive Insurance Inc., and First Merchants Corporation
owned Indiana Title Insurance Company.
54
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we present statistics for the insurer-affiliated CBs or SBs that have insurer affiliates filing with
the NAIC. The non-affiliated CBs or SBs include banks subsidiaries of those FHCs/BHCs,
which report insurance underwriting income to the FRB but have no insurance subsidiaries filing
with the NAIC.
By analyzing the business profile of these FHCs/BHCs (bancassurers with no insurance
subsidiaries), we find that the insurance business they conducted mainly supported their banking
business or just appeared to be by-products supporting the banking operations, such as credit
related insurance and mortgage insurance. Because these banks are different from bancassurers
with full line insurance subsidiaries, 56 we classify them as non-affiliated commercial banks with
insurance underwriting business reported. The assurbanking-affiliated CBs are all small trust
banks or grandfathered non-bank banks. Since they are small in size and no more than 10 in
number, we merge these banks to bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Hence, we have the following
structure for CBs:
Commercial Banks (CBs):
•

Bancassurance-affiliated CBs

•

Non-affiliated CBs
o Non-affiliated INS CBs --- with insurance underwriting
o Non-affiliated NOINS CBs --- without insurance underwriting

7.1. MARKET STRUCTURE – DISTRIBUTION AND SIZE OF FIRMS
The data sample contains 48 bancassurance-affiliated CBs, 46 non-affiliated INS CBs, and 343
non-affiliated NOINS CBs for the year 2003. Table 11 shows that bancassurance-affiliated CBs
represented 11 percent of the commercial banks in number, but they accounted for over half of
56

In 2003, 44 FHCs/BHCs with general insurance underwriter subsidiaries are identified and included in our data.
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the total assets, deposits, and net income of the market. Non-affiliated INS CBs were 10.5
percent of the commercial banks in number and about 20 percent of market total assets, deposits,
and net income. So, important players in the commercial banking industry have been involved in
the insurance underwriting business through either in-house production or manufacturing
affiliates. The remaining non-affiliated NOINS CBs represented the majority of the commercial
banking market in number (78.5 percent), but they accounted for only one-fourth market share in
terms of total assets, deposits, and net income.
In the thrift sector, 39 assurbanking-affiliated SBs, 14 bancassurance-affiliated SBs, and
132 non-affiliated SBs were identified. Similar to the commercial banking sector, bancassuranceaffiliated SBs were 7.6 percent of the thrift saving market in number and accounted for a 29.1
percent share of the total assets, 27.6 percent of deposits, and 33.4 percent of net income (Table
11.1). Assurbanking-affiliated SBs were 21.1 percent of the thrifts in number, 5 percent of the
total assets, 6.3 percent of deposits, and 2.7 percent of net income. Non-affiliated SBs
represented the remaining 71.4 percent of thrifts in number and approximately two-thirds of
industry total assets, deposits, and net income.
Table 12 and 12.1 show the average bank size in terms of total assets, deposits, and net
income. Table 12 shows a pattern that on average bancassurance-affiliated CBs were
significantly larger than non-affiliated ones regardless of the metric used. However, the variance
on firm size was higher among bancassurance-affiliated CBs than non-affiliated INS CBs. 57 The
firm size disparity in the thrift industry is shown in Table 12.1. We can see a significant firm size
difference: assurbanking-affiliated SBs are significantly smaller than bancassurance-affiliated
SBs and non-affiliated SBs. Although bancassurance-affiliated SBs on average were the largest
57

Our data sample contains large banks with at least $1 billion assets, which include the large wholesales banks,
e.g., Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo. These giant banks are kept in the data sample in the
univariate analysis, but are excluded in the later scope efficiency analysis.
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among SBs, the size difference is not statistically significant. Because of the super large thrifts in
the data, e.g., Washington Mutual, Golden West Financial, the variance on firm size is much
higher among bancassurance-affiliated SBs. The evidence suggests that large commercial and
saving banks are more likely to affiliate with full line insurance companies, and insurance
companies are more likely to extend their traditional business to banks through relative smallsize thrifts.
7.2. FIRM PERFORMANCE
7.2.1. PORTFOLIO OF BANKING PRODUCTS
The traditional banking products are deposits on the liability side of the balance sheet and loans
on the asset side. We compare three banking product measures: total deposits, interest bearing
deposits, and total loans and leases. Total deposits include deposits and savings accounts that
either require interest payments or are not allowed to pay interest. Interest bearing deposits
include only those requiring interest payments, such as savings accounts and time deposits. Total
loans and leases include loans to individuals, commercial and industrial loans, and all other loans
and leases. Table 13 Panel A shows the average total deposits, interest bearing deposits and total
loan and lease. To control for size effects they are scaled by assets. The evidence indicates that
non-affiliated NOINS CBs had more deposits than non-affiliated INS CBs and bancassuranceaffiliated CBs. And non-affiliated INS CBs had more deposits than bancassurance-affiliated
CBs. The differences were statistically significant. On the asset side, bancassurance-affiliated
CBs had statistically less loan portfolios than non-affiliated CBs. Non-affiliated NOINS CBs in
turn had significantly more loan portfolios than bancassurance-affiliated CBs.
In the thrift sector, Table 13 Panel B shows that non-affiliated SBs had significantly more
deposits compared with assurbanking-affiliated and bancassurance-affiliated SBs. On the asset
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side, assurbanking-affiliated SBs had statistically less loans portfolios than other SBs. Loan
portfolio differences between bancassurance-affiliated SBs and non-affiliated SBs were not
statistically significant. The evidence suggests that, on average, CBs and SBs without insurance
business had more deposits and loans than those with insurance business or affiliates in 2003.
7.2.2. INTEREST INCOME AND NON-INTEREST INCOME
In this section, we compare the interest income, non-interest income, and ratio of non-interest
income to interest income between banks. Interest income is the main source of revenue for
banks and includes interest and fee income on loans, income from lease financing receivables,
interest income on balances due from depository institutions, interest and dividend income on
securities, and other interest income. Non-interest income comes from fiduciary activities,
service charges on deposit accounts, investment banking, advisory, brokerage, and underwriting
fees and commissions. To control for the size effect, we scale the interest income and noninterest income by total asset. Table 13.1 Panel A indicates that, on average, bancassuranceaffiliated CBs had significantly higher interest income and non-interest income than nonaffiliated CBs. We then calculate the ratio of non-interest income to interest income. The results
show that both the mean and median measure presented the same trend, and the measures
indicate that bancassurance-affiliated CBs conducted significantly more non-interest related
business than non-affiliated CBs.
The evidence in the thrift saving industry is shown in Table 13.1 Panel B. Assurbankingaffiliated SBs had the lowest interest income, but the highest non-interest income was seen in the
thrift saving sector. The interest income of the non-affiliated and the bancassurance-affiliated
were not statistically different. The interest thing is that non-affiliated SBs had a significantly
higher ratio of non-interest income to interest income than both bancassurance-affiliated and
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assurbanking-affiliated SBs. It suggests that for non-interest income generating business, bankaffiliated saving banks were involved less in the non-insurance related business.
7.2.3. OVERALL PERFORMANCE – ROA, ROE, AND NET OPERATING
INCOME TO ASSETS
We follow the widely accepted measures, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and
net operating income to assets ratio to compare banks’ overall performance. In the commercial
banking sector, those affiliating with insurers or conducting limited insurance underwriting
business had consistently higher ROA, ROE, and net operating income to assets ratios than those
without any insurance business (Table 14 Panel A). The evidence in thrift saving sector is
different: on average assurbanking-affiliated saving banks performed worse in 2003 than the
other two SBs groups (Table 14 Panel B), even showing negative average ROE and showing net
operating losses. This evidence suggests that although assurbanking-affiliated SBs had profitable
interest business (discussed next), their lower non-interest related return still couldn’t be offset
and, as a result, it contributed to their lower overall return.
7.2.4. INTEREST MARGIN AND NON-INTEREST MARGIN
The interest margin and non-interest margin measure the profitability of banks and are two
important ratios in evaluating banks’ performance and conditions. Interest margin is defined as
the dollar difference between interest income and interest expense as a percentage of earning
assets. Similarly, the non-interest margin is defined as the dollar difference between non-interest
income and non-interest expense as a percentage of earning assets. Table 14.1 Panel A indicates
that, on average, bancassurance-affiliated CBs had significantly higher interest and non-interest
margins than non-affiliated CBs. And non-affiliated INS CBs had significantly higher noninterest margins but lower interest margins than non-affiliated NOINS CBs. The evidence in the
thrift saving industry is different. Table 14.1 Panel B shows that bancassurance-affiliated SBs
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had the highest interest margins and assurbanking-affiliated SBs had the lowest interest and noninterest margins among thrift institutions. However, all three thrifts groups showed negative noninterest margins on average in 2003.
7.2.5. RBC RATIO, LOAN TO DEPOSIT RATIO, AND NET CHARGE-OFF TO
LOAN RATIO
In this section, we compare three key ratios highly monitored by bank regulators. These are the
risk-based capital (RBC) ratio, the loan to deposit (LTD) ratio, and the net charge-offs to loan
ratio. Bank capital performs several important functions. The FDIC Rules and Regulations, Part
325 Appendix A - Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, establish a risk adjusted capital
framework; they are used in the examination and supervisory process of the bank. The risk-based
framework includes a definition of capital for risk-based capital purposes, a system for
calculating risk-weighted assets by assigning assets and off-balance sheet items to broad risk
categories, and a minimum supervisory ratio of risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets, which
is the risk-based capital ratio. 58 Table 14.2 Panel A and B show RBC ratios for the commercial
banking sector and the thrift sector, respectively. In the commercial banking industry,
bancassurance-affiliated CBs had significantly higher RBC ratios than non-affiliated CBs. In the
thrifts, the evidence is different: assurbanking-affiliated SBs had the highest RBC ratios.
Bancassurance-affiliated SBs had the lower RBC ratios than non-affiliated SBs, but the
difference was not significant. Incorporating the evidence discussed in Chapter 6, these results
indicate that commercial banking and insurance subsidiaries of bancassurers presented higher
RBC ratios in the banking and insurance industry. Thrift subsidiaries of assurbanks showed the
58

Risk-based capital standard serves as a useful tool for assessing banks’ capital adequacy ; it is considered a
capital measure that is more explicitly and systematically sensitive to the risk profiles of individual banks. Under
the risk-based framework, a bank's qualifying total capital base consists of two types of capital elements, "core
capital elements" (Tier 1) and "supplementary capital elements" (Tier 2). To qualify as an element of Tier 1 or Tier 2
capital, a capital instrument should not contain or be subject to any conditions, covenants, terms, restrictions, or
provisions that are inconsistent with safe and sound banking practices. Total risk-based capital is the sum of Tier 1
capital and Tier 2 capital.
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highest RBC ratios in the thrift saving industry, and insurance subsidiaries of assurbanks
presented market average RBC ratios in the insurance industry.
The loan to deposit (LTD) ratio is used as a measure of liquidity in banking sector; it
often receives the most attention. The LTD ratio, measured as the value of a bank's gross
outstanding loans divided by total deposits, indicates the percentage of a bank's loans funded
through deposits. An upswing in the LTD may indicate that a bank has less of a cushion to fund
its growth and to protect itself against a sudden recall of its funding, especially a bank that relies
on deposits to fund growth. The evidence in Table 14.2 Panel A shows that non-affiliated
NOINS CBs’ had the lowest LTD ratio suggesting that they had higher liquidity than those
commercial banks with insurance business or affiliated with insurers. In the thrift saving sector,
bancassurance-affiliated SBs showed the lowest liquidity level and non-affiliated SBs had lower
liquidity levels than assurbanking-affiliated SBs, but the difference was not statistically
significant (Table 14.2 Panel B).
Charge-offs are loans written off as uncollectable by the banks and are loans recognized
as losses. Charge-offs are measured on a net basis and are calculated as loans charged off as
losses minus recoveries on loans preciously charged off. The net charge-off ratio is calculated as
net loan charge-offs divided by the total loans. 59 Table 14.2 Panel A shows that bancassuranceaffiliated CBs had statistically higher loan charge-off ratios than non-affiliated INS CBs, and
non-affiliated INS CBs had higher loan charge-off ratios than non-affiliated NOINS CBs. This
suggests that commercial banks affiliated with insurers had higher losses on default loans than
those with in-house insurance business. And commercial banks with in-house insurance
59

A similar measure of bank’s performance on loan is the allowance for loan losses, which was originally referred
to as the “reserve for bad debts,” and is a valuation reserve established and maintained by charges against the bank’s
operating income. As a valuation reserve, it is an estimate of uncollectible amounts that is used to reduce the book
value of loans and leases to the amount that is expected to be collected (“Allowance to Loan and Lease Loss,” OCC,
1998). We calculate the loan allowance ratio of a bank and find similar evidence as the loan charge-off ratio.
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underwriting business had higher losses on default loans than those without any insurance
affiliates or insurance underwriting business. For savings banks, Table 14.2 Panel B presents
similar evidence. Insurance-affiliated SBs (including bancassurance-affiliated and assurbankingaffiliated) had significantly higher loan charge-off ratios than non-affiliated SBs.
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CHAPTER 8
SCOPE ECONOMIES IN FINANCIAL SERVICES:
A SURVEY OF THE EVIDENCE
Financial services integration is broadly defined as a financial service group's participation in
more than one of the major sectors of the financial service industry either in-house or through
separately capitalized subsidiaries. In this dissertation, we further classify financial service
integration as being either within-sector integration or cross-sector integration. Within-sector
integration involves offering multiple financial products within the same sector of the financial
industry. Cross-sector integration involves offering a broad range of financial products in two or
more sectors of the financial industry. 60 We specifically focus on cross-sector integration and
refer to financial services cross-sector integration as “financial integration” in short.
One of the important elements in the current debate is the effect integration has on the
efficiency of financial institutions. The most commonly quoted source of potential gains from
cross-sector integration is the exploitation of scope economies (Herring and Santomero, 1990;
Saunders and Walter, 1994; Calomiris, 1998; Berger, 2000; Yeager, Yeager and Harshman,
2004). The scope efficiency gains can be created, for example, by providing customers the
consumption complementarities (“one-stop shopping” convenience); sharing such physical
inputs as computers, furniture, or offices; employing common information systems, distribution
systems, or services department; reusing managerial expertise; obtaining external capital by
issuing securities in larger sizes. However, scope diseconomies may also arise at the same time
because of organizational diseconomies, higher administration and coordination expenses,
60

Within-sector integration occurs when, for example, a commercial bank expands its banking business by acquiring
another commercial bank, or an insurance holding company owning only life insurance subsidiaries acquires a
property-liability insurance company. Cross-sector integration occurs when, for example, a bank holding company
launches an insurance subsidiary, or an insurance group offers banking products through its banking subsidiaries.
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principal-agent conflicts, cross-subsidization in internal capital markets, or losing specialization
expertise when customers need specially tailored products. Therefore, it is particularly important
to evaluate scope and product mix efficiencies of financial conglomerates (e.g., bancassurers and
assurbanks).
The remainder of this dissertation investigates scope economies of the cross-sector

integration in the post-GLB U.S. insurance and banking industries across costs, revenue and
profit measures. This chapter briefly reviews the concept of scope economies and discusses the
prior literature concerning cost scope economies, revenue scope economies, and profit scope
economies in the financial services industries.
8.1. COST SCOPE ECONOMIES
Cost scope economies refer to the reduction of the average total production costs through the
production of a wider variety of goods or services. For cross-sector integration, cost scope
economies may be realized from the sharing of physical inputs such as computers, software,
furniture, or offices; reusing managerial expertise and experience; raising external capital at
lower costs because of reduced risks; and employing common service functions, such as
distribution, advertisement, or investment. One of the most desirable things about joint
production is that commercial bank and insurer integration may lower total costs by cross-selling
and by using a joint customer database and using information at a lower cost. 61 However, cost
scope diseconomies may also arise from the integration because of higher coordination and
administrative costs, and organizational diseconomies may arise when producing or distributing
a broad range of products.
61

Jappelli and Pagano (2002) showed that by using a common information system or reusing gathered information,
integrated financial institutions can diminish the adverse selection problem and reduce their default rate in credit
markets. Mester, Nakamura and Renault (2002) offered empirical evidence showing that information gathered from
different financial services gave an advantage to institutions that combined these services over other lending
institutions.
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Some studies exist estimating the cost scope efficiencies of providing multiple products
within a single financial institution. These studies evaluate cost scope economies of within-sector
products (e.g., commercial loans and consumer loans) rather than cross-sector products (e.g.,
commercial loans and life insurance policies). Within the U.S. banking sector, the evidence was
mixed and most studies found no substantial evidence of cost scope economies in commercial
banks or in savings and loans (e.g., Mester, 1987, 1993; Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Pulley and
Humphrey, 1993; Ferrier, et al., 1993; Jagtiani, Nathan, and Sick, 1995; and Rogers, 1998). 62
Two papers found evidence of cost scope diseconomies arising from the coordination and
administrative costs of banks offering a broad range of products (Cebenoyan, 1990; Winton,
1999). As for the evidence in Europe, Cavallo and Rossi (2001) examined six EU countries and
found consistent cost scope economies at all production levels, suggesting that cost scope
economies can increase as banks move towards the universal banking model. Valverde and
Fernandez (2005) examined Spanish banks and found significant cost scope economies when
incorporating off-balance sheet business.
Within the insurance sector, Grace and Timme (1992) found no significant cost scope
economies for the largest 423 U.S. life insurance companies. Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi
(2000) focused on both the U.S. life and property-liability insurance sectors for the period 19881992 and found cost scope economies for firms in all size quartiles when those firms jointly
offered life and property-liability insurance. A more recent paper by Cummins, Weiss, and Zi
(2003) extended Berger et al. (2000) and found no evidence of cost scope efficiencies for firms
offering both life and property-liability insurance in the U.S. insurance sector during the period
1993-1997.

62

See: Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987), Hunter, Timme, and Yang (1990), Goldberg et al., (1991), Noulas,
Miller, and Ray (1993).
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In addition, Kellner and Mathewson (1983) found cost scope economies in the Canadian
life industry. Khaled, Adams, and Pickford (2001) concluded that small and medium-sized New
Zealand life insurance companies experienced cost scope diseconomies while the large-sized
companies had neither economies nor diseconomies of scope. Hirao and Inoue (2004) found
statistically significant cost scope economies for Japanese property-liability insurers, and
Toivanen (1997) showed modest cost scope economies in the Finnish non-life insurance
industry. Though these economy studies exist, scope studies in the financial services industry are
limited, with the available research providing unconvincing evidence.
Although studies have investigated scope economies across lines of business within the
same sector of the U.S. financial services industry, no evidence exists on whether scope
economies exist for offering a wider variety of products across different sectors of the industry.
To our knowledge, no empirical study investigates the scope efficiencies of financial
conglomerates in the U.S., and only a handful of studies provide evidence on scope economies of
financial conglomerates in the EU, with mixed results. Lang and Welzel (1998) found mostly
diseconomies of producing loans and investment-oriented services within German universal
banks, and they found cost scope economies only for small German banks. By searching for
complementarities between loans and investment-related products offered by universal banks,
Allen and Rai (1996) showed small scope economies for EU universal banking. Vander Vennet
(2002) found limited evidence of cost scope economies of universal banks in Europe.
8.2. REVENUE SCOPE ECONOMIES
Scope economies in revenue refer to the increases of total revenue resulting from the production
of different categories of services or products. Revenue scope economies may occur because of
consumption complementarities, otherwise called the demand super-additivity. By offering “one-
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stop shopping” convenience, financial conglomerates can reduce consumers’ search and
transactions costs.

Furthermore, some customers may be willing to pay more for the

convenience of “supermarket” shopping for their banking and insurance needs. Demand side
scope efficiency gains may also arise by cross-selling a broad range of financial products or
integrating distribution systems. Reputation recognition can also lead to revenue scope
economies when the integration or consolidation associates itself with a strong brand name,
which customers recognize and prefer. By diversifying across products, financial conglomerates
may lower their risk if net cash flows are negatively correlated. In this sense, conglomerates may
realize revenue scope economies by charging higher prices because of their lower bankruptcy
and financial distress costs. In addition, financial integration may also provide firms with market
power in pricing.
However, the existence of revenue scope diseconomies cannot be dismissed, especially if
the integration creates or enhances conflicts of interest. The conglomerate form of organization
can create internal capital markets, which may somehow worsen inefficient cross-subsidies and
investment inefficiencies arising from managerial agency problems (e.g., Jensen, 1993; Lamont,
1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998). Scharfstein and Stein (2000) reported inefficient cross-subsidies in
internal capital markets, which are often “socialist” in nature, whereby weaker divisions receive
subsidies from stronger ones. Thus, the failure of a subsidiary may endanger the other
subsidiaries and even the group as a whole.
Mester (1992b) argued that the market would view problems in one subsidiary as
signaling problems in other subsidiaries and emphasized that BHCs have tended to rescue their
failing affiliates. In a financial conglomerate, catastrophic losses of one business line (e.g.,
property-liability insurance) could be subsidized by other business lines (e.g., commercial
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banking). Thus, commercial banking customers would worry about their savings and change to
unaffiliated banks. In this case, revenue scope diseconomies are more likely to occur. Revenue
scope diseconomies may also arise if specialists from different types of financial services have
better knowledge and expertise in their areas and can provide better-tailored products for
customers, and, thereby, charge higher prices than joint producers.
There exists little research investigating revenue scope efficiency effects of financial
services integration. The studies that do exist, again, are based on within-sector data (e.g.,
banking or insurance), and the results are inconclusive. Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley (1996)
and Noulas, Miller, and Ray (1993) found little or no evidence of revenue scope efficiency for
providing deposits and loans. In addition, both studies showed non-increasing revenue for
charging customers for joint consumption benefits. Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2000)
found revenue scope diseconomies from providing life insurance and property-liability insurance
products by integrated insurers. However, using a more sophisticated estimation technique, a
more recent research by Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2003) found weak evidence of revenue scope
economies in the U.S. insurance industry.
8.3. PROFIT SCOPE ECONOMIES
Profit scope economies generally refer to increased profits from producing a broader range of
products. Profit scope economies simultaneously consider both costs and revenues and,
therefore, reflect differences in product or service quality, which may not be measurable by
considering cost or revenue scope efficiency in isolation. For example, customers show their
preference for “one-stop shopping” by paying more for such consumption convenience, which
leads to revenue scope economies. However, financial conglomerates may incur additional
expenses in offering one-stop shopping convenience to their customers that leads to cost scope
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diseconomies. So, revenue scope economies or cost scope diseconomies alone cannot explain the
net scope efficiency gain/loss from integrating different categories of financial products. In this
sense, profit scope economies dominate the more commonly used concept of cost and revenue
scope economies since estimation of profit scope economies incorporates both cost and revenue
efficiency effects.
Studies of profit scope efficiencies generally do not find consistent benefits of either joint
production or specialization either within the banking or the insurance industry. Studies typically
find that joint production was more efficient for some firms and specialization was more efficient
for others (Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey, 1993; Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2000;
Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2003). Few studies analyzing profit efficiencies have found meaningful
profit scope economies among traditional deposit and loan outputs (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997;
Rogers, 1998). Vander Vennet (1999, 2002) studied universal banks in Europe and showed that
universal banks typically had both higher revenue and higher profitability than specialized banks.
Vander Vennet (1996) suggested that EU universal banks appear to be more profit efficient than
non-universal banks. Valverde and Fernandez (2005) examined Spanish banks and found
significant profit scope economies when the banks incorporated off-balance sheet business.
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CHAPTER 9
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we develop the testable hypotheses regarding scope economies in financial
services. Some studies investigated valuation effects of regulation or deregulation in the financial
services industry, and most of the results suggest that regulations destroy value while
deregulation creates value. For example, Rajan (1996) and Benston (1996) showed that the
Glass-Steagall Act had limited financial institutions’ ability to pursue economies of scope, and
Mamun et al. (2005a, 2005b) suggested GLB had provided welfare gains to banks and insurance
companies. Although GLB largely eliminates the barriers and restrictions on affiliations across
financial sectors, it does not necessarily follow that financial "supermarkets" will become
dominant in the U.S. financial service industry. Furthermore, we observe the coexistence of
conglomeration and specialization business strategies by U.S. banks and insurance companies.
Whether scope efficiency benefits exist for either joint or specialized production remains an open
question for cross-industry financial conglomeration in the U.S. These suggest the first two
general hypotheses regarding the existence of scope economies, stated in null form as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Neither scope economies nor diseconomies exist in the post-GLB
integrated banking and insurance industries.
Hypothesis 2: Economies of scope are invariant among financial conglomerates jointly
producing banking and insurance products.
As we discuss in Chapter 8, economies of scope can arise from variety cost
complementarities and/or revenue complementarities. Firm-specific characteristics, e.g., firm
size, product mix, distribution network, and regulatory regime, may affect those
complementarities and then contribute to assorted scope economies or diseconomies. Some
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banks or insurers could be in a better position to benefit from the diversified manufacturing. We
then formulate the following specific hypotheses to address the question of which types of banks
and insurers are more likely to realize economies of scope through cross-industry financial
integration.
Firm size is regarded as an important factor in the financial institution literature. Akhigbe
and Whyte (2001) and Barth et al. (2000) found that large banks benefited more from the
passage of GLB than small banks. In addition, there is a consensus that firm size may be
associated with greater or lesser scope economies, and it is typically found that large banks or
insurance companies could exploit higher scope economies than small ones (Berger, Humphrey,
and Pulley, 1996; Milbourn, Boot, and Thakor, 1999; Berger, et al., 2000; Cummins, Weiss, and
Zi, 2003). Financial conglomerates jointly producing banking and insurance products may gain a
competitive advantage through implicit government guarantees if they are large enough and if
they are considered “too big to fail.” These large conglomerates may also gain a reputational
advantage if consumers perceive that the implicit guarantees reduce potential losses. The implicit
guarantees may also allow them to borrow funds at lower costs (Kane, 1995, 1999; Carow,
2001a). Cost scope economies may exist on a small scale, from sharing some inputs or sharing
fixed resources such as computers or offices, but for larger conglomerates these cost scope
economy gains could be exhausted or offset by coordination or management diseconomies.
Nevertheless, large scale may be needed to generate revenue scope economies from consumption
complementarities because of the need to maintain a large distribution network. The third null
hypothesis is stated as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Larger financial conglomerates are more likely to exploit economies of
scope in jointly producing banking and insurance products.
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The two primary product segments of the insurance sector are life-health insurance and
property-liability insurance. The business opportunities offered by GLB may benefit some lines
of insurance business more than others. Carow (2001a) found that life insurance companies
benefited more from the passage of GLB than did property-liability insurers. A GAO (1990)
study, along with a study conducted by Saunders and Walter (1994), concluded that synergistic
gains are greater for the combination of banks and life insurers than for the combination of banks
and property-casualty insurers. Given regulations precluding banks from manufacturing
insurance, U.S. banks have been engaging in the insurance business through the selling of
annuities and through the selling of credit and mortgage-related insurance, and they have long
entered distribution alliances with insurance companies. Since life insurance products have more
similarities with banking products or since they can function as complementarities to banking
products, banks are more interested in life insurance products than property-liability products
(Johnston and Madura, 2000). The evidence found in Chapter 6 supports this inference – bankowned insurers accounted for 7.3 percent life insurance industry assets but only 3 percent
property-liability industry assets. Carow (2001b) found that life insurance companies received
more intense competition from banks than did property-liability insurers. 63
A majority of banks has been offering annuities and credit related life and health
insurance to their customers for a long time. A 1996 Life Office Management Association survey
of banks and thrifts involved in insurance distribution showed that banks were most likely to sell
annuities followed by term life and whole life, and were least likely to distribute propertyliability products. As a result, many banks and thrift institutions have accumulated significant
experience distributing life insurance. Hence, banks could gain greater scope economies when
63

The combination of banks and life insurers may also benefit from risk reduction. Using simulated data, Boyd and
Graham (1988) and Brewer et al. (1988) document reduced coefficients of variation and reduced bankruptcy risk for
bank-life insurance combination.
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combining with life insurers than property-liability insurers. The fourth null hypothesis is stated
as follows:
Hypothesis 4: Economies of scope are more likely to occur in jointly producing life and
banking products than in jointly producing property-liability and banking products.
In addition, economies that arise from marketing, distribution, administration, and other
functions could be more prevalent in the retail product lines than in the commercial lines. The
primary argument in favor of this position is that marketing, distribution, administration, and
other functions tend to be more homogeneous in the retail lines and more heterogeneous in the
commercial lines. Retail customers may be willing to pay more for such one-stop shopping
convenience, however, commercial customers face relatively trivial search or transaction costs
and prefer tailored products for their banking or insurance needs. These arguments suggest the
following null hypothesis in relation to the product portfolio:
Hypothesis 5: Economies of scope are more likely to occur in the retail financial product
lines than in the commercial lines.
A sixth hypothesis has to do with distribution systems, which may have an effect on the
level of scope economies. Although a consolidated bank and insurer may lower total costs or
increase expected revenue by cross-selling, scope economies may vary with distribution systems.
Insurers using vertically integrated distribution systems distribute their products through
exclusive agents, direct marketing (by company employees), or mass marketing (mail and/or
mass media advertising). Insurers using horizontally integrated distribution systems distribute
through brokers or independent agents who sell the products of multiple insurers. 64
Banks are expected to sell their insurance affiliates’ products through their branches or
offices. Banks affiliated with vertically integrated insurers can reuse insurers’ relatively large
investments in advertising and marketing, which more likely create cost scope economies.
64

Kim, Mayers , and Smith (1996) had further discussions of the choice of insurance distribution system.
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However, revenue scope economies may be less likely in the affiliation between banks and
vertically integrated insurers because such affiliations may increase competition and conflicts
within the group, which is especially serious when bank-sold insurance products are similar to
the insurance products offered by their insurer affiliates, especially annuities. 65 In this sense,
insurers using horizontal distribution systems may be in a better position to gain revenue scope
economies when affiliating with banks. Berger, Cummins, and Weiss (1997) found that
vertically integrated distributors are more likely to realize both cost and revenue scope
economies in the life insurance industry. However, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2003) did not find
evidence that scope economies were more likely for insurers using vertically integrated
distributions than those using horizontal distribution systems. These arguments inform the next
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: Economies of scope are more likely to be present for the combination of
banks and insurers using vertically integrated distributions than for the combination of
banks and insurers using horizontally integrated distributions.
Since efficient managers are already outperforming their competitors, with the ability to
achieve high levels of X-efficiency, they can use and extend their managerial talent, experience,
and expertise into the conglomeration. Thus, they can better realize economies of scope, yielding
a positive relationship between efficiency and scope economies. X-efficiencies capture
individual firm’s deviations from the efficiency frontier. For example, the revenue X-efficiency
refers to how close a firm’s actual revenues are to the revenues of a best-practice firm producing
the same outputs. 66 The last hypothesis is as follows:
65

Banks and thrift institutions made about 15 percent of individual annuity sales in 1999 and about 23 percent in
2003 (The Financial Services Fact Book 2005).
66
Consistent with the original definition of Leibenstein (1966), Berger (1993) defined cost X-efficiency as the ratio
of the minimum costs that could have been expended to produce a given outputs bundle to the actual costs
expended, and varies between 0 and 1. We follow Berger (1993) and define revenue X-efficiency and profit Xefficiency as the ratio of the actual revenue or profit earned to the maximum revenue or profits that could have been
earned to produce a given outputs bundle.
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Hypothesis 7: X-efficient firms are more likely to enjoy economies of scope in the joint
production of banking and insurance products.

61

CHAPTER 10
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
This section describes the data, the two-stage econometric method utilized and the estimation of
outputs, inputs, and prices.
10.1. ECONOMETRIC APPROACH
The translog functional form, first proposed by Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1973),
has been employed to estimate cost functions in a number of scope economy studies. However,
this functional form does not allow for zero production of any product and, therefore, is not ideal
for scope economy estimation. Some studies attempted to circumvent this problem by estimating
the translog function at some close-to-zero output value (e.g., Benston, Berger, Hanweck,
Humphrey, 1983; Gilligan, Simirlock, and Marshall, 1984; Murray and White, 1983; Mester,
1987; and Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey, 1987). Unfortunately, these efforts have proved
unsatisfactory since the translog was not well behaved around zero and scope economy
estimation was sensitive to the value chosen (Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey, 1987). More
recently, researchers have introduced Box-Cox transformations into the conventional translog
functions (Box and Cox, 1964; and Cebenoyan, 1990). 67 Again, the results were still
unsatisfactory as the Box-Cox parameters were found close to the translog function parameters
(Pulley and Humphrey, 1993).
In this dissertation, we use the composite cost function first proposed by Pulley and
Braunstein (1992). The composite function not only allows zero output for some products but

67

Using Box-Cox transformation in outputs, the hybrid translog function substitutes lnQi with (Qλi -1)/λ.
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also negative values for the dependent variable. Thus, this functional form is attractive for the
scope economies analysis, especially for estimating profit scope efficiencies. 68
10.1.1. FUNCTION FORM
The composite Pulley and Braunstein (P-B) model combines a quadratic structure for outputs
and a log-quadratic specification for input prices. It is given by:
C = [α 0 + ∑ α i qi + (1 2)∑∑ α ij q i q j + ∑∑ δ ik qi ln rk ]

⋅ exp[ β 0 + ∑ β k ln rk + (1 / 2)∑∑ β kl ln rk ln rl + ∑∑ μ ik q i ln rk ] + ε

(1)

where C is total costs; qi is the ith output, i=1,…,n; rk is the kth input price, k=1,…,m; α, β, δ,

μ are coefficient vectors to be estimated; ε denotes a random error term. The theoretical
requirement that the cost function be homogeneous of degree one in input prices is met by
imposing the following restrictions (Brown, Caves and Christensen, 1979): 69

∑

k

β k = 1 and

∑

k

δ ik = 0 (k = 1,…,m)

∑

l

β kl = ∑k β lk = 0 ( k, l = 1,…,m )

The symmetry restriction implies αij = αji and βkl = βlk. The constant terms β0 and the interaction
term

∑∑ μ

ik

qi ln rk are omitted because of the technical difficulty in estimating both constant

terms and both interaction terms simultaneously (Pulley and Braunstein, 1992; McKillop et al.,
1996; and Berger et al., 2000). 70 Hence, the P-B composite model used is specified as
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This type of model has been used to estimate economies of scope in banking (e.g., Pulley and Humphrey, 1993;
McKillop, Glass, and Morikawa, 1996; Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley, 1996; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997) and in
insurance (e.g., Berger et al., 2000; Hirao and Inoue, 2004).
69
The function must exhibit homogeneity of degree one in input prices to be a well-behaved cost function. That is a
doubling of all input prices exactly doubles costs. Linear homogeneity, a necessary condition for the cost function, is
not necessary for the alternative revenue and profit functions.
70 The original P-B model has two constant terms, α0 and β0 , and two interaction terms, ∑∑μikqilnrk and
∑∑δikqilnrk. Technically, they cannot be simultaneously estimated. P-B (1992) and other literature recommended
retaining one in the final model.
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C = [α 0 + ∑ α i q i + (1 2)∑∑ α ij qi q j + ∑∑ δ ik qi ln rk ]

(2)

⋅ exp[∑ β k ln rk + (1 / 2)∑∑ β kl ln rk ln rl ] + ε

Consistent with the literature, we adopt a modified version of the composite cost function
form by normalizing the dependent variable and the output and input variables as follows:

C
= [α 0 + ∑ α i y i + (1 2)∑∑ α ij yi y j + ∑∑ δ ik yi ln s k ]
rm

⋅ exp[∑ β k ln s k + (1 / 2)∑∑ β kl ln s k ln sl ] + ε

(3)

In this normalized composite function, the dependent variable is normalized by the price of the
last input (rm). Output terms are scaled by the sample mean (yi =qi /mean(qi)) and input prices are
normalized by the last input price (sk = ri / rm). The normalization of output quantities by the
sample mean helps reduce scale bias in estimation and the normalization by the last input price
imposes linear homogeneity in the input prices, a necessary condition for the empirical cost
function to be consistent with production theory.
The revenue and profit functions estimated in our study are identical to the composite
cost function, (2) and (3), except that the dependent variable, cost, is replaced by revenue and
profit respectively. 71 Thus, revenue functions are
R = [α 0 + ∑ α i qi + (1 2)∑∑ α ij qi q j + ∑∑ δ ik qi ln rk ]

⋅ exp[∑ β k ln rk + (1 / 2)∑∑ β kl ln rk ln rl ] + ε

(4)
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Following Berger et al. (2000), we use the same form and independent variables for the cost, revenue, and profit
functions to avoid the impact of specification differences on the cost, revenue, and profit scope economies
estimations. Although linear homogeneity is not necessary for the revenue and profit functions, we impose the same
normalization to avoid the specification differences effects. In addition, output prices generally move with input
prices, so we assume that if all input prices double, output prices would approximately double, as would profits and
revenues.
Furthermore, these are also called alternative revenue and profit efficiency functions. Standard profit efficiency
takes output prices to be exogenous, and the alternative profit efficiency takes output quantities to be exogenous. It
is called the alternative profit function because it includes output quantities rather than output prices. The alternative
profit efficiency concept is used primarily because output prices and quality are difficult to measure accurately for
banks and because output quantities are relatively fixed in the short-run and cannot respond quickly to changing
prices as is assumed in the use of standard profit efficiency (Berger and Mester, 1997, 2003).
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R
= [α 0 + ∑ α i y i + (1 2)∑∑ α ij yi y j + ∑∑ δ ik yi ln s k ]
rm

⋅ exp[∑ β k ln s k + (1 / 2)∑∑ β kl ln s k ln sl ] + ε

(5)

and profit functions are
P = [α 0 + ∑ α i qi + (1 2)∑∑ α ij qi q j + ∑∑ δ ik qi ln rk ]

(6)

⋅ exp[∑ β k ln rk + (1 / 2)∑∑ β kl ln rk ln rl ] + ε

P
= [α 0 + ∑ α i y i + (1 2)∑∑ α ij yi y j + ∑∑ δ ik yi ln s k ]
rm

⋅ exp[∑ β k ln s k + (1 / 2)∑∑ β kl ln s k ln sl ] + ε

(7)

where R is the revenue; P is the profit. The modified composite cost, revenue, and profit
functions are estimated by non-linear least squares.
10.1.2. MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIES OF SCOPE

Cost economies of scope (CSCOPE) are measured as the percentage of costs that firms could
save by producing multiple products jointly instead of producing each product separately in
specialist firms (Panzar and Willig, 1975, 1981). The traditional measure of CSCOPE (specified
as CSCOPET) in the case of a firm producing two products Q1 and Q2 is given by

CSCOPE T =

C (q1 ,0; r ) + C (0, q 2 ; r ) − C (q1 , q 2 ; r )
C (q1 , q 2 ; r )

(8)

Where C( . ) is a continuous cost function estimated for conglomerates only; 72 q1 and q2 are
output level of the two products; and r refers to the input price vector. Cost scope economies are
believed to be present if CSCOPET > 0, and diseconomies are present if CSCOPET < 0. Since
data on specialist firms were generally not available, this measure was acceptable and widely
used in literature. Recently, this traditional measurement by Panzar and Willig (1981) was
72

The traditional approach to estimating scope economies of financial institutions is to use a single continuous cost
function that is estimated only for joint producers but is assumed to apply to specialists as well. This is usually
necessitated by an absence of data on specialist firms.
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criticized by some researchers. Panzar and Willig assumed that both specialist firms and
conglomerates produced financial products with the same technology, and they operated at the
same production frontier. They estimated a single cost function using the conglomerates data
only and applied this to both specialists and conglomerates. However, the assumption was hard
to justify, as it was quite possible that the joint producers used different technologies than the
specialists, especially when the market segment served was different.
To fix these problems, an alternative measure of scope economies has been developed by
Berger, Cummins, Weiss and Zi (2000), who suggested that cost, revenue, or profit functions
should be estimated separately for specialist firms and joint producers. This approach is feasible
only when data are available on both diversified and specialized firms. Fortunately, this is the
case for our data sample. Thus, we adopt this alternative approach for our estimation. This
approach gives the measure of cost scope economies when producing two product categories, Q1
and Q2, as

CSCOPE =

C S 1 (q1 ; r1 ) + C S 2 (q 2 ; r2 ) − C J 1 (q1 ; r1 ) − C J 2 (q 2 ; r2 )
C J 1 (q1 ; r1 ) + C J 2 (q 2 ; r2 )

(9)

where CS1(q1; r1) is the cost function for the specialist firm S1 producing Q1; CS2(q2; r2) is the
cost function for the specialist firm S2 producing Q2; CJ1(q1 ; r1) is the cost function for the
division J1 (producing Q1 only) of conglomerates; CJ2(q2 ; r2) is the cost function for the division
J2 (producing Q2 only) of conglomerates. Cost scope economies are believed to be present if
CSCOPE> 0, and diseconomies are present if CSCOPE< 0.
Revenue and profit scope economies are generally measured as the percentage increase in
revenue or profit when different categories of products are provided jointly instead of being
provided separately. The revenue scope economies score (RSCOPE) is given by
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RSCOPE =

R J 1 (q1 ; r1 ) + R J 2 (q 2 ; r2 ) − RS 1 (q1 ; r1 ) − RS 2 (q 2 ; r2 )
R J 1 (q1 ; r1 ) + R J 2 (q 2 ; r2 )

(10)

and profit scope economies score (PSCOPE) is

PSCOPE =

PJ 1 (q1 ; r1 ) + PJ 2 (q 2 ; r2 ) − PS 1 (q1 ; r1 ) − PS 2 (q 2 ; r2 )
PJ 1 (q1 ; r1 ) + PJ 2 (q 2 ; r2 )

(11)

where RS1( . ), RS2( . ), and PS1( . ), PS2( . ) are revenue and profit functions for specialist firms
S1 and S2 respectively; RJ1( . ), RJ2( . ), and PJ1( . ), PJ2( . ) are revenue and profit functions for
divisions J1 and J2 of conglomerates,. Similarly, revenue or profit scope economies are believed
to be present if RSCOPE> 0 or PSCOPE> 0, and scope diseconomies are present if RSCOPE< 0
or PSCOPE< 0.
10.2. DATA

The data screening and selection process is discussed in Chapter 4. The data sample used
contains 260 observations of diversified firm jointly producing banking and insurance products,
613 insurance specialist observations (offering insurance products only) and 1,450 bank
specialist observations (offering banking products only) over the three year period 2003 – 2005.
Table 16 shows the statistics of the data sample. The number of firms is further disaggregated by
sectors and product lines. The firms included in the data sample accounts for 98 percent of life
insurance industry assets, 94 percent of property-liability insurance assets, 88 percent of
commercial banks assets, and 81 percent of thrifts assets.
10.3. ESTIMATION OF OUTPUTS, INPUTS, AND PRICES

Like other service industries, it is difficult to define what financial institutions produce and how
the services are priced. This section briefly discusses the measurement of outputs, inputs, and
prices for insurance companies and banks, respectively. Table 17 summarizes the output and
input measures.
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10.3.1. OUTPUTS AND PRICES

Three alternative methods have been used in the literature to measure outputs in the financial
services industry – the asset (financial intermediation) approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977), the
user-cost approach (Donovan, 1978), and the value-added (production) approach (Berger and
Humphrey, 1992). The asset approach considers financial institutions as intermediaries that
borrow funds from depositors and then lend the money to borrowers. The user-cost approach
determines whether a financial product is an input or output by comparing its contribution to the
firm’s revenue. If its return on assets exceeds the opportunity cost of funds, then the product is
treated as an output, otherwise, it is considered as an input. The value-added approach treats all
asset and liability categories as having both output and input characteristics (Berger and
Humphrey, 1992; Pulley and Braunstein, 1992; Pulley and Humphrey, 1993; Berger et al., 2000;
Cummins et al., 2003).

Those categories having significant value added are considered

important outputs, and others are treated as inputs, intermediate products, or unimportant
outputs.
10.3.1.1.

INSURANCE OUTPUTS AND PRICES

The literature has evolved over time and the value-added approach is believed to be the most
appropriate approach to measure the outputs of the insurance industry (Leverty, 2005). 73
Consistent with the recent literature on insurance efficiency (e.g., Cummins and Zi, 1998; Berger
et al., 2000; Cummins and Weiss, 2001; Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2003; Greene and Segal,
2004), we identify three principal services provided by insurance companies: risk pooling and
risk-bearing, real financial services, and financial intermediation. The actuarial, underwriting,
claim settlement, and associated expenses incurred in operating risk pools are the main
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Leverty (2005) surveyed the production approach in defining and measuring P&L insurer’s outputs and discussed
the issues in measuring the efficiency of P&L insurers.
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components of value added related to risk-pooling and risk-bearing. In life insurance, real
financial services include personal financial planning, pension counseling, and commercial
benefit plan administration. In property-liability insurance, risk surveys, coverage program
design, and consulting on policy deductibles and limits are the major real services related to
insured losses. For financial intermediation, interest credited to life insurance policies and
premium discounts applied to property-liability insurance policies represent the value added of
the insurers’ intermediation function.
PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE. For property-liability insurers, the present

value of real losses incurred (PV(L)) is used as a output proxy (Berger, Cummins, and Weiss,
1997; Berger, Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2000; Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 2003). Losses incurred
are generally defined as the total losses that are expected to be paid by insurers for providing
insurance coverage arising from business written during the previous year; specifically they are
calculated as the sum of losses paid plus the net change in loss reserves. They are good
representations of risk-pooling and risk-bearing services since this service functions by
collecting funds from individuals in the pool and then redistributing those funds to those who
incur losses. Losses incurred are also good proxies for real services provided by the insurer. We
calculate the present value to reflect claim settlement lags that may have a significant impact on
certain product lines, e.g., liability insurance vs. auto physical damage insurance. Following the
insurance literature, we define four output lines of business: personal short-tail lines, personal
long-tail lines, commercial short-tail lines, and commercial long-tail lines. Table 15 provides a
list of outputs and lines of business definition.
We estimate the proportion of losses incurred from any accident year t that is paid in year
t+j using the Taylor separation method (Taylor, 2000), and we estimate industry aggregate claim
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data obtained from Schedule P of the A.M. Best Rating Guide (2003, 2004, and 2005). Then the
expected loss payouts of the company are discounted using interest rate data for U.S. Treasury
yield curves obtained from the Federal Reserve Board.
The output of intermediation functions is measured by the annual average real invested
assets, which is computed as an average of the beginning and end-of-year invested assets
(Berger, Cummins, and Weiss, 1997; Berger et al., 2000; Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 1999, 2003;
Cummins and Weiss, 2001).
The prices of the four categories of property-liability insurance outputs are computed as
pi = [Pi – PV(Li)] / PV(Li), (i = 1,…, 4), where pi refers to the price of output i; Pi refers to the
total premium earned for the output i; and PV(Li) is the present value of losses incurred for
output i. For the price of the intermediary output, we use the expected rate of return on the
insurer’s invested assets, including the expected returns on both the stocks and other invested
assets in the insurer’s investment portfolio. Because the expected return on other invested assets,
such as bonds and notes, is typically close to their actual return, the rate of return on other
invested assets in the portfolio is represented by the ratio of actual investment income (minus
dividends on stocks) to insurer’s total holdings of other investment assets. For stocks, the
expected rate of return is calculated as the cost of equity capital using 3-Factor Fama-French
CAPM with Ibbotson Associates industry beta (SIC categories 6331). 74 Finally, the expected
portfolio rate of return is determined as a weighted average of the stocks and other investment
asset returns with each proportion weighted in the investment portfolio.
Because of the sample size limitation (146 observations of conglomerate propertyliability subsidiaries), we use three aggregate insurance outputs for property-liability insurers:

74

Industry betas are from Ibbotson Associates Cost of Capital Yearbook, 2004, 2005, and 2006. Standard Industrial
Classification system (SIC) categories can be found at www.census.gov.
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(1) personal lines combining personal short-tail and long-tail products; (2) commercial lines
combining commercial short-tail and long-tail products; (3) intermediary output (invested
assets).
LIFE INSURANCE. Because of the specific limitations in information reported by life

insurers, the present value of benefits incurred for life insurers is not available. Following
accepted practice, e.g., Yuengert (1993), Cummins, Tennyson, and Weiss (1999), Berger,
Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2000), Cummins, Weiss, and Zi (2003), we use incurred benefits
(payments received by policyholders in a year) plus additions to reserves as a proxy of life
insurance outputs. Incurred benefits are suitable for measuring the risk-pooling and risk-sharing
functions because they reflect the amount of funds pooled and redistributed by life insurers to
policyholders for insured events. Increases in reserves are similar to bank deposits and represent
the funds received by insurers but not needed for benefit payments and expenses. The funds
backing the reserves are invested by insurers in financial instruments. Thus, additions to reserves
should be a good output measure for the intermediation function. In addition, both are highly
correlated with the real services provided by life insurers, such as personal financial planning
and commercial benefit plan management. Consistent with the literature, we define five business
lines: personal life insurance, personal annuities, group life insurance, group annuities, and
accident and health insurance. Because of the small sample size (210 conglomerate life insurance
subsidiary observations), we use three aggregate outputs for life insurers: (1) life insurance
including personal and group life insurance; (2) annuities including personal and group annuities;
(3) accident and health insurance.
The prices of the life insurance outputs are computed by the function pi = [Pi + I i – (Li +
Wi)] / (Li + W i ), (i = 1,…, 5), where pi is the price of output i; Pi refers to the total premium
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earned for the output i; and Ii is the allocated investment income for output i; 75 Li represents the
incurred benefits for output i; and Wi is the additions to reserves for output line i.
10.3.1.2.

BANKING OUTPUTS AND PRICES

Consistent with most of the recent literature on bank efficiencies, we measure bank outputs using
the intermediation approach. The definition and measurement of banking outputs and prices are
simpler and easier compared with insurance. The services provided by banks are traditional
financial services (on-balance sheet), new financial services (on-balance sheet), and off-balance
sheet (OBS) activities. The traditional financial services include deposits (demand, time and
savings) and loans (real estate, commercial, installment), and those services continue to represent
the majority of the bank business (Berger et al., 1992; Berger et al., 1997; Pulley and Humphrey,
1993; Pulley and Braunstein, 1992; and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002). As noted by Stiroh
(2000), fee-based services and off-balance sheet activities have been recognized as a growing
category of bank assets and have accounted for a substantial portion of bank revenues. These
activities are especially concentrated in large institutions and failure to account for them may
lead to incorrect conclusions. 76 New financial services, including portfolio management, mutual
or pension fund distributions, and safekeeping services, are expected to reduce risk (Gallo,
Apilado, and Kolari, 1996), enhance scale economies and produce cross-selling synergy (Kane,
1995; Golter, 1996). The major off-balance sheet activities are loan commitments (lines of credit
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Life insurers are required to report allocated investment income by product lines in their NAIC regulatory
statement, which is not required for property-liability insurers.
76
Mester (1992a) did not find complementarities between loans and off-balance sheet securitization; while Rogers
(1998) found significant but small complementarities between traditional output and “new financial services.”
Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996) and Clark and Siems (2002) found complementarities when considering a wide range
of off-balance sheet activities jointly although they vanished as bank size increased. Valverde and Fernandez (2005)
examined Spanish banks and found that OBS business introduced both cost and profit scope economies compared to
a narrow (traditional) definition of output mix.
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and credit cards), credit derivatives, letters of credit, and loan originations, sales, and servicing
(Jagtiani and Khanthavit, 1996; Clark and Siems, 2002; Rime and Stiroh, 2003). 77
Following the literature, we identify three categories of outputs – consumer loans,
business loans, and other assets. 78 The first output, consumer loans, involves intermediation and
loan services and is calculated as the sum of the dollar value of residential loans, credit card
loans and other installment loans. The second output, business loans, includes the dollar value of
real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, farm loans and other loans and leases. The
price of loans is defined as total interest and fee earnings on loans divided by the quantity of
loans. The last output, other assets, includes a bank's new financial services and off-balance sheet
business and reflects another important source of bank revenue. It is defined as the sum dollar
value of securities and trading assets held by banks and OBS activities. The OBS activities are
calculated as the risk-weighted (based on Basle Accord risk weights) amounts of unused
commitments, letters of credit, derivatives and other OBS items. 79 The price for “other assets” is
obtained as the sum of the total interests and non-interest earnings on these assets divided by the
total dollar value of “other assets.”
10.3.2. INPUTS AND PRICES

Unlike output definitions, there is a general agreement in the literature regarding the
measurement of inputs in the financial service industry.
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Also see DeYoung (1994), Hunter and Timme (1995), Jagtiani, Nathan, and Sick (1995), Berger, Humphrey, and
Pulley (1996), Hughes and Mester (1998).
78
It would be ideal if the bank outputs were disaggregated into more categories, e.g., commercial and industrial
loans, real estate loans, installment loans to individuals. However, because of the trade-off between the degree of
aggregation for outputs and the degree of freedom, our data cannot afford to lose the degree of freedom since the
data have a small number of conglomerate observations.
79
The Basle Accord risk weights indicates that the OBS items have approximately the same perceived credit risk
and the same origination, monitoring, and control costs as loans. Since the correct risk weights specified by the RBC
requirements vary according to maturity, type of contracts, and other characteristics, we assume the risk weights are
100 percent for letters of credit, 50 percent for unused loan commitments, and 10 percent for derivatives and all the
other OBS items (Jagtiani and Khanthavit, 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997; and Berger and DeYoung, 2001).
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10.3.2.1.

INSURANCE INPUTS AND PRICES

The inputs of property-liability and life insurers are very similar. Since they are similarly
defined, this section presents the inputs and prices discussion for both life and property-liability
insurers. Generally, the inputs to insurance fall into four principal categories – home office
administrative labor, agent labor, material and physical capital, and financial equity and debt
capital.
Since insurers are not required to report detail information about the number of
employees and quantity of materials used in business, we impute them from the dollar value of
related expenses reported in their regulatory statements divided by the price. The price of the
home office labor is obtained from average weekly wage rates for life insurers (SIC categories
6311 or NAICS categories 524113)
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and property-liability insurers (SIC categories 6331 or

NAICS categories 524126) in their domicile state available from the U.S. Department of Labor.
Similarly, the price of agent labor is defined as the premium-weighted average weekly wage
rates for insurance agents (SIC categories 6411 or NAICS code 524210) in states where the
insurer operates. The weight is the proportion of the insurer’s direct business written in each
state. The price of the materials and business services is defined as the U.S. Department of Labor
average weekly wage rates for business services. We use the national index consistent with
materials being available for the same price nationwide.
The quantity of home office labor is defined as QHL =

E HL
, where EHL denotes the dollar
wHL

expenditures on home office labor and wHL refers to the price of home office labor. The dollar
expenditure on home office labor is defined as the sum of salaries, payroll taxes, and employee
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North America Industry Classification System (NAICS) and Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories
can be found at www.census.gov.
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welfare reported in insurer’s regulatory statements. Similarly, the quantity of agent labor is
specified as Q AL =

E AL
, where EAL is the dollar expenditures on agent labor and wAL refers to the
w AL

price of agent labor. The dollar expenditure on agent labor is defined as the sum of net
commissions, brokerage fees and allowance to agents. The quantity of material and physical
capital is defined as the dollar value of net premises and fixed assets available in insurer’s
regulatory report; the price of physical capital is obtained as occupancy and fixed asset
expenditures divided by the quantity of physical capital.
In addition to labor and physical inputs, we include two proxies for the financial capital:
equity capital and debt capital. Financial equity capital plays an important role in reducing the
insolvency risk 81 and is viewed as one of the important inputs as conveyed in the literature (e.g.,
Berger, Cummins, and Weiss, 1997; Hughes and Mester, 1998; and Hughes, Mester, and Moon,
2001). An insurer’s financial equity capital is defined as the statutory policyholders surplus
measured as the average of beginning and end-of-year equity capital. To measure the price of
financial equity capital, we use the estimated cost of equity capital using 3-Factor Fama-French
CAPM with industry specific beta obtained from Ibbotson Associates Cost of Capital
Yearbook. 82
The debt capital of insurers is defined as the funds borrowed from policyholders. These
funds are comprised of loss reserves and unearned premiums reserves. The price of policyholder
supplied debt capital is calculated as total expected investment income minus expected
investment income attributed to equity capital divided by average debt capital. The expected
81

The insurance pricing theory predicts that insurers have optimal capital structures and insurance product price is
inversely related to insurers’ default risk (Cummins and Sommer, 1996; Cummins and Danzon, 1997).
82
Cummins and Weiss (2001) proposed a book-value approach, which assumed that insurers held equity portfolios
with a market beta coefficient of 1.0; and, therefore, they use a constant cost of equity across all insurers in the
industry. It was calculated on the average 90-day Treasury Bill rate plus the long-term average market risk premium
(1926 to the end of year t) on large company stocks from Ibbotson Associates.
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investment income attributed to equity capital is calculated as the expected rate of investment
return multiplied by average equity capital (Cummins and Weiss, 2001).
10.3.2.2.

BANKING INPUTS AND PRICES

Similar to the inputs for insurance companies, the four inputs for banks (both commercial banks
and thrift saving institutions) are widely recognized as deposits, labor, physical capital, and
purchased funds (e.g., Berger, Dick, Goldberg, and White, 2005; Berger and Mester, 2003;
Berger and DeYoung, 2001; Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Berger, Humphrey, and Pulley, 1996;
and Hughes, Mester, and Moon, 2001).
The first input, deposits, includes demand deposits, time and saving deposits. The
quantity of deposits is directly measured as the total dollar value of demand deposits, time and
saving deposit liabilities of the bank. The price of deposits is calculated as total interest expense
on the deposits divided by the quantity of deposits. The quantity of labor is defined as the
number of employees reported in the bank’s regulatory report, and the price of labor is calculated
as the salary, wage and welfare per employee. The quantity of physical capital is defined by the
dollar value of net premises and fixed assets available in the bank’s regulatory report, and the
price of physical capital is obtained as occupancy and fixed asset expenditures divided by the
quantity of physical capital. Since purchased funds require very small amounts of physical inputs
like labor and capital, they are treated as financial inputs to the intermediation process, which
include federal funds purchased, large CDs, foreign deposits, demand notes, and other liabilities
for borrowed money. The price of purchased funds is calculated as interest paid on these funds
divided by the total dollar value of these funds, which is the quantity of purchased funds.
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CHAPTER 11
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

This section reports the empirical results of the scope economies analysis for U.S. financial
institutions jointly producing banking and insurance products. We first evaluate the cost,
revenue, and profit scope economies by estimating the composite cost, revenue, and profit
functions. Then, the second-stage regression results are discussed.
11.1. SCOPE ECONOMY ESTIMATES

It is well recognized that specialist firms and diversified firms may operate at different
production frontiers due to different business strategies and technologies. We estimate cost,
revenue, and profit functions for specialist and diversified firms, respectively. A total of 24
functions is estimated: two types of firms (specialists and diversified) by four sectors (life
insurance, property-liability insurance, commercial banking, and thrifts) by three types of
functions (cost, revenue, and profit). Tables 18, 19, 20 and 21 show the descriptive statistics of
the variables used in the function estimation for commercial banks, thrift saving banks, life
insurers, and property-liability insurers, respectively. Panel A is the summary of the statistics for
the diversified firms, Panel B is for the specialist firms, and Panel C shows the statistics for all
firms in the sample. We use non-linear least square estimation to estimate the composite
functions. The estimated functions well fit the sample and show good overall fitness.
Scope economy estimates for the joint producers (bancassurers and assurbanks) are
obtained by applying the scope economy formulas for each of them with the coefficients
estimated from the composite functions. Scope economy estimates for the specialists are
obtained by simulating mergers of insurance specialists with bank specialists (Berger et al.,
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2000). We use Cartesian product (also called direct product) to obtain the hypothetical financial
conglomerates. The hypothetical financial conglomerates are created by merging every insurance
specialist with every bank specialist in each given year. Thus, 298,185 synthetic joint producers
are obtained. 83
One common approach in inferring scope economies is to evaluate at a single point, e.g.,
the mean or median of the data. Nevertheless, this point estimation method has been criticized
for its weak representation, as it may not provide a good approximation for the whole sample
(Hirao and Inoue, 2004; and Berger et al., 2000). We present our scope economy estimations in
several different ways. The cost, revenue, and profit scope economies are evaluated, first, for all
the firms in the sample, then, for the actual joint producers only, and, finally, for the synthetic
financial conglomerates. The scope economy scores, then, are evaluated at three points, the 25th
(Q1), 50th (median), and 75th (Q3) percentile of the data. For example, for the whole sample the
scope economy scores are estimates at the first quartile, the median, and the third quartile of
outputs quantities and inputs prices.
Table 22 summarizes the estimates of costs, revenue, and profit scope economy scores
for all firms in the sample, the actual joint firms only, and the simulated joint firms only.
Focusing first on cost scope economies, Panel A shows consistent negative cost scope economy
estimates regardless of evaluation points or firms samples. The evidence indicates significant
cost scope diseconomies on jointly producing banking and insurance products. For example, at
median level of outputs and input prices, the data show cost scope diseconomies of 11.4 percent
for all the firms, 24.1 percent for actual joint producers, and 26 percent for the hypothetical joint
firms. The estimates at Q1 and Q3 suggest the same conclusion, and the cost scope diseconomies
83

The Cartesian product approach considers all possible firm pairs and, therefore, can reduce the potential for bias
resulting from arbitrarily excluding ex ante some firm combinations that might be associated with scope economies
or diseconomies.
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are statistically significant. Panel A also shows an inverse relationship between firm size and
cost scope diseconomies. As discussed in Chapter 9, cost scope economies may exist on a small
scale from sharing inputs or sharing fixed resources such as computers or offices, but such gains
could be offset by coordination or management diseconomies and exhausted in larger scale. The
relationship between scope economies and firm size will be further discussed in the regression
analysis.
Panel B of Table 22 lists the revenue scope economies estimates. All the estimate scores
are large in value and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The positive revenue scope
economy scores indicate revenue scope economies in joint production, suggesting that offering
both banking and insurance products can generate higher sales revenue than producing the
products separately in specialists firms. At median value, actual joint firms could realize revenue
scope economies of 32.1 percent, and for specialist firms, revenue scope economies are predicted
to be 38.8 percent. In terms of the pattern between revenue scope economies and firm size, Panel
B indicates a positive relationship. The larger the firm size, the higher its revenue scope
economies. It is not surprising to see that small size firms are less capable of benefiting from
such production complementarities. As discussed earlier, large scale operations may be needed to
generate revenue scope economies from consumption complementarities because of the need to
maintain a large distribution network. In addition, this finding suggests that large firms are the
most efficient in utilizing cross-selling and exploiting benefits from offering one-stop shopping
convenience when providing banking and insurance products simultaneously.
Panel C of Table 22 provides the summary of profit scope economy score estimations.
The data generally show significant profit scope economies for all firms in the sample, the actual
joint firms only, and hypothetical joint firms only. However, profit scope economies are quite
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small and less significant. For example, at sample median, actual joint producers could benefit
from joint production by increasing 2 percent net income, and the specialists are predicted to
increase 10 percent net income by conglomeration. Except for the estimates for actual joint
producers at Q1, the profit scope economies are statistically significant. Similar to the revenue
scope economies in Panel B, large firms show higher profit scope economies when producing
both banking and insurance products. The profit scope economies increase from 2.6 percent at
Q1, to 3.9 percent at median, to 7.6 percent at Q3 for all firms in the data.
The findings reject Hypothesis 1 and suggest that significant cost scope diseconomies,
significant revenue scope economies, and weak profit scope economies exist in the post-GLB
integrated banking and insurance industries. The evidence of cost scope diseconomies cannot
support production complementarities and suggests that cost savings from sharing resources such
as marketing systems, information databases, and offices do not offset the extra costs possibly
incurred in joint production and conglomeration. The findings of revenue scope economies
support consumption complementarities, which suggests that customers are willing to pay more
for the convenient one-stop shopping; Demand side scope efficiency gains also arise by crossselling. The findings of profit scope economies indicate that revenue scope economies dominate
cost scope diseconomies on joint productions. This leads to the final net profit scope economies,
which, however, are small.
Furthermore, the evidence of varied cost and revenue scope economies or diseconomies
supports our contention that profit scope economies dominate the commonly used concept of
cost or revenue scope economies. Neither the cost nor the revenue scope economies can explain
net effects of integrating the banking and insurance manufacturing on financial conglomerate
operations. Focusing on either cost or revenue economies may lead to misleading conclusions.
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11.2. REGRESSION ANALYSIS

We next investigate which types of firms are more likely to benefit from conglomeration and
how firm characteristics explain the scope economies difference among firms. The remainder of
the dissertation is devoted to a regression analysis. It is the second stage analysis. The cost,
revenue, and profit scope economy scores are regressed on a set of firm characteristic variables.
The regression results discussed in this section reveal the effects of firm characteristics on
economies of scope and test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 9. Observations with extreme
scope economy scores, e.g., scope economy scores greater than 1 and less than -1, are excluded
from the sample. The final sample used in the regression contains 214 joint producer
observations.
Table 23 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of regression variables. Table
24 shows the coefficient results for cost, revenue, and profit scope economy regressions. A
truncated Tobit model is used since dependent variables are truncated at 1 and -1. The dependent
variables are cost scope economy scores (function <1> and <4>), revenue scope economy scores
(functions <2> and <5>), and profit scope economy scores (functions <3> and <6>). Two sets of
regressions are estimated and compared. The only difference is the variables used to capture each
firm’s business portfolio and product mix. Functions <1>, <2>, and <3> use the total personal
business share and overall firm categories, while functions <4>, <5>, and <6> further segregate
personal business share into insurance personal business share and banking personal business
share. Then, firms are grouped into nine sub-categories.
To test Hypothesis 3 that firm size is related on scope economies, we use the natural log
of the gross total assets (LASSETGTA) to measure the size, which is a commonly used proxy in
the literature. Gross total assets are defined as the sum of insurance division assets, bank division
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assets, and allowance for loans and leases. The coefficient on LASSETGTA is negative in the
cost regression and positive in both revenue and profit regressions. All these coefficients are
statistically significant. These coefficient results are consistent with the findings in Table 3, with
no controls for other factors. The coefficients suggest that large firms are more likely to benefit
from revenue increases than cost savings when jointly producing banking and insurance
products. They are more efficient in keeping large scale distribution networks which could
generate significant revenue increases by cross-selling. Small firms are more likely to benefit
from cost saving by sharing important or costly resources in conglomeration.
Hypothesis 4 and 5 are related with a firm’s business portfolio and product mix effects on
scope economies. Three business share variables are used. The total personal products share is
defined as total personal business outputs (including insurance personal business and banking
personal business) 84 divided by the firm’s total business outputs (P_SHARE). The personal
product share in the insurance division is measured as the personal insurance outputs divided by
total insurance outputs (P_SHARE_INS). 85 The personal banking product share in the banking
division is defined as the personal banking outputs divided by total banking outputs
(P_SHARE_BK). 86
We also include indicator variables designed to capture broad differences in the business
strategies employed by the firms. Firms whose bank division assets are more than 75 percent of
total group assets are defined as bancassurers (DV_BKASSUR). If bank division assets account
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Insurance personal business includes individual life or annuity insurance, private passenger auto physical damage
insurance, and homeowner's insurance. Banking personal business includes consumer loans, credit cards and other
installment loans, residence mortgage, and core deposits.
85
Total insurance outputs include personal insurance outputs and commercial insurance outputs, such as group life
or annuity insurance, inland marine, commercial auto insurance, and workers compensation.
86
Total banking outputs include personal banking outputs and commercial banking outputs, such as commercial and
industrial loans.
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for less than 25 percent of group assets, the firms are categorized as assurbanks
(DV_ASSURBK), and the remaining firms are conglomerates (DV_CONG).
Each of the three groups is further segregated by the range of business in which they
engage. The DV_BKASSUR is segregated into three indicators: bancassurers participating in life
insurance business only (BKASSUR_LH), bancassurers owning property-liability insurance
subsidiaries only (BKASSUR_PC), and bancassurers participating in both the life and propertyliability insurance business (BKASSUR_LHPC). The DV_ASSURBK is segregated into:
assurbanks that operate commercial banks only (ASSURBK_CB), assurbanks owning thrift
saving business only (ASSURBK_SB), and assurbanks owning both commercial banking and
thrift saving businesses (ASSURBK_CBSB). Then, the DV_CONG is disaggregated into:
conglomerates owning life insurance subsidiaries only (CONG_LH), conglomerates participating
in the property-liability insurance business only (CONG_PC), and conglomerates doing both life
and property-liability insurance business (CONG_LHPC). DV_CONG and CONG_LHPC are
dropped because of the linearity.
As shown in Table 24, both the overall total personal product share variable, P_SHARE,
and division personal product share variables, P_SHARE_INS and P_SHARE_B, have negative
coefficients in the cost scope regression and positive coefficients in the revenue and profit scope
regression. These results suggest that joint firms with an emphasis on the retail business are less
likely to realize cost scope economies but more likely to benefit from revenue scope economies.
In addition, such effects are mainly dominated by the insurance retail business, which tends to
contribute more effects than the banking retail business. The effect on net profit scope economies
is estimated to be positive and statistically significant, which supports Hypothesis 5. Economies
of scope are more likely to occur in personal product lines than in commercial lines. This finding
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suggests that retail banking and insurance products are more homogeneous and could be
efficiently produced through cross-selling. In addition, the results also suggest that commercial
customers may prefer expertise and tailored products to meet their banking and/or insurance
needs. Firms with business portfolios highly weighted on commercial products appear unable to
achieve significant revenue scope economies due to joint production.
As discussed in Chapter 9, life insurance products have more similarities to banking
products than do property-liability insurance products, and higher economies of scope are
expected to occur in the joint production of life and banking products than in the joint production
of property-liability and banking products. The results in Table 24 show that the coefficient on
BKASSUR_LHPC is positive and significant in the profit scope equation. This evidence
suggests that bancassurers are profit scope efficient when participating in both the life and
property-liability

insurance

business.

The

negative

and

significant

coefficient

on

ASSURBK_CBSB in the profit scope equation suggests that assurbanks are profit scope
inefficient when participating in both the commercial and thrift banking business. The coefficient
on CONG_PC in the profit scope regression is positive and significant, suggesting that if the firm
has balanced banking and insurance business, scope economies are more likely to occur when
offering property-liability insurance products.
To control for the business diversifications, four variables are included: the insurance
product Herfindahl index (PRODHHI), the banking product Herfindahl index (PRODHHI_B),87
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Herfindahl index (HHI) for a firm producing n types of products is measured as (Y1^2 + Y2^2 + …+ Yn^2 ) /
(Y1 + Y2 + … + Yn)^2, where Yi is the ith product output. Insurance products include property-liability insurance
(personal short-tail lines, personal long-tail lines, commercial short-tail lines, and commercial long-tail lines) and
life insurance (individual life insurance, individual annuity, group life insurance, group annuity, and accident and
health insurance). Banking products include residential real estate loans, commercial real estate loans, credit card
and other installment loans, farm loans, commercial & industrial loans, other loans, demand deposits, and time and
saving deposits.
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the insurance division geographic business HHI (DPWHHI), 88 and the log of the number of
domestic offices and branches in the banking division (LOFFDOM). The maximum possible
value for the Herfindahl index of 1.0 indicates a single product manufacturing and, as such,
higher index values indicate a decrease in product diversification. Table 24 shows that, the more
products diversified in the insurance division, the more likely the firm is to exploit cost scope
economies but the less likely it is to exploit revenue and profit scope economies. In addition, the
more products diversified in the banking division, the more likely it is to realize cost and profit
scope economies and the less likely it is to realize revenue scope economies. Only the insurance
products diversification effects on net profit scope economies are statistically significant.
The insurance geographic business Herfindahl index and the number of bank offices and
branches capture the effects of national or local operation strategies. The higher the insurance
geographic diversification variable, DPWHHI, and the lower the number of bank offices,
LOFFDOM, the less geographically diversified. The results show that both measures of
geographical diversification have a consistent impact on scope economies. Joint firms with more
geographically diversified insurance or banking businesses are less likely to exploit cost scope
economies but are more likely to exploit revenue and profit scope economies, suggesting that
national operations contribute to net profit scope economy gains. This finding is consistent with
our earlier discussions. National operations are sufficient to large sales volumes and, therefore,
contribute to revenue scope economies. However, on the cost side, national operations can be
cost inefficient, and extra costs or expenses can contribute to cost scope diseconomies. The
results show that national operations provide positive net effects on profitability.

88

Herfindahl index for insurers operating in m states is measured as (Y1^2 + Y2^2 + …+ Ym^2 ) / (Y1 + Y2 + …
+ Ym)^2, where Yi is the direct premium written in the ith state.
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We test the hypothesis regarding the insurance distribution systems using three dummy
variables: insurance horizontal integrated distribution (DV_MKT_H = 1, if the insurance
horizontal integrated distribution channels are used), insurance vertical integrated distribution
(DV_MKT_V = 1, if insurance vertical integrated distribution channels are used), and both
insurance horizontal and vertical distributions (DV_MKT_HV = 1, if both horizontal and vertical
integrated distribution channels are used).89

The final classification is omitted from the

regression to avoid linearity. The coefficient on DV_MKT_V is positive, and the coefficient on
DV_MKT_H is negative in the profit scope equation, suggesting that banks affiliated with
vertically integrated insurers could benefit from reusing insurers’ relatively large investments in
advertising, marketing, and brand names and therefore enjoy profit scope economies. However,
these two coefficients are not statistically significant in Table 24.
Some of the other variables included in the regressions also appear related to scope
economies. The capital to asset ratio (C_TO_A) estimated coefficients suggest that a higher
capital to asset ratio leads to cost scope diseconomies and revenue and profit scope economies.
The results are consistent with low risk firms attracting more potential customers; however,
holding additional equity capital can be costly.
The results in Table 24 also suggest that efficient companies are more likely to enjoy
profit scope economies. This is evidenced by the estimated coefficients on the X-efficiency
variables for each industry are positive and significant. This finding supports our last hypothesis.
Since efficient managers are already outperforming their competitors with the ability to achieve
high levels of X-efficiency, they can reuse and extend their managerial talent, experience, and
expertise into the conglomeration. Thus, they can be better able to realize economies of scope,
89

Vertical integrated distribution channels include exclusive/captive agents, direct response, internet, affinity group
marketing, worksite marketing. Horizontal integrated distribution channels include independent agents, brokers,
general agents, career agents, and banks.
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yielding a positive relationship between efficiency and scope economies. Finally, two yeardummy variables are added to the control for any possible effects, and the coefficients are
significant for both sets of regressions.
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CHAPTER 12
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 is a landmark financial services legislation, which
promised the most fundamental reform in the U.S. financial services regulation in more than half
a century. Few doubted the potential for GLB to have a profound impact on financial service
providers and on the market. However, there is a striking lack of empirical research on the
effects of diversification by financial firms. This dissertation presents an empirical analysis of
the insurance and banking sectors of the economy in the post-Gramm-Leach-Bliley era. This
dissertation has sought to contribute new evidence on scope efficiencies from the joint
production of insurance and banking products after the passage of the GLB Act.
The dissertation first identifies domestic assurbanks and bancassurers, and all the unique
subsidiaries of all financial service companies in the U.S. licensed as a commercial bank, thrift,
or insurance company. The data come from a variety of sources. We construct a unique variable
that links the banking and insurance regulatory datasets. The data sample contains 260
diversified firm observations (jointly producing banking and insurance products), 613 insurance
specialist observations (offering insurance products only) and 1,450 bank specialist observations
(offering banking products only) over the three year period 2003 – 2005. The data sample
accounts for 98 percent of life insurance industry assets, 94 percent of property-liability
insurance assets, 88 percent of commercial banks assets, and 81 percent of thrift savings banks
assets.
Following the construction of the dataset, we next conduct a univariate analysis to
investigate the effects of integrating the banking and insurance sectors in the U.S. We evaluate
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the market structure, firm characteristics, and operating performance of financial institutions in
the U.S. integrated banking and insurance industry. The empirical results suggest that both
domestic “assurbanks” and “bancassurers” are large in size and account for significant portions
of the insurance and banking industries. Large commercial or saving banks are more interested in
small-size life and property-liability insurance companies, and large insurance companies are
more likely to extend their traditional business into banking through small-size thrifts. Banks
appear more interested in life insurance than property-liability insurers, and insurers prefer to
affiliate with thrift saving banks than with commercial banks.
Insurance companies owning banking subsidiaries are more geographically diversified
and have relatively higher A.M. Best ratings than insurance specialists and, therefore, they have
presumably lower default risks. Joint producers are more engaged in personal lines than
commercial lines of insurance and are more diversified in their traditional products. Joint firms
have higher non-interest income than bank specialists even after controlling firm size effects.
Firms jointly producing insurance and banking services have higher overall profitability in their
traditional lines of business. Bancassurers perform well in the insurance business, but most
assurbanks lose money in their banking division, evidenced by their negative interest and noninterest margins. Joint producers generally keep higher equity capital in the non-traditional
business divisions, which is evidenced by higher RBC ratios and lower leverage ratios.
The next section of this dissertation examines the existence of scope economies in
financial conglomerations. To do so, we utilize a two-stage procedure econometric method. The
first stage consists of investigating cost, revenue, and profit scope economies for U.S. banks and
insurers by estimating the composite costs, revenue, and profit composite functions. We then use
the results to explain the variation of scope economy estimations and to examine the relationship
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between scope economies and firm characteristics. The scope economy estimates are regressed
upon a set of variables describing firm characteristics and environments.
The estimation results suggest that significant cost scope diseconomies, revenue scope
economies, and weak profit scope economies exist in the post-GLB U.S. integrated banking and
insurance industries. The evidence of cost scope diseconomies suggests that cost savings from
sharing inputs cannot offset the extra costs possibly incurred in joint production and
conglomeration.

The

findings

of

revenue

scope

economies

support

consumption

complementarities, showing that customers may be willing to pay more for the convenience of
one-stop shopping; the findings also suggest that demand side scope efficiency gains also arise
by cross-selling. This finding further suggests that financial conglomerates may target consumers
of financial services in different ways, such as offering higher quality products for which they
charge a premium.
The findings of profit scope economies indicate that revenue scope economies dominate
cost scope diseconomies for joint productions. That is, revenue scope efficiency gains can offset
the cost scope efficiency losses and contribute to net profit scope efficiency gains. In addition,
the findings of an inverse relationship between firm size and cost scope diseconomies and the
positive relationship between firm size and revenue or profit scope economies indicate that scope
economies are variant among different size firms, where small firms are more efficient in cost
saving while large firms are efficient in maintaining large scale distribution networks and, thus,
sales augments.
In the second stage, we use regression analysis to test the determinants of scope
economies. We address the following research questions: Which types of firms are more likely to
benefit from conglomeration? How do firm characteristics explain scope economies differences
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among firms. The regression results suggest that large firms are associated with higher cost
scope diseconomies and higher revenue or profit scope economies than small firms. This is
consistent with the evidence from the first-stage scope economy estimations. Large firms are
more likely to benefit from increased revenue than increased savings when jointly producing
banking and insurance products.
Considering business portfolios and product mix, economies of scope are also found to be
more likely to occur in personal product lines than in commercial lines. This finding suggests
that retail banking and retail insurance products are more homogeneous and can be efficiently
distributed through cross-selling, but commercial customers may prefer expertise and tailored
products to meet their banking and insurance needs. Thus, firms with business portfolios highly
weighted on commercial products struggle to achieve significant sales arising from joint
production. Bancassurers focusing on their traditional banking business are found to be more
profit scope efficient in conducting life and property-liability insurance business simultaneously,
while assurbanks concentrating on insurance business are profit scope inefficient in engaging in
both commercial and thrifts business.
Business diversifications also affect scope economies in joint production. The more
products diversified in insurance, the more likely to exploit cost scope economies but the less
likely to exploit revenue and profit scope economies. In addition, joint producers, which are
more geographically diversified in both the insurance or banking business, are more likely to
realize profit scope economy gains. The results show that national operations impose positive net
effects on scope efficiencies, the significant profit scope economies. Then, the impact of
insurance distribution systems are that banks affiliated with vertically integrated insurers show
higher profit scope economies in joint production.

91

The other firm characteristics affecting scope economies include capital-to-assets ratio
and X-efficiencies. The results suggest the more X-efficient a firm is, the more scope efficient;
and firms with high capital-to-assets ratio present high profit scope economies.
After the passage of GLB, we did not observe the wave of cross-sector conglomerations,
as expected in the U.S. banking and insurance industries. Banks and insurers showed their
hesitation on exercising the new power granted by GLB. Our results further explain why U.S.
banks and insurers have opted for integration at the marketing level rather than the production
level. The cost scope economies on the supply side are not pervasive, and whether the magnitude
of the revenue scope economies on the demand side is large enough to offset the cost increase,
hinders cross-sector expansions.
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1331

45

Bancassurers

Banks w/ ins. agency only

42

# Firms

Assurbanks

Panel C: 2005

1327

45

Bancassurers

Banks w/ ins. agency only

41

# Firms

Assurbanks

Panel B: 2004

1251

44

Bancassurers

Banks w/ ins. agency only

44

Assurbanks

# Firms

NA

24.93%

90.61%

NA

4.01%

99.28%

NA

2.94%

99.16%

% ins. underwriting net income
Mean
Median

NA

23.67%

89.27%

NA

3.00%

97.74%

% ins. underwriting net income
Mean
Median

NA

19.50%

87.58%

% ins. underwriting net income
Mean
Median

5.91%

10.09%

NA

1.74%

5.23%

NA

1.80%

5.60%

NA

1.72%

% ins. Income / non-interest income
Mean
Median

5.84%

10.57%

NA

NA
3.99%

% ins. Income / non-interest income
Mean
Median

5.60%

8.09%

NA

% ins. Income / non-interest income
Mean
Median

This table provides three years statistics summary for insurers with banking business (Assurbanks), banks with insurance underwriting business (Bancassurers), and
banks with insurance agency business only. The statistics reported include the number of firms, the mean and median of the ratio of net insurance underwriting
income to total net income, and the mean and median of the ratio of insurance income to non-interest income.
Panel A: 2003

Table 1 Inusrance Underwriting Net Income / Total Net Income, Insurance Income / Non-interest Income

SLHC
FHC
SLHC
SLHC
SLHC
SLHC
SLHC
SLHC
SLHC
SLHC

Structure
Type
370,656
326,842
245,757
154,415
166,490
148,548
138,694
136,052
121,354
113,890

Total Asset
($M)

FHC
FHC
FHC
FHC
FHC
FHC
FHC
FHC
FHC
FHC

CITIGROUP INC.
COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
BANK ONE CORPORATION
J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO.
HSBC NORTH AMERICA INC.
BANK OF AMERICA CORP
CIBC DELAWARE HOLDINGS INC.
WACHOVIA CORPORATION
NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION

1,264,032
97,958
387,798
326,563
770,912
125,950
736,487
39,210
401,032
113,933

Total Asset
($M)
2,550.0
732.8
233.0
151.0
104.0
72.3
69.2
62.6
60.0
55.6

Underwrit. Income
($M)

52,613.6
34,125.5
19,902.5
8,973.1
20,533.2
48,899.9
14,955.9
25,198.8
33,543.9
10,277.6

Underwrit. Income
($M)

1,256.0
102.2
579.0
67.0
20.0
9.3
74.8
34.2
33.0
16.9

Underwrit. Net Income
($M)

6,370.9
2,121.5
1,122.7
1,314.1
527.9
2,835.8
864.1
1,763.7
3,618.1
552.9

Underwrit. Net Income
($M)

57,047.0
6,116.2
19,418.0
12,631.0
23,444.0
4,592.8
31,056.3
969.6
15,080.0
5,978.8

Bank Interest Income
($M)

31.9
33.2
42.2
0.5
563.0
299.7
0.3
0.5
27.5
0.2

Bank Interest Income
($M)
6,378.4
2,109.4
1,114.5
1,306.4
596.1
2,815.2
863.6
1,767.0
3,614.8
550.5

17,853.0
2,373.0
6,202.0
3,535.0
6,719.0
996.9
10,810.5
-93.1
4,264.0
2,117.1

7.04%
4.31%
9.34%
1.90%
0.30%
0.93%
0.69%
NA
0.77%
0.80%

Total Net Income %Underwrt. Net Inc. to
($M)
Total Net Inc.

7.6
-12.1
-8.2
-7.8
68.2
-20.5
-0.5
3.3
-3.3
-2.3

10.57%
20.40%
8.65%
5.95%
1.38%
6.63%
0.90%
5.90%
3.28%
3.40%

%Ins. Inc. to Noninterest Inc.

0.12%
-0.57%
-0.74%
-0.59%
11.45%
-0.730%
-0.06%
0.19%
-0.09%
-0.42%

Bank Net Income
% Bank Net Inc. to
($M)
Total Net Income ($M)
Total Net Inc.

Note: Assurbanks are insurers who sell banking products manufactured by their banking subsidiaries that are owned and controlled. Bancassurers are banks who sell insurance products, either through its own
distribution channels or outside agents, manufactured by their insurance subsidiaries that are owned and controlled.
FHC: Financial Holding Co.
SLHC: Saving and Loan Holding Co.
NA: Total net income is negative

Structure
Type

Bancassurers Name

Table 2 Panel B: Top 10 Bancassurers (in terms of Underwriting Income)

AMERICAN INTRNL GRP
METLIFE, INC.
PRUDENTIAL OF AMER
TIAA FAMILY OF CO
ING USA HOLDING CORP
STATE FARM IL
NEW YORK LIFE GRP
NATIONWIDE CORP
ALLSTATE CORPORATION
NORTHWESTERN MUT

Assurbanks Name

Table 2 Top 10 Assurbanks and Bancassurers
This table lists the top 10 assurbanks and the top 10 bancassurers, their structure types, and some selected key operating information.
Panel A: Top 10 Assurbanks (in terms of Total Asset)
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Table 3 Distribution of Firms by Num., Assets, Premiums, and Net Income (Life-Health Insurers)
This table provides the distribution and market share of Life-Health (L/H) Insurers in terms of number of firms, total asset, premium income (net
premium earned), and net income.
# Firms
% Firms
% Assets
%Premiums
% Net Income
ALL
182
-- Non-affiliated
110
60.4%
35.0%
41.4%
36.8%
-- Affiliated
72
39.6%
65.0%
58.6%
63.2%
-- Assurbanking
36
19.8%
57.7%
51.6%
53.4%
-- Bancassurance
36
19.8%
7.3%
7.0%
9.8%
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.
Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by
banks. Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which
own or control banks. Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.

Figure 3.a
Distribution of Firms by Assets - (Life-Health Insurers)
Bancassurance
7%

Non-affiliated

Non-affiliated
35%

Assurbanking
Bancassurance

Assurbanking
58%

Figure 3.b
Market Share by Number, Assets, Premiums, Net income - (Life-Health Insurers)
100%

7.3%

7.0%

19.8%

9.8%

80%
19.8%
57.7%

60%

51.6%

53.4%

Bancassurance
Assurbanking
Non-affiliated

40%
60.4%
20%

35.0%

41.4%

36.8%

%Premiums

% Net Income

0%
% Firms

% Assets
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Table 3.1 Distribution of Firms by Num., Assets, Premiums, and Net Income (Property-Liability Insurers)
This table provides the distribution and market share of Property-Liability (P/L) Insurers in terms of number of firms, total asset, premium income
(net premium earned), and net income.
# Firms
% Firms
% Assets
%Premiums
% Net Income
ALL
191
-- Non-affiliated
144
75.4%
65.7%
58.0%
66.7%
-- Affiliated
47
24.6%
34.3%
42.0%
33.3%
-- Assurbanking
25
13.1%
30.9%
39.1%
32.8%
-- Bancassurance
22
11.5%
3.5%
2.9%
0.4%
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.
Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by
banks. Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which
own or control banks. Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.

Figure 3.1.a
Distribution of Firms by Assets - (Property-Liability Insurers)

Bancassurance
3%

Non-affiliated

Assurbanking
31%

Assurbanking
Bancassurance

Non-affiliated
66%

Figure 3.1.b
Market share by Number, Assets, Premiums,Net Income - (Property-Liability Insurers)
100%
80%

3.5%

2.9%

0.4%

11.5%
13.1%

30.9%

39.1%

32.8%

60%

Bancassurance
Assurbanking

40%

75.4%

Non-affiliated
65.7%

58.0%

66.7%

20%
0%
% Firms

% Assets

%Premiums

% Net Income
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Table 4 Firm Size by Total Assets, Premiums, and Net Income -- (Life-Health Insurers)
This table provides average and median Life-Health (L/H) insurers' firm size in terms of total asset, premium income (net premium earned), and
net income. The P-value of t- test is also provided.
Mean ($ Million)
Non-Affi.
Assurbanking
Bancassurance
Affiliated
# Firms

110

Total Assets
Premium Income
Net Income

72
11,164.46
1,685.11
103.84

34,530.79
3,978.30
297.05

36
61,317.55
7,003.38
501.71

Median ($ Million)
Assurbanking
Affiliated
2,656.45
21,231.63
363.93
3,095.84
32.28
273.51

Non-Affi.
Total Assets
Premium Income
Net Income

36

2,282.10
484.48
21.68

7,744.03
953.22
92.40

Bancassurance
125.96
9.63
1.82

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.
Assurb.~Bancass.
Total Assets
0.00
0.00
0.22
0.00
Premium Income
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.41
0.00
Net Income
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.
Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by
banks. Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which
own or control banks. Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.
Non-affi.~ Affi.

Figure 4.a
Firm Size by Assets, Premiums, Net Income (mean) ($ M) - (Life-Health Insurers)
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Figure 4.b
Firm Size by Assets, Premium, Net Income (median) ($ M) - (Life-Health Insurers)
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Table 4.1 Firm Size by Total Assets, Premiums, and Net Income -- (Property-Liability Insurers)
This table provides average and median Property-Liability (P/L) insurers' firm size in terms of total asset, premium income (net premium earned),
and net income. The P-value of t- test is also provided.
Mean ($ Million)
Non-Affi.
Assurbanking
Bancassurance
Affiliated
# Firms

144

Total Assets
Premium Income
Net Income

47
5,131.53
1,336.28
131.98

9,077.07
3,273.66
222.54

22
15,344.38
5,733.38
413.09

Median ($ Million)
Assurbanking
Affiliated
1,055.72
3,341.98
409.98
1,312.96
36.11
59.69

Non-Affi.
Total Assets
Premium Income
Net Income

25

1,475.96
469.69
22.68

1,955.13
478.52
6.00

Bancassurance
225.31
58.51
8.87

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.
Assurb.~Bancass.
Total Assets
0.11
0.04
0.02
0.01
Premium Income
0.06
0.03
0.01
0.01
Net Income
0.22
0.08
0.01
0.02
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.
Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by
banks. Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which
own or control banks. Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.
Non-affi.~ Affi.

Figure 4.1.a
Firm Size by Assets, Premium, Net Income (mean) ($ M) - (Property-Liability Insurers)
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Figure 4.1.b
Firm Size by Assets, Premium, Net Income (median) ($ M) - (Property-Liability Insurers)
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Table 5 A.M. Best Rating
This table provides A.M. Best Financial Strength Rating for insurers. A.M. Best's Financial Strength Rating is an independent opinion,
based on a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative evaluation, of an insurance company's balance sheet strength, operating
performance and business profile. Its rating scale and associated descriptions include: A++, A+ (Superior); A, A- (Excellent); B++, B+ (Very
Good); B, B- (Fair); C++, C+ (Marginal); C, C- (Weak); D (Poor); NR (Not Rated). Since the A.M. Best Rating is assigned to individual firms
not groups, the firms analyzed here are non-grouped life or property-liability insurers.
Panel A: Life-Health Insurers' A.M.Best Rating
Non-Affi.
All Affi.
Assurbanking
Bancassurance
A++, A+ (Superior)
74
108
83
25
A, A- (Excellent)
177
70
47
23
B++, B+(Very Good)
46
12
4
8
B, B- (Fair)
13
4
0
4
<= C++ (Weak or Poor)
4
1
0
1
NR (Not Rated)
55
48
25
23
Total
369
243
159
84
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.
Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or
controled by banks. Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding
companies, which own or control banks. Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassuranceaffiliated L/H insurers.

Distribution of AM.Best Ratings -- (Life-Health Insurers)
100%
90%
80%

NR (Not Rated)

70%

<= C++ (Weak or Poor)

60%
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50%

B++, B+(Very Good)

40%

A, A- (Excellent)

30%

A++, A+ (Superior)

20%
10%
0%
Non-Affi.

Assurbanking

Bancassurance

Table 5 Panel B: Property-Liability Insurers' A.M.Best Rating
Non-Affi.
All Affi.
Assurbanking
Bancassurance
A++, A+ (Superior)
261
103
102
1
A, A- (Excellent)
491
203
161
42
B++, B+(Very Good)
53
16
13
3
B, B- (Fair)
47
3
1
2
<= C++ (Weak or Poor)
13
1
0
1
NR (Not Rated)
103
43
22
21
Total
968
369
299
70
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.
Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or
controled by banks. Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding
companies, which own or control banks. Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassuranceaffiliated P/L insurers.

Distributions of AM Best Ratings --(Property-Liability Insurers)
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Table 6 Geographic Diversification: Number of States Insurers Licenced in.
This table shows insurers' geographic diversification. It reports the average and median number of states in the U.S. L/H and P/L insurers licenced in to
do insurance business. The P-value of t -test is provided below.
Panel A: Life-Health Insurers' Geographic Diversification : Num. of States Insurers Licensed in.
Non-Affi.
Average Num. of States Licenced in
Median Num. of States Licenced in

All Affi.

Assurbanking

33
47

32
47

Bancassurance
36
48

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.

Non-affi.~ Affi.

25
24

Assurb.~Bancass.

0.10
0.00
0.00
Average Num. of States Licenced in
0.25
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks. Assurbankingaffiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks.
Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control
banks. Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.

Number of States Insurer Licenced in -- (Life-Health Insurers)

40

48

47

50

33

36

30

25

Non-Affi.

24

Assurbanking

20
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10
0
Average Num. of States Licenced in

Median Num. of States Licenced in

Table 6 Panel B: Property-Liability Insurers' Geographic Diversification : Num. of States Insurers Licensed in.
Non-Affi.
Average Num. of States Licenced in
Median Num. of States Licenced in

All Affi.

Assurbanking

27
28

Non-affi.~ Affi.

41
43

Bancassurance
44
45

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.

33
26

Assurb.~Bancass.

Average Num. of States Licenced in
0.25
0.14
0.23
0.11
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks. Assurbankingaffiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks.
Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control
banks. Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.

Number of States Insurer is Licenced --(Property-Liability Insurers)
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Table 7 Number of Affiliated vs. Non-Affiliated by Insurance Line -- (Life-Health Insurers)
This table examines the product mix of Life-Health (L/H) insurers. L/H insurance products are categorized as (1) individual life, (2) individual annuity, (3)
credit life, (4) group life, (5) group annuity, and (6) accident & health insurance.
Non-Affiliated
# firms w/ business share
% firm w/ share
# Firms
>50%
>50%
% Firms
Prem. Inc. ($M)
Product Line
Individual Life
Individual Annuity
Credit Life
Group Life
Group Annuity
Accident & Health

112
102
25
102
66
106

Product Line

# Firms

31
27
1
1
8
28

# firms w/ business share
>50%

27.7%
26.5%
4.0%
1.0%
12.1%
26.4%
Affiliated
% firm w/ share
>50%

93.3%
85.0%
20.8%
85.0%
55.0%
88.3%

% Firms

27,127.1
66,659.0
342.0
8,988.1
34,136.5
64,949.7

Prem. Inc ($M)

Individual Life
57
16
28.1%
79.2%
68,767.0
Individual Annuity
50
15
30.0%
69.4%
93,352.0
Credit Life
28
4
14.3%
38.9%
507.6
Group Life
48
2
4.2%
66.7%
15,657.6
Group Annuity
31
2
6.5%
43.1%
68,448.1
Accident & Health
56
11
19.6%
77.8%
39,493.6
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.
Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by
banks. Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or
control banks. Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.

Figure 7.a
% Firm with >50% Business Share in each Product Line - (Life-Health Insurers)
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Figure 7.b
Premium Income by Product Line - (Life-Health Insurers)
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Table 7.1 Number of Affiliated vs. Non-Affiliated by Insurance Line (Property-Liability Insurers)
This table examines the product mix of Property-Liability (P/L) insurers. P/L insurance products are categorized as (1) personal property, (2) personal
liability, (3) commercial property, and (4) commercial liability. Table 15 lists detail P/L products and lines of business definitions.
Non-Affiliated
# firms w/ business share
% firm w/ share
# Firms
>50%
>50%
% Firms
Prem. Inc. ($M)
Product Line
Personal Property
Personal Liability
Commercial Property
Commercial Liability

117
114
137
149

2.6%
22.8%
12.4%
59.1%

73.6%
71.7%
86.2%
93.7%

Affiliated
% firm w/ share
>50%

# firms w/ business share
>50%

# Firms

Product Line

3
26
17
88

% Firms

30857.9
57650.1
31575.3
92384.6

Prem. Inc ($M)

Personal Property
34
2
5.9%
72.3%
33887.7
Personal Liability
32
14
43.8%
68.1%
66375.4
Commercial Property
41
9
22.0%
87.2%
14774.0
Commercial Liability
36
10
27.8%
76.6%
39269.5
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks. Assurbankingaffiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks.
Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control
banks. Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.

Figure 7.1.a
% of Firms with > 50% Business Share by each Product Line - (Property-Liability Insurers)
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Figure 7.1.b
Premium Income by Product Line - (Property-Liability Insurers)
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Table 8 Insurers Products Concentration Herfindahl Index ( Focused vs. Multi-lines)
This table shows insurers products concentration level in insurance industry. The products concentration level was measured by herfindahl index,
which approach to one when insurers are more focused producing. L/H insurance products are categorized as individual life, individual annuity,
credit life, group life, group annuity, and accident & health insurance. P/L insurance products are categorized as personal property, personal
liability, commercial property, and commercial liability.
Panel A: Life-Health Insurers Product Concentration Herfindahl Index ( Focused vs. Multi-lines)
Product Herfindahl Index
Assurbanking
Affiliated

Non-Affi.
Mean
Median

56.6%
52.8%

52.2%
47.5%

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.

Non-affi.~ Affi.
Product Herfindahl Index

58.1%
53.5%

Bancassurance

0.37

0.35

65.5%
61.2%

Assurb.~Bancass.

0.43

0.46

Figure 8.a
Product Concentration Herfindahl Index - (Life-Health Insurers)
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Table 8 Panel B: Property-Liability Insurers Product Concentration Herfindahl Index ( Focused vs. Multi-lines)
Product Herfindahl Index
Assurbanking
All Affi.

Non-Affi.
Mean
Median

62.5%
51.7%

49.2%
43.6%

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.

Non-affi.~ Affi.
Product Herfindahl Index

58.8%
49.9%

Bancassurance

0.00

0.11

69.8%
65.2%

Assurb.~Bancass.
0.01

0.27

Figure 8.b
Product Concentration Herfindahl Index - (Property-Liability Insurers)
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Table 9 Insurers Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE)
This table reports insurers' overall performance - Return on Asset (ROA), and Return on Equity (ROE). The P-value of t -test is provided
below in both Panel A and Panel B.
Panel A: Life-Health Insurers ROA , ROE
Mean (%)
Non-Affi.
ROA
ROE

1.4%
6.6%

Non-Affi.
ROA
ROE

Assurbanking

Affiliated
1.8%
8.7%

Affiliated
0.7%
8.1%

Bancassurance
1.3%
13.4%

Median (%)
Assurbanking
0.8%
8.3%

2.3%
3.9%

Bancassurance
0.8%
10.6%

0.7%
5.9%

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.
Assurb.~Bancass.
ROA
0.23
0.48
0.16
0.17
ROE
0.19
0.18
0.01
0.00
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.
Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or
controled by banks. Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their
holding companies, which own or control banks. Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or
Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.
Non-affi.~ Affi.

Financial Conditions -- ROA, ROE (mean) - (Life-Health Insurers)
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%

13.4%
Non-Affiliated
6.6%

1.4%

1.3%

Assurbanking
Bancassurance

3.9%

2.3%

ROA

ROE

Table 9 Panel B: Property-Liability Insurers ROA , ROE
Mean (%)
Non-Affi.
ROA
ROE

All Affi.
1.7%
1.5%

Non-Affi.
ROA
ROE

All Affi.
1.9%
5.6%

Assurbanking
5.8%
10.5%

Bancassurance
2.5%
6.1%

Median (%)
Assurbanking
3.1%
7.0%

9.7%
15.5%

Bancassurance
2.7%
6.3%

3.5%
8.3%

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.
Assurb.~Bancass.
ROA
0.01
0.08
0.02
0.03
ROE
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.05
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.
Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or
controled by banks. Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their
holding companies, which own or control banks. Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or
Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.
Non-affi.~ Affi.

Financial Conditions -- ROA, ROE (mean) - (Property-Liability Insurers)
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%

15.5%
Non-Affiliated

9.7%
6.1%

Assurbanking
Bancassurance

1.7%

2.5%

ROA

1.5%

ROE
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Table 10.1 Insurers Profitability Test
Panel A: Life-Health Insurers Profitability Test
This table provides results of the profitability test for Life-Health (L/H) insurers. Four profitability ratios are compared: (1) Total Benefits Paid as a percentage of Net
Premiums Written -- Benefits paid include death benefits, matured endowments, annuity benefits, accident and health benefits, disability and surrender benefits, group
conversions, coupons and payments on supplementary contracts, interest on policy or contract funds and other miscellaneous benefits. (2) Commissions and Expenses
Incurred as a percentage of Net Premiums Written -- Commissions and expenses include payments on both direct and assumed business, general insurance expenses,
insurance taxes, licenses and fees, increase in loading and other miscellaneous expenses, and exclude commissions and expense allowances received on reinsurance
ceded. (3) Net Operating Gain (after taxes) as a percentage of Total Assets -- Total assets are the mean of current and prior year admitted assets and this test measures
insurance earnings in relation to the company's total asset base. (4) Net investment income as a percent of invested assets -- Investment assets are the mean of cash
and invested assets plus accrued investment income minus borrowed money.
Mean
Non-Affi.
Benefits Paid to NPW (%)
Comm and Expenses to NPW (%)
NOG to Total Assets (%)
Yield On Invested Assets (%)

All Affi.
104.1%
66.3%
1.8%
5.4%

104.9%
35.1%
2.9%
5.3%

Assurbanking
108.2%
36.3%
2.4%
5.5%

Bancassurance
98.8%
33.0%
3.9%
4.9%

Assurbanking
64.5%
18.1%
1.0%
5.8%

Bancassurance
58.7%
19.3%
1.1%
5.0%

Median
Non-Affi.
Benefits Paid to NPW (%)
Comm and Expenses to NPW (%)
NOG to Total Assets (%)
Yield On Invested Assets (%)

All Affi.
64.5%
26.5%
1.0%
5.6%

62.4%
18.4%
1.0%
5.6%

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.
Assurb.~Bancass.
Benefits Paid to NPW (%)
0.48
0.41
0.40
0.35
0.00
0.01
0.00
Comm and Expenses to NPW (%)
0.38
NOG to Total Assets (%)
0.02
0.18
0.01
0.05
0.04
0.01
Yield On Invested Assets (%)
0.43
0.20
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks. Assurbanking-affiliated L/H
insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks. Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are
those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control banks. Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbankingaffiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.
Non-affi.~ Affi.

Table 10.1 Panel B: Property-Liability Insurers Profitability Test
This table provides results of the profitability test for Property-Liability (P/L) insurers. Five profitability ratios are compared: (1) Loss Ratio -- The ratio of incurred losses and
loss adjustment expenses to net premiums earned. This ratio measures the company's underlying profitability, or loss experience on its total book of business. (2) Expense
Ratio -- The ratio of underwriting expenses (including commissions) to Net Premiums Written. This ratio measures the company's operational efficiency in underwriting its
book of business. (3) Combined Ratio -- This ratio is the sum of the Loss Ratio and Expense Ratio. This ratio measures a company's overall underwriting profitability. (4)
Yield on Invested Assets -- The ratio of annual net investment income divided by the mean of cash and net invested assets. This ratio measures the average return on a
company's invested assets, before capital gains or losses and income taxes. (5) Return on Policyholders' Surplus (PHS) -- "Return" is calculated as the overall after-tax
profitability from underwriting and investment activity, including unrealized capital gains. This ratio measures a company's efficiency in utilizing its surplus on a total return basis.
Mean
Non-Affi.
Loss Ratio (%)
Expense Ratio (%)
Combined Ratio (%)
Yield on Invested Assets (%)
Return on PHS (%)

All Affi.
89.4%
41.2%
121.6%
3.99%
7.9%

73.0%
56.4%
111.4%
4.60%
13.2%

Assurbanking
79.5%
57.4%
113.8%
4.60%
11.6%

Bancassurance
51.5%
52.6%
103.1%
4.57%
20.0%

Assurbanking
69.5%
27.6%
96.3%
4.40%
7.4%

Bancassurance
56.7%
30.2%
96.4%
3.70%
8.6%

Median
Non-Affi.
Loss Ratio (%)
Expense Ratio (%)
Combined Ratio (%)
Yield on Invested Assets (%)
Return on PHS (%)

All Affi.
72.1%
27.4%
100.2%
4.10%
6.8%

68.8%
27.9%
96.3%
4.30%
7.5%

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.
Assurb.~Bancass.
0.02
0.00
0.00
Loss Ratio (%)
0.14
0.08
0.10
Expense Ratio (%)
0.24
0.40
Combined Ratio (%)
0.15
0.24
0.18
0.31
0.01
0.01
Yield on Invested Assets (%)
0.14
0.48
0.00
0.00
0.07
Return on PHS (%)
0.15
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks. Assurbanking-affiliated P/L
insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks. Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are
those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control banks. Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbankingaffiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.
Non-affi.~ Affi.
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Table 10.2 Insurers Leverage Test
Panel A: Life-Health Insurers Leverage Test
This table shows the results of the leverage test for Life-Health (L/H) Insurers. Four leverage measures are compared: (1) Net Premium Written
(NPW) to Capital and Surplus -- This reflects the leverage, after reinsurance assumed and ceded, of the company's current volume of net business
in relation to its capital and surplus. (2) Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio -- The BCAR compares an insurer’s adjusted surplus relative to the required
capital necessary to support its operating and investment risks. (3) Capital and Surplus to Liability -- This test measures the relationship of capital
and surplus to the company's unpaid obligations after reinsurance assumed and ceded. (4) Reinsurance Leverage Ratio --The relationship of total
reserves ceded plus commissions and expenses due on reinsurance ceded plus other refunds due or recoverable from reinsurers to total capital
and surplus.
Mean
Non-Affi.
All Affi.
Assurbanking
Bancassurance
NPW to Capital and Surplus (%)
200%
181.66%
212.67%
122.86%
Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) (%)
224.64%
288.23%
207.05%
429.71%
RBC Ratio (%)
323.78%
374.11%
367.38%
415.40%
Capital and Surplus to Liability (%)
137.45%
184.93%
154.16%
243.50%
Reinsurance Leverage (%)
163.38%
113.96%
128.82%
80.10%

Non-Affi.
NPW to Capital and Surplus (%)
Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) (%)
RBC Ratio (%)
Capital and Surplus to Liability (%)
Reinsurance Leverage (%)

130%
163.00%
323.58%
21.50%
58.80%

Median
All Affi.
Assurbanking
130.00%
150.00%
175.50%
174.00%
748.28%
413.87%
23.40%
17.20%
22.85%
24.10%

Bancassurance
50.00%
194.00%
904.93%
85.80%
20.90%

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi.~ Affi.
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.
Assurb.~Bancass.
NPW to Capital and Surplus (%)
0.22
0.31
0.00
0.00
Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) (%)
0.02
0.21
0.00
0.00
RBC Ratio (%)
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.10
Capital and Surplus to Liability (%)
0.03
0.28
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.09
0.00
0.04
Reinsurance Leverage (%)
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.
Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by
banks. Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which
own or control banks. Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.

Table 10.2 Panel B: Property-Liability Insurers Leverage Test
This table provides the results of leverage test for Property-Liability (P/L) insurers. Four leverage ratios are compared: (1) Net Premium Written
(NPW) to Policyholders' Surplus -- This ratio measures a company’s net retained premium in relation to its surplus and exposure to pricing errors.
(2) Net Leverage Ratio -- This represents the sum of a company's NPW to Policyholders' Surplus and Net Liabilities to Policyholders' Surplus. (3)
Gross Leverage Ratio -- This represents the sum of Net Leverage and Ceded Reinsurance Leverage, which is calculated. (4) Best's Capital
Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) -- The BCAR compares an insurer’s adjusted surplus relative to the required capital necessary to support its operating and
investment risks.
Mean
Non-Affi.
All Affi.
Assurbanking
Bancassurance
NPW to Policyholders' Surplus (%)
102%
102%
104%
95%
Net Leverage (%)
392%
215%
208%
249%
Gross Leverage (%)
494%
385%
386%
381%
Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) (%)
201.25%
238.63%
227.20%
304.37%
RBC Ratio (%)
233.64%
279.00%
276.53%
308.54%
Median
Non-Affi.
NPW to Policyholders' Surplus (%)
Net Leverage (%)
Gross Leverage (%)
Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) (%)
RBC Ratio (%)

90%
230%
290%
184.10%
267.75%

All Affi.
100%
150%
220%
187.70%
418.57%

Assurbanking
105%
130%
220%
183.60%
343.36%

Bancassurance
60%
170%
220%
216.50%
502.83%

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi.~ Affi.
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.
Assurb.~Bancass.
NPW to Policyholders' Surplus (%)
0.49
0.36
0.37
0.33
Net Leverage (%)
0.16
0.05
0.05
0.10
Gross Leverage (%)
0.21
0.22
0.21
0.48
Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio (BCAR) (%)
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.03
RBC Ratio (%)
0.19
0.19
0.29
0.44
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks.
Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by
banks. Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which
own or control banks. Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.
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Table 10.3 Insurers Liquidity Test
Panel A: Life-Health Insurers Leverage Test
This table provides the results of leverage test for Life-Health (L/H) insurers. Four leverage ratios are compared: (1) Quick Liquidity Ratio -- The ratio of
unaffiliated quick assets to liabilities. Quick assets include cash, short-term investments, 80% of unaffiliated common stock, Government bonds maturing
in five years or less and all other bonds (excluding affiliates) maturing in one year or less. (2) Current Liquidity Ratio – The ratio of unaffiliated invested
assets, excluding mortgages and real estate, to liabilities. This test measures the proportion of liabilities covered by cash and unaffiliated investment
assets holdings. (3) Operating Cash Flow to Total Assets – Operating cash flow is the change in cash and invested assets attributable to net underwriting
and net investment income. This ratio measures a company’s ability to meet current obligations through the internal generation of funds from insurance
operations. (4) Non-Investment Grade Bonds to Capital – The designation as non-investment grade utilizes the bond quality classifications that coincide
with different bond ratings assigned by major credit rating agencies. This test measures exposure to non-investment grade bonds as a percentage of capital and surplus.

Quick Liquidity (%)
Current Liquidity (%)
Operating CF to Total Asset (%)
Non-Invest. Grade Bonds to Capital and Surplus (%)

Non-Affi.
88.13%
191.63%
2.92%
41.2%

All Affi.
116.55%
229.67%
4.54%
41%

Mean
Assurbanking
110.7%
212.2%
5.9%
44.8%

Bancassurance
129.34%
267.8%
2.0%
33.4%

Quick Liquidity (%)
Current Liquidity (%)
Operating CF to Total Asset (%)
Non-Invest. Grade Bonds to Capital and Surplus (%)

Non-Affi.
17.95%
105.90%
3.64%
30.4%

Median
All Affi.
Assurbanking
15.20%
13.3%
108.80%
103.3%
2.75%
3.8%
33%
39.6%

Bancassurance
23.00%
139.8%
0.5%
20.4%

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi.~ Affi.
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.
Assurb.~Bancass.
Quick Liquidity (%)
0.09
0.18
0.10
0.31
Current Liquidity (%)
0.04
0.21
0.01
0.08
Operating CF to Total Asset (%)
0.11
0.01
0.34
0.04
Non-Invest. Grade Bonds to Capital and Surplus (%)
0.48
0.22
0.09
0.03
Non-affiliated L/H insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks. Assurbankingaffiliated L/H insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks.
Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control
banks. Affiliated L/H insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated L/H insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated L/H insurers.

Table 10.3 Panel B: Property-Liability Insurers Liquidity Test

This table provides the results of leverage test for Property-Liability (P/L) insurers. The liquidity ratios used for P/L insurers are similar to those for L/H
insurers: (1) Quick Liquidity Ratio -- The ratio of unaffiliated quick assets to liabilities. Quick assets are defined as the sum of cash, unaffiliated short-term
investments, unaffiliated bonds maturing within one year, government bonds maturing within five years, and 80% of unaffiliated common stocks. (2)
Current Liquidity Ratio – The ratio of unaffiliated invested assets, excluding mortgages and real estate, to liabilities. (3) Operating Cash Flow to Total
Assets – Operating cash flow is the change in cash and invested assets attributable to net underwriting and net investment income after policyholder
dividends and federal income taxes. This ratio measures a company’s ability to meet current obligations through the internal generation of funds from
insurance operations. (4) Non-Investment Grade Bonds to Capital – The designation as non-investment grade utilizes the bond quality classifications that
coincide with different bond ratings assigned by major credit rating agencies. This test measures exposure to non-investment grade bonds as a percentage of capital and s

Quick Liquidity (%)
Current Liquidity (%)
Operating CF to Total Asset (%)
Non-Invest. Grade Bonds to Capital and Surplus (%)

Quick Liquidity (%)
Current Liquidity (%)
Operating CF to Total Asset (%)
Non-Invest. Grade Bonds to Capital and Surplus (%)

Mean
Assurbanking
291.3%
470.5%
5.1%
5.2%

Bancassurance
306.3%
442.4%
3.8%
3.2%

Median
Assurbanking
69.7%
63.6%
225.3%
217.8%
5.0%
5.2%
2.9%
3.0%

Bancassurance
102.2%
242.0%
2.5%
1.2%

Non-Affi.
216.4%
325.6%
4.8%
7.0%

All Affi.
293.8%
465.9%
3.8%
4.8%

Non-Affi.

All Affi.

54.1%
141.5%
5.2%
3.8%

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi.~ Affi.
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.
Assurb.~Bancass.
Quick Liquidity (%)
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.39
Current Liquidity (%)
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.30
Operating CF to Total Asset (%)
0.02
0.02
0.39
0.03
Non-Invest. Grade Bonds to Capital and Surplus (%)
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.04
Non-affiliated P/L insurers are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with banks. Assurbankingaffiliated P/L insurers are those directly owned by banks or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by banks.
Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers are those affiliated with banks by directly holding banks or through their holding companies, which own or control
banks. Affiliated P/L insurers refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated P/L insurers or Bancassurance-affiliated P/L insurers.
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Table 11 Distribution of Firms by Num., Assets, Deposits, and Net Income -- (Commercial Banks)
This table provides the distribution and market share of Commercial Banks (CBs) in terms of number of firms, total asset, total deposit, and net
income.
# firms
% Firms
% Assets
% Deposits
%Net Income
ALL
437
-- Bancassurance
48
11.0%
57.6%
55.0%
57.1%
-- Non-Affiliated
389
89.0%
42.4%
45.0%
42.9%
- w/ ins.
46
10.5%
19.1%
19.9%
19.9%
- w/o ins.
343
78.5%
23.3%
25.1%
23.0%
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control
insurers. Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by
insurers. Since the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Nonaffiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance
companies. Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance products
as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.
Figure 11.a
Distribution of Firms by Assets -- (Commercial Banks)
Non-Affi. No ins.
23%

Bancassurance
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Figure 11.b
Market Share by Number, Assets, Deposits, Net Income -- (Commercial Banks)
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Table 11.1 Distribution of Firms by Num., Assets, Deposits, and Net Income -- (Thrift Saving Banks)
This table provides the distribution and market share of Thrift Saving Banks (SBs) in terms of number of firms, total asset, total deposit, and net
income.
# Firms
% Firms
% Assets
% Deposits
%Net Income
Final Data
185
-- Affiliated
53
28.6%
34.1%
34.0%
36.1%
- Assurbanking
39
21.1%
5.0%
6.3%
2.7%
- Bancassurance
14
7.6%
29.1%
27.6%
33.4%
-- Non-Affiliated
132
71.4%
65.9%
66.0%
63.9%
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies.
Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by insurers.
Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control
insurers. Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.
Figure 11.1.a
Distribution of firms by Assets -- (Thrift Saving Banks)
Assurbanking
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Assurbanking
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Figure 11.1.b
Market Share by Number, Assets, Deposits, Net Income -- (Thrift Saving Banks)
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Table 12 Firm Size by Assets, Total Deposits, Net Income ($ M) -- (Commercial Banks)
This table provides average and median Commercial Banks' (CBs) firm size in terms of total asset, premium income (net premium earned),
and net income. The P-value of t- test is also provided.
Mean ($ Million)
Bancassurance
Non-Affiliated
Non-affi. w/ ins.
Non-affi. w/o ins.
# Firms
48
389
46
343
Total Assets
Total Deposits
Net Income

82,018.7
49,757.7
1,120.1

Total Assets
Total Deposits
Net Income

Bancassurance
4,213.1
2,845.4
58.3

8,531.7
5,764.2
119.3

28,333.9
18,743.9
407.2

5,422.8
3,726.4
74.1

Median ($Million)
Non-Affiliated
Non-affi. w/ ins.
2,210.1
11,689.0
1,610.2
8,044.4
26.1
121.4

Non-affi. w/o ins.
1,974.2
1,480.2
23.2

t - Test (P-value)
Bancass. ~ Non-affi.

Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/
ins.

Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/o Non-affi. w/ ins. ~ Nonins.
affi. w/o ins.

Total Assets
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.00
Total Deposits
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.00
Net Income
0.01
0.04
0.00
0.00
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or
control insurers. Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are
owned or controled by insurers. Since the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to
bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Non-affiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding
companies they belong to) with insurance companies. Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance
companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance products as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.

Figure 12.a
Firm Size by Assets, Total Deposits, and Net Income (mean) ($ M) -- (Commercial Banks)

82,019
80000
70000
60000

49,758

Non-affi. w/o ins.

50000

Non-affi. w/ ins.

40000

28,334

30000

Bancassurance

18,744

20000
10000

5,423

3,726

74

0
Total Assets

Total Deposits

407 1,120

Net Income

Figure 12.b
Firm Size by Assets, Total Deposits, and Net Income (median) ($ M) -- (Commercial Banks)
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Table 12.1 Firm Size by Assets, Total Deposits, Net Income ($ M) -- (Thrift Saving Banks)
This table provides average and median Thrift Saving Banks' (SBs) firm size in terms of total asset, premium income (net premium earned),
and net income. The P-value of t- test is also provided.
Mean ($ Million)
Non-Affiliated
Affiliated
Assurbanking
Bancassurance
# Firms
132
53
39
14
Total Assets
Total Deposits
Net Income

5,185.6
3,165.5
65.0

Total Assets
Total Deposits
Net Income

Non-Affiliated
2,191.2
1,449.5
22.2

6,690.6
4,058.9
91.6

1,327.4
1,028.6
9.3

21,630.8
12,500.5
321.0

Median ($Million)
Affiliated
Assurbanking
179.1
94.8
133.8
57.5
0.9
0.2

Bancassurance
1,259.0
757.0
27.9

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.

Non-affi.~ Affi.

Assurb.~Bancass.

Total Assets
0.37
0.00
0.17
0.12
Total Deposits
0.37
0.00
0.17
0.12
Net Income
0.34
0.00
0.15
0.10
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance
companies. Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or
controled by insurers. Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding
companies, which own or control insurers. Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.

Figure 12.1.a
Firm Size by Assets, Total Deposits, and Net Income (mean) ($ M) -- (Thrift Saving Banks)
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Figure 12.1.b
Firm Size by Assets, Total Deposits, and Net Income (median) ($ M) -- (Thrift Saving Banks)
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Table 13 Total Deposit, Interest Bearing Deposit, Total Loan & Lease
This table shows the portfolio of traditional banking products. The traditional banking products are deposits on the liability side of the balance sheet and
loans on the asset side. Total deposits include deposits and saving accounts that either require interest payment or are not allowed to pay interest.
Interest bearing deposits only include those requiring interest payment, such as savings accounts and time deposits. Total loans and lease include
loans to individuals, commercial and industrial loans, and all other loan and lease. To smooth out size effects we scale Total Deposits, Interest Bearing
Deposits, and Total Loans & Lease by total asset.
Panel A: Commerical Banks: Total Deposit, Interest Bearing Deposit, Total Loan & Lease
Mean
Bancassurance
Total Deposit
Interest Bearing Deposit
Total Loan & Lease

Non-Affiliated
0.64
0.55
0.57

Median
Non-Affiliated
0.76
0.63
0.65

Bancassurance
Total Deposit
Interest Bearing Deposit
Total Loan & Lease

0.71
0.59
0.61

Bancass. ~ Non-affi.

Non-affi. w/ ins.
0.74
0.61
0.63

0.70
0.58
0.64

Non-affi. w/o ins.
0.75
0.62
0.63

0.70
0.58
0.66

Non-affi. w/o ins.
0.77
0.64
0.65

Non-affi. w/ ins.

t - Test (P-value)
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/ Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/o
ins.
ins.

Non-affi. w/ ins. ~ Nonaffi. w/o ins.

0.00
0.07
0.00
0.00
Total Deposit
Interest Bearing Deposit
0.03
0.17
0.02
0.01
0.04
0.03
0.05
Total Loan & Lease
0.28
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control
insurers. Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by
insurers. Since the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Nonaffiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance
companies. Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance products
as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.
Figure 13.a

Deposit, Interest Bearing Deposit, Total Loan & Lease
(scaled by Asset) (mean) -- (Commercial Banks)
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Table 13 Panel B: Thrift Saving Banks: Total Deposit, Interest Bearing Deposit, Total Loan & Lease
Mean
Non-Affiliated
Total Deposit
Interest Bearing Deposit
Total Loan & Lease

Affiliated
0.67
0.63
0.64

Assurbanking
0.53
0.48
0.42

0.52
0.49
0.36

Bancassurance
0.55
0.45
0.60

0.64
0.61
0.35

Bancassurance
0.61
0.52
0.72

Median
Non-Affiliated
Total Deposit
Interest Bearing Deposit
Total Loan & Lease

Affiliated
0.68
0.62
0.66

Assurbanking
0.64
0.61
0.53

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.

Non-affi.~ Affi.

Assurb.~Bancass.

0.00
0.00
0.05
Total Deposit
0.37
0.00
0.01
0.01
Interest Bearing Deposit
0.32
0.00
0.00
0.02
Total Loan & Lease
0.34
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies.
Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by insurers.
Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control
insurers. Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.
Figure 13.b

Deposit, Interest Bearing Deposit, and Total Loan & Lease
(scaled by Asset) (mean) -- (Thrift Saving Banks)
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Table 13.1 Interest Income and Non-Interest Income
Panel A: Commercial Banks Performance: Interest Income, Non-Interest Income, %Non-interest Income to Interest Income
This table provides the statistics of Commercial Banks' (CBs) Interest Income, Non-Interest Income, and Ratio of Non-interest Income to Interest
Income between banks. Interest income includes interest and fee income on loans, income from lease financing receivables, interest income on
balances due from depository institutions, interest and dividend income on securities, and other interest income. Non-interest income comes from
fiduciary activities, service charges on deposit accounts, investment banking, advisory, brokerage, and underwriting fees and commissions. To control
for the size effect, we scale them by total asset.

Interest Income
Non-Interest Income
%Non-interest Income to Interest income

Bancassurance
0.061
0.076
0.753

Mean
Non-Affiliated
0.048
0.017
0.385

Non-affi. w/ ins.
0.047
0.020
0.432

Non-affi. w/o ins.
0.049
0.017
0.377

Interest Income
Non-Interest Income
%Non-interest Income to Interest income

Bancassurance
0.046
0.022
0.429

Median
Non-Affiliated
Non-affi. w/ ins.
0.048
0.048
0.011
0.016
0.234
0.323

Non-affi. w/o ins.
0.048
0.011
0.222

t - Test (P-value)
Bancass. ~ Non-affi.

Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/
ins.

Bancass. ~ Non-affi.
w/o ins.

Non-affi. w/ ins. ~ Nonaffi. w/o ins.

0.06
0.05
0.06
Interest Income
0.17
Non-Interest Income
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.14
%Non-interest Income to Interest income
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.23
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control
insurers. Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by
insurers. Since the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Nonaffiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance
companies. Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance products
as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.
Figure 13.1.a
Interest Income and Non-Interest Income
(scaled by asset) (mean) -- (Commercial Banks)
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Table 13.1 Panel B: Thrift Saving Banks Performance: Interest Income, Non-Interest Income, %Non-Interest Income to Interest Income
This table provides the statistics of Thrift Saving Banks' (SBs) Interest Income, Non-Interest Income, and Ratio of Non-interest Income to Interest
Income between banks. Interest income includes interest and fee income on loans, income from lease financing receivables, interest income on
balances due from depository institutions, interest and dividend income on securities, and other interest income. Non-interest income comes from
fiduciary activities, service charges on deposit accounts, investment banking, advisory, brokerage, and underwriting fees and commissions. To control
for the size effect, we scale them by total asset.
Mean
Non-Affiliated
Interest Income
Non-Interest Income
%Non-interest Income to Interest income

Affiliated
0.048
0.008
0.609

0.038
0.109
0.052

Assurbanking
0.034
0.110
0.060

Bancassurance
0.049
0.105
0.030

Assurbanking
0.036
0.010
0.003

Bancassurance
0.046
0.020
0.004

Median
Non-Affiliated
Interest Income
Non-Interest Income
%Non-interest Income to Interest income

Affiliated
0.047
0.005
0.111

Non-affi.~ Affi.

0.039
0.017
0.004

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.

Assurb.~Bancass.

0.00
0.00
0.00
Interest Income
0.40
0.00
0.01
0.06
Non-Interest Income
0.47
0.03
0.04
0.09
%Non-interest Income to Interest income
0.20
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies.
Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by insurers.
Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control
insurers. Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.
Figure 13.1.b
Interest Income and Non-Interest Income
(scaled by asset) (mean) -- (Thrift Saving Banks)
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Table 14 Banks Operating Performance: Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and Net Operating Income to Assets
This table reports banks' overall performance - Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and Ratio of Net Operating Income to Asset. The Pvalue of t-test is also provided.
Panel A: Commercial Banks: ROA, ROE, and Net Operating Income to Assets
Mean (%)
Bancassurance
Non-Affiliated
Non-affi. w/ ins.
Non-affi. w/o ins.
ROA
6.15%
3.19%
4.39%
3.00%
ROE
35.70%
35.58%
47.46%
33.71%
Net Operating Income to Asset
5.80%
3.09%
4.27%
2.90%

ROA
ROE
Net Operating Income to Asset

Median (%)
Non-Affiliated
Non-affi. w/ ins.
1.53%
3.19%
17.15%
28.09%
1.46%
3.09%

Bancassurance
2.26%
17.30%
2.11%

Bancass. ~ Non-affi.

t - Test (P-value)
Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/ Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/o
ins.
ins.

Non-affi. w/o ins.
1.48%
16.15%
1.39%

Non-affi. w/ ins. ~ Nonaffi. w/o ins.

0.03
0.02
0.03
ROA
0.14
0.05
ROE
0.49
0.12
0.41
0.04
0.03
0.03
Net Operating Income to Asset
0.18
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control
insurers. Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by
insurers. Since the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Nonaffiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance
companies. Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance products
as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.
Figure 14.a
Performance - ROA, ROE, Ratio of Net Operating Inc. to Assets
(mean) -- (Commercial Banks)
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Table 14 Panel B: Thrift Saving Banks:

ROA, ROE, and Net Operating Income to Assets
Mean (%)
Non-Affiliated

ROA
ROE
Net Operating Income to Asset

Affiliated

1.18%
12.86%
0.82%

-0.97%
4.75%
-1.43%

Assurbanking
-1.65%
0.30%
-1.98%

Bancassurance
0.93%
17.16%
0.10%

Assurbanking

Bancassurance
1.33%
16.48%
0.78%

Median (%)
Non-Affiliated
ROA
ROE
Net Operating Income to Asset

Affiliated

1.04%
11.06%
0.88%

Non-affi.~ Affi.

0.40%
4.27%
0.24%

0.24%
2.25%
0.17%

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.

Assurb.~Bancass.

0.02
0.01
0.07
ROA
0.42
0.00
0.00
0.00
ROE
0.21
0.01
0.02
0.10
Net Operating Income to Asset
0.24
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies.
Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by insurers.
Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control
insurers. Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.
Figure 14.b

Performance - ROA, ROE, Ratio of Net Operating Inc. to Assets
(mean) -- (Thrift Saving Banks)
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Table 14.1 Banks Operation Performance: Interest Margin, Non-Interest Margin
This table shows Interest Margin and Non-interest Margin measuring the profitability of banks. (1) Interest margin is defined as the dollar difference
between interest income and interest expense as a percentage of earning assets. (2) Similarly, non-interest margin is defined as the dollar difference
between non-interest income and non-interest expense as a percentage of earning assets.
Panel A: Commercial Banks Performance: Interest Margin, Non-interest Margin
Mean (%)
Bancassurance
Non-Affiliated
Non-affi. w/ ins.
Non-affi. w/o ins.
Interest Margin
5.12%
3.99%
3.75%
4.03%
Non-Interest Margin
1.11%
-1.54%
-1.32%
-1.58%

Bancassurance
3.98%
-1.41%

Interest Margin
Non-Interest Margin

Median (%)
Non-Affiliated
Non-affi. w/ ins.
3.92%
3.71%
-1.69%
-1.34%

Non-affi. w/o ins.
3.97%
-1.75%

t - Test (P-value)
Bancass. ~ Non-affi.

Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/
ins.

Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/o
ins.

Non-affi. w/ ins. ~ Nonaffi. w/o ins.

Interest Margin
0.07
0.04
0.08
0.01
0.10
0.02
Non-Interest Margin
0.11
0.13
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control
insurers. Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled
by insurers. Since the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to bancassurance-affiliated CBs.
Non-affiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance
companies. Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance
products as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.
Figure 14.1.a
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Table 14.1 Panel B: Thrift Saving Banks Operation Performance: Interest Margin, Non-interest Margin
Mean (%)
Non-Affiliated
Affiliated
Interest Margin
3.09%
3.10%
Non-Interest Margin
-1.54%
-4.38%

Assurbanking
2.67%
-4.96%

Bancassurance
4.30%
-2.76%

Assurbanking
2.49%
-2.41%

Bancassurance
3.89%
-1.99%

Median (%)
Non-Affiliated
Interest Margin
Non-Interest Margin

Affiliated

3.27%
-1.62%

Non-affi.~ Affi.

3.04%
-2.26%

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.

Assurb.~Bancass.

0.04
0.03
0.01
Interest Margin
0.49
Non-Interest Margin
0.05
0.07
0.25
0.22
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies.
Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by
insurers. Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or
control insurers. Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.
Figure 14.1.b
Interest Margin, Non-Interest Margin (mean) -- (Thrift Saving Banks)
6%
4%

4.30%
3.09%

2.67%

2%

Non-affiliated

0%

Assurbanking

-1.54%

-2.76%

-2%
-4%

Bancassurance

-4.96%

-6%
Interest Margin

Non-Interest Margin

131

Table 14.2 Banks OperationPerformance: Risk-Based Capital (RBC) Ratio, Loan to Deposit (LTD) Ratio, Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio
This table provides bank's Risk-Based Capital (RBC) Ratio, Loan to Deposit (LTD) Ratio, and Loan Charge-offs Ratio. (1) RBC ratio is calculated as
the ratio of total risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets. (2) LTD ratio is used as a measure of bank's liquidity and is calculated as a bank's gross
loans divided by total deposits, indicating the percentage of a bank's loans funded through deposits. (3) Charge-offs are loans written off as
uncollectable by the banks and are measured on a net basis, loans charged off as losses minus recoveries on loans preciously charged off, The loan
charge-offs ratio is calculated as net loan charge-offs divided by the total loans.
Panel A: Commercial Banks Performance: RBC Ratio, Net Loan to Deposit Ratio, Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio
Mean (%)
Bancassurance
Non-Affiliated
Non-affi. w/ ins.
Non-affi. w/o ins.
RBC Ratio
117.27%
48.72%
85.58%
42.94%
Loan to Deposit Ratio
344.74%
239.63%
303.30%
230.50%
Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio
3.54%
1.11%
2.17%
0.95%

Bancassurance
33.54%
117.37%
1.14%

RBC Ratio
Loan to Deposit Ratio
Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio

Median (%)
Non-Affiliated
Non-affi. w/ ins.
14.15%
32.13%
98.99%
166.87%
0.38%
0.87%

Non-affi. w/o ins.
13.89%
95.96%
0.35%

t - Test (P-value)
Bancass. ~ Non-affi.

Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/ Bancass. ~ Non-affi. w/o Non-affi. w/ ins. ~ Nonins.
ins.
affi. w/o ins.

0.06
0.05
0.02
RBC Ratio
0.25
Loan to Deposit Ratio
0.23
0.39
0.21
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.04
Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio
0.11
Bancassurance-affiliated CBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control
insurers. Assurbanking-affiliated CBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by
insurers. Since the assurbanking-affiliated CBs are tiny in size and no more than 10 in number, we merge them to bancassurance-affiliated CBs. Nonaffiliated CBs WITHOUT INS are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance
companies. Non-affiliated CBs WITH INS are those without any affiliation with insurance companies, but underwriting such inhouse insurance products
as credit related insurance, mortgage insurance.
Figure 14.2.a
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Table 14.2 Panel B: Thrift Saving Banks Performance:

RBC Ratio
Loan to Deposit Ratio
Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio

RBC Ratio, Net Loan to Deposit Ratio, Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio
Mean (%)
Non-Affiliated
Affiliated
Assurbanking
16.96%
47.43%
55.97%
98.70%
89.76%
81.38%
0.39%
0.55%
0.27%

Bancassurance
23.65%
113.13%
1.12%

Median (%)
Non-Affiliated
14.31%
98.06%
0.06%

RBC Ratio
Loan to Deposit Ratio
Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio

Non-affi.~ Affi.

Affiliated
15.23%
72.59%
0.12%

Assurbanking
15.65%
49.87%
0.10%

t - Test (P-value)
Non-affi. ~ Assurb.
Non-affi. ~ Bancass.

Bancassurance
14.17%
103.58%
0.35%
Assurb.~Bancass.

0.00
0.00
0.02
RBC Ratio
0.18
Loan to Deposit Ratio
0.37
0.31
0.30
0.24
0.08
Net Charge-off to Loan Ratio
0.26
0.28
0.12
Non-affiliated SBs are those without any affiliation (either direct control or through holding companies they belong to) with insurance companies.
Assurbanking-affiliated SBs are those directly owned by insurers or owned through their holding companies, which are owned or controled by insurers.
Bancassurance-affiliated SBs are those affiliated with insurers by directly holding insurers or through their holding companies, which own or control
insurers. Affiliated SBs refer to either Assurbanking-affiliated SBs or Bancassurance-affiliated SBs.
Figure 14.2.b
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Table 15: Property-Liability Insurance Products and Lines of Business Definitions
Products
Personal Property
Personal Liability

Commercial Property

Commercial Liability

Lines of Business
Private Passenger Automobile Physical Damage
Farmowners Multiple Peril
Homeowners Multiple Peril
Private Passenger Automobile Liability
Fire
Allied Line
Inland Marine
Earthquake
Burglary and Theft
Commercial Automobile Physical Damage
Fidelity
Surety
Mortgage Guaranty
Financial Guaranty
Group Accident and Health
Credit Accident and Health
Other Accident and Health
Credit
Aggregate write-ins
Commercial Automobile Liability
Workers' Compensation
Commercial Multiple Peril
Medical Malpractice (occurrence, claims made)
Ocean Marine
Aircraft
Boiler and Machinery
Other Liability (occurrence, claims made)
Products Liability (occurrence, claims made)
International
Reinsurance
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Table 16 Data Sample Statistics
This table lists the number of firms contained in the data sample by sectors and product lines. The firms under
common ownership are aggregated to the group level. Joint firms are those producing both banking and insurance
products. Life, PC, CB and SB subsidiaries are joint producers' business divisions by product lines. Insurance and
banking specialists are firms producing only insurance or banking products, respectively. The data sample accounts
for 98 percent life insurance industry assets, 94 percent property-liability insurance assets, 88 percent commercial
banks assets, and 81 percent thrift saving banks assets.
2003
Joint Firms

2004

88

2005

85

Total

87

260

- Bank & LH

38

37

36

111

- Bank & PC

14

15

15

44

- Bank & LH, PC

36

33

26

95

Insurance Specialists

204

208

209

621

- Life Insurers

110

104

102

316

- PC Insurers

144

149

151

444

Banking Specialists

461

470

509

1,440

- Commercial Banks

389

402

439

1,230

- Thrift Saving Banks

132

132

146

410

Note: LH is the abbreviation for life insurance. PC is the abbreviation for property-liability insurance. "Bank & LH"
refers to the affiliation between banks and life insurance companies, "Bank & PC" refers to the affiliation between
banks and property-liability insurance companies, and "Bank & LH, PC" refers to the affiliation between banks, life
insurance and property-liability insurance.
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Table 17. Outputs and Inputs Measures
Panel A: Property-Liability Insurers
Outputs
Quantity
Present Value of Losses Incurred (PV (L ))
(1) Personal short-tail lines
(2) Personal long-tail lines
(3) Commercial short-tail lines
(4) Commercial long-tail lines

Price
Price = ( Premium Earned - Present Value of Losses Incurred ) / Present Value
of Losses Incurred

Average Invested Assets
Insurer holding of stocks and other invested assets

Expected Rate of Return (ROR) on the Insurer's Assets
-- Expected ROR on Invested Assets is the weighted average of the expected return on
stocks and on other invested assets
-- Expected ROR on stocks is cost of equity capital using 3-Factor Fama-French CAPM
with industry beta (SIC 6311) from Ibbotson Associates.
-- Expected ROR on other invested assets is the ratio of acutal investment income
(minus dividends on stock) to insurer holding of other invested assets.
Inputs

Quantity
Adminstrative Labor
Total Administration and Manager Labor Expenses/Input Price
Agent Labor
Total Acquisition Expenses/Input Price
Materials & Physical Capital
Dollar Value of Net Premises and Fixed Assets
Materials & Business Services
All Non Labor Expense / Input Price
Financial Equity Capital
Equity Capital (Surplus)
Debt Capital
Loss Reserves and Unearned Premium Reserves

Price
Real Average Weekly Wages SIC 6331
Real Average Weekly Wages SIC 6411
The occupancy and fixed asset expenditures divided by the quantity of physical capital.
Real Avg. Weekly Wage SIC 7300
Cost of equity capital using 3-Factor Fama-French CAPM using industry beta (SIC
6331) from Ibbotson Associates.
Price = Investment Income Attributed to Policy Holders / Input Quantity

Panel B: Life-Health Insurers
Outputs
Quantity
Incurred Benefits plus Additions to Reserves (L + W )
(1) Personal life insurance
(2) Personal annuities
(3) Group life insurance
(4) Group annuities
(5) Accident & Health

Price
Price = [Premium Earned + Investment Income - (Incurred Benefits + Additions to
Reserves)] / (Incurred Benefits + Additions to Reserves)

Inputs
Quantity
Adminstrative Labor
Total Administration and Manager Labor Expenses/Input Price
Agent Labor
Total Acquisition Expenses/Input Price
Materials & Physical Capital
Dollar Value of Net Premises and Fixed Assets
Financial Equity Capital
Equity Capital (Surplus)
Debt Capital
Loss Reserves and Unearned Premium Reserves

Price
Real Average Weekly Wages SIC 6311
Real Average Weekly Wages SIC 6411
The occupancy and fixed asset expenditures divided by the quantity of physical capital.
Cost of equity capital using 3-Factor Fama-French CAPM using industry beta (SIC
6311) from Ibbotson Associates.
Price = Investment Income Attributed to Policy Holders / Input Quantity
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Panel C: Banks
Outputs
Quantity

Price

Consumer Loans
Residential real estate loans, Loans to individuals.
Business Loans
Commercial real estate loans, Commercial & Industrial loans, Farm loans,
Other loans.
Other Assets
Securities and Investments held, and Off-Balance Sheet (OBS) activities

Total interest income earned on these loans divided by the quantity of these loans
Total interest income earned on these loans divided by the quantity of these loans

Sum of the total interests and earnings on securities and investment and the total noninterest income divided by the total dollar value of “other assets”.
Inputs
Price

Quantity
Deposits
Demand Deposits, Saving and Small Time Deposits, and Other deposits
domestic only)
Labor
Number of Employees Reported
Physical Capital
Dollar Value of Net Premises and Fixed Assets

(

Total interest expenses on the deposits divided by the quantity of total deposits

The salary, wage and welfare per employee

The occupancy and fixed asset expenditures divided by the quantity of physical capital.
Purchased Funds
Federal Funds Purchased, Foreign Deposits, and Other Liabilities for Borrowed
Money

The interest paid on these funds divided by the dollar value of purchased funds
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Table 18. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Composite Function Estimation - Commercial Banks
This table provides summary statistics of variables used in the composite function estimation. Cost, Revenue, Profit, and output
quantities are in thousands.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for diversified commercial banks ( N= 111 )
Variable Definition

Mean

Std. Dev.

Cost

3,821,298

8,868,608

Revenue

5,020,367

Profit

1,199,069

Output quantity - Consumer loans
Output quantity - Business loans

Min

Max

4,035

51,172,912

11,661,406

4,949

67,617,667

2,816,317

-18,449

16,444,755

33,050,750

73,816,765

0

358,827,325

20,434,609

48,476,928

0

268,248,721

150,522,991

479,974,730

74,302

3,117,297,782

78.5325

45.3557

35.8438

347.2667

Input price - Net premiuses and fixed assets

1.6137

5.7786

0.0000

52.2632

Input price - Deposits

0.0169

0.0147

0.0009

0.0969

Input price - Purchased Fund

0.0250

0.0241

0.0000

0.2176

Output quantity - Other assets
Input price - Labor

Panel B: Descriptive statistics for specialist commercial banks ( N= 1,238 )
Variable Definition

Mean

Std. Dev.

Cost

288,041

644,243

Revenue

368,159
80,118

Output quantity - Consumer loans
Output quantity - Business loans
Output quantity - Other assets

Min

Max

20,013

5,518,470

822,725

18,563

7,105,638

186,667

-59,209

1,738,170

1,741,006

4,120,055

0

35,748,992

2,261,665

5,119,329

0

46,505,825

4,183,472

12,178,919

139,659

129,215,588

59.8007

22.7612

20.1755

276.4737

Input price - Net premiuses and fixed assets

0.3977

0.6602

0.0000

14.1736

Input price - Deposits

0.0149

0.0056

0.0020

0.0596

Input price - Purchased Fund

0.0290

0.0247

0.0000

0.6769

Profit

Input price - Labor

Panel C: Descriptive statistics for all commercial banks ( N= 1,349 )
Variable Definition

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Cost

578,768

2,782,530

Revenue

750,957

3,654,265

4,949

67,617,667

Profit

172,189

879,677

-59,209

16,444,755

Output quantity - Consumer loans

4,317,271

23,114,961

0

358,827,325

Output quantity - Business loans

3,756,992

15,516,865

0

268,248,721

16,224,752

143,365,414

74,302

3,117,297,782

Output quantity - Other assets
Input price - Labor

4,035

51,172,912

61.3420

25.8804

20.1755

347.2667

Input price - Net premiuses and fixed assets

0.4977

1.7991

0.0000

52.2632

Input price - Deposits

0.0151

0.0069

0.0009

0.0969

Input price - Purchased Fund

0.0287

0.0246

0.0000

0.6769

138

Table 19. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Composite Function Estimation - Thrift Saving Banks
This table provides summary statistics of variables used in the composite function estimation. Cost, Revenue, Profit, and output
quantities are in thousands.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for diversified thrifit saving banks ( N= 68 )
Variable Definition

Mean

Std. Dev.

Cost

219,562

512,449

Revenue

251,198
31,636

Min

Max

5,416

3,177,384

596,823

6,025

3,670,408

87,580

-20,548

493,024

1,529,552

3,048,094

0

12,826,927

283,622

1,129,100

0

7,047,061

3,337,837

9,804,086

7,400

50,942,408

72.6990

28.7693

38.7872

251.0833

Input price - Net premiuses and fixed assets

5.1889

12.3835

0.0000

61.9318

Input price - Deposits

0.0212

0.0067

0.0060

0.0361

Input price - Purchased Fund

0.0287

0.0284

0.0000

0.1990

Profit
Output quantity - Consumer loans
Output quantity - Business loans
Output quantity - Other assets
Input price - Labor

Panel B: Descriptive statistics for specialist thrift saving banks ( N= 202 )
Variable Definition

Mean

Cost

258,653

Revenue

328,918
70,265
3,405,588
924,846

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

32,583

2,526,626

434,286

47,141

3,253,980

111,019

-19,880

727,354

4,586,445

895

27,655,552

1,767,719

0

16,150,809

2,734,887

4,311,897

114,652

28,828,965

63.2470

24.1848

29.1730

295.5603

Input price - Net premiuses and fixed assets

0.5389

0.4275

0.0000

2.9332

Input price - Deposits

0.0185

0.0057

0.0059

0.0422

Input price - Purchased Fund

0.0385

0.0390

0.0000

0.5253

Profit
Output quantity - Consumer loans
Output quantity - Business loans
Output quantity - Other assets
Input price - Labor

336,869

Panel C: Descriptive statistics for all thrift saving banks ( N= 270 )
Variable Definition

Mean

Cost

248,808

Revenue

309,344
60,536
2,933,105
763,352
2,886,741
65.6275

Input price - Net premiuses and fixed assets

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

5,416

3,177,384

480,404

6,025

3,670,408

106,781

-20,548

727,354

4,324,080

0

27,655,552

1,652,333

0

16,150,809

6,156,456

7,400

50,942,408

25.6923

29.1730

295.5603

1.7100

6.5131

0.0000

61.9318

Input price - Deposits

0.0191

0.0060

0.0059

0.0422

Input price - Purchased Fund

0.0360

0.0368

0.0000

0.5253

Profit
Output quantity - Consumer loans
Output quantity - Business loans
Output quantity - Other assets
Input price - Labor

387,931
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Table 20. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Composite Function Estimation - Life Insurance Companies
This table provides summary statistics of variables used in the composite function estimation. Cost, Revenue, Profit, and output
quantities are in thousands.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for diversified life insurance companies ( N= 133 )
Variable Definition
Cost
Revenue

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

831,038

1,033,719

535

4,145,507

1,125,697

1,400,670

3,545

6,489,245
2,343,738

Profit

294,659

434,943

-38,546

Output quantity - Life Insurance

957,672

1,636,354

8

7,719,653

1,435,005

2,609,786

0

12,558,310

Output quantity - Accident & Health Insurance

284,276

535,468

0

2,669,184

Input price - Administration and management labor

1265.34

228.10

807.00

1882.00

Input price - Agent labor

Output quantity - Annuities

1024.27

98.11

796.52

1457.71

Input price - Materials and physical capital

706.63

145.73

435.05

1019.43

Input price - Equity capital

0.1200

0.0061

0.1132

0.1280

Input price - Debt capital

0.0445

0.0140

0.0102

0.0823

Panel B: Descriptive statistics for specialist life insurance companies ( N= 315 )
Variable Definition

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Cost

237,061

311,482

79

1,833,309

Revenue

311,534

422,973

255

2,373,229

Profit

74,474

139,820

-66,198

1,005,259

Output quantity - Life Insurance

217,125

364,395

0

2,955,663

Output quantity - Annuities

251,982

437,434

0

2,867,009

Output quantity - Accident & Health Insurance

252,897

587,877

0

3,382,254

Input price - Administration and management labor

1241.30

219.13

760.00

1923.00

Input price - Agent labor

999.39

99.63

760.01

1412.22

Input price - Materials and physical capital

714.76

177.99

353.01

1473.32

Input price - Equity capital

0.1200

0.0061

0.1132

0.1280

Input price - Debt capital

0.0466

0.0173

0.0102

0.1192

Panel C: Descriptive statistics for all life insurance companies ( N= 448 )
Variable Definition

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Cost

413,398

676,399

79

4,145,507

Revenue

553,239

918,529

255

6,489,245

Profit

139,841

282,382

-66,198

2,343,738

Output quantity - Life Insurance

436,975

999,362

0

7,719,653

Output quantity - Annuities

603,192

1,561,572

0

12,558,310

Output quantity - Accident & Health Insurance

262,213

572,405

0

3,382,254

Input price - Administration and management labor

1248.44

221.85

760.00

1923.00

Input price - Agent labor

1006.78

99.72

760.01

1457.71

Input price - Materials and physical capital

712.35

168.94

353.01

1473.32

Input price - Equity capital

0.1200

0.0061

0.1132

0.1280

Input price - Debt capital

0.0460

0.0164

0.0102

0.1192
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Table 21. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Composite Function Estimation - Property-Liability Insurance Companies
This table provides summary statistics of variables used in the composite function estimation. Cost, Revenue, Profit, and output
quantities are in thousands.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for diversified property-liability insurance companies ( N= 114 )
Variable Definition

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Cost

535,078

1,077,620

52

Revenue

662,600

1,247,356

73

7,258,835

Profit

127,522

218,534

-24,344

1,123,429

Output quantity - Personal property-liability insurance

485,816

1,130,523

0

5,597,831

Output quantity - Commercial property-liability insurance

312,227

690,986

0

3,923,788

3,128,234

5,587,308

2,570

29,081,332

Input price - Administration and management labor

1145.71

130.96

792.00

1408.00

Input price - Agent labor

1007.18

125.09

665.00

1438.53

Input price - Materials and physical capital

679.10

203.02

432.33

1655.83

Input price - Equity capital

0.0811

0.0015

0.0798

0.0832

Input price - Debt capital

0.0287

0.0267

0.0102

0.1889

Output quantity - Invested assets

6,792,995

Panel B: Descriptive statistics for specialist property-liability insurance companies ( N= 443 )
Variable Definition

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Cost

331,560

458,874

323

4,402,666

Revenue

421,052

592,411

233

5,921,569

Profit

89,492

182,961

-385,183

1,518,902

Output quantity - Personal property-liability insurance

167,852

315,397

0

1,961,435

Output quantity - Commercial property-liability insurance

284,816

451,168

0

3,970,428

Output quantity - Invested assets

2,339,506

3,114,810

5,791

26,166,168

Input price - Administration and management labor

1171.83

152.04

664.00

1707.00

Input price - Agent labor

1046.39

130.13

714.00

1444.00

Input price - Materials and physical capital

706.07

158.86

296.82

1154.76

Input price - Equity capital

0.0811

0.0015

0.0798

0.0832

Input price - Debt capital

0.0315

0.0281

0.0102

0.3449

Panel C: Descriptive statistics for all property-liability insurance companies ( N= 557 )
Variable Definition

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Cost

373,214

640,437

52

Revenue

470,490

777,640

73

7,258,835

97,275

191,188

-385,183

1,518,902

Output quantity - Personal property-liability insurance

232,929

596,087

0

5,597,831

Output quantity - Commercial property-liability insurance

290,426

508,898

0

3,970,428

2,500,934

3,762,829

2,570

29,081,332

Input price - Administration and management labor

1166.48

148.23

664.00

1707.00

Input price - Agent labor

1038.37

129.97

665.00

1444.00

Input price - Materials and physical capital

700.55

168.99

296.82

1655.83

Input price - Equity capital

0.0811

0.0015

0.0798

0.0832

Input price - Debt capital

0.0309

0.0278

0.0102

0.3449

Profit

Output quantity - Invested assets

6,792,995
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Table 22. Cost, Revenue, and Profit Scope Economy Estimates
Panel A: Cost Scope Economies

-19.9% **
-0.1%
-24.4% ***

Cost Scope Economies
Median
-11.4% **
-24.1% ***
-26.0% ***

29.2% ***
15.7% **
33.7% ***

Revenue Scope Economies
Median
25.6% ***
32.1% ***
38.8% ***

2.6% *
-0.4%
6.3% ***

Profit Scope Economies
Median
3.9% *
2.0% *
10.3% ***

1st Quartile
All
Joint Firms
Synthetic Joint Firms

3rd Quartile
-36.0% ***
-70.8% ***
-78.6% ***

Panel B: Revenue Scope Economies
1st Quartile
All
Joint Firms
Synthetic Joint Firms

3rd Quartile
49.6% ***
74.3% ***
78.1% ***

Panel C: Profit Scope Economies
1st Quartile
All
Joint Firms
Synthetic Joint Firms

3rd Quartile
7.6% ***
16.9% ***
25.9% ***

Notes: The data sample used to evaluate scope economies contains 260 actual joint firms and 298,185 hypothetic joint firms, which
is created by merging every insurance specialist with every bank specialist. Scope economy is present if the scope economy score is
greater than zero; Scope diseconomy is present if the scope economy score is less than zero; Neither scope economy nor
diseconomy is present if the scope economy score equals zero.
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
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Table 23. Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables (N = 214 )
This table provides summary statistics of regression variables for financial groups joint producing banking and insurance products. Observations with
extreme scope economy scores, e.g., scope economy scores >1 or <-1, are excluded from the sample. The final sample used in the regression contains 214
actual joint producers
Variable
CSCORE
RSCORE
PSCORE
LASSETGTA
P_SHARE
P_SHARE_INS
P_SHARE_BK
DV_BKASSUR
DV_ASSURBK
DV_CONG
BKASSUR_LH
BKASSUR_PC
BKASSUR_LHPC
ASSURBK_CB
ASSURBK_SB
ASSURBK_CBSB
CONG_LH
CONG_PC
CONG_LHPC
PRODHHI
PRODHHI_B
DPWHHI
LOFFDOM
DV_MKT_H
DV_MKT_V
C_TO_A
XEFF_C_LH
XEFF_C_PC
XEFF_C_BK
XEFF_R_LH
XEFF_R_PC
XEFF_R_BK
XEFF_P_LH
XEFF_P_PC
XEFF_P_BK

Definition
Cost scope economy score
Revenue scope economy score
Profit scope economy score
Log ( Total group assets)
Total retail products business share (%)
Insurance retail products share (%)
Banking retail products share (%)
Dummy - Bancassurer
Dummy - Assurbank
Dummy - Conglomerate
Dummy - Bancassurer doing life insurance only
Dummy - Bancassurer doing property-liab. insurance only
Dummy - Bancassurer doing both life & property-liab. insurance
Dummy - Assurbank doing commercial banking only
Dummy - Assurbank doing thrift saving only
Dummy - Assurbank doing both commercial banking & thrift saving
Dummy - Conglomerate doing life insurance only
Dummy - Conglomerate doing property-liab. insurance only
Dummy - Conglomerate doing both life & property-liab. insurance
Insurance product mix HHI
Banking product mix HHI
Insurance geographic business HHI
Log ( number of bank branches and offices )
Insurance horizontal distribution dummy
Insurance vertical distribution dummy
Capital to assets ratio
Cost X-efficiency - Life insurance
Cost X-efficiency - Property-Liability insurance
Cost X-efficiency - Banking
Revenue X-efficiency - Life insurance
Revenue X-efficiency - Property-Liability insurance
Revenue X-efficiency - Banking
Profit X-efficiency - Life insurance
Profit X-efficiency - Property-Liability insurance
Profit X-efficiency - Banking

Mean
-0.4231
0.4482
0.1772
23.1793
0.6485
0.5731
0.6090
0.3832
0.5093
0.1075
0.1776
0.0561
0.1495
0.0841
0.4112
0.0140
0.0140
0.0327
0.0607
0.5424
0.4097
0.2889
2.0552
0.4907
0.1869
0.1610
0.0846
0.1364
0.1549
0.0882
0.1210
0.1358
0.7392
0.9419
0.4157

Std. Dev.
0.4233
0.3748
0.2430
2.1399
0.2184
0.3408
0.2812
0.4873
0.5011
0.3104
0.3830
0.2306
0.3574
0.2782
0.4932
0.1178
0.1178
0.1783
0.2394
0.2469
0.2590
0.3518
2.4232
0.5011
0.3908
0.1132
0.2196
0.2546
0.2882
0.2198
0.2484
0.2781
0.1123
0.0209
0.1985

Min
-1.0000
-0.7694
-0.4029
19.1334
0.0079
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.1650
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0311
0.0007
0.0034
0.0020
0.0017
0.0044
0.0013
0.4943
0.9068
0.1676
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Max
0.8984
1.0000
1.0000
27.7889
0.9886
1.0000
0.9997
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
8.6923
1.0000
1.0000
0.5314
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

-3.96 ***

-0.81
1.52

-2.01 **
-0.41
1.50
-0.31
-0.10
0.74
-4.23 ***
-2.23 ***
-2.81 ***
-0.77

-2.34 **
-1.32

-0.8422

-0.1420
0.2330

-0.3979
-0.0698
0.2422
-0.0104
-0.0102
0.1029
-2.0945
-0.6069
-0.5800
-0.1290

-0.2440
-0.1316
-0.4231
214

Average value of dependent variable
Number of observations

* Significant at the 10% level

** Significant at the 5% level

*** Significant at the 1% level

-5.71 ***

-0.1940

Independed Variables
Intercept
Firm size variables
Log ( Total group assets)
Business and product mix variables
Total retail products business share (%)
Insurance retail products share (%)
Banking retail products share (%)
Dummy - Bancassurer
Dummy - Assurbank
Dummy - Bancassurer doing life insurance only
Dummy - Bancassurer doing property-liab. insurance only
Dummy - Bancassurer doing both life & property-liab. insurance
Dummy - Assurbank doing commercial banking only
Dummy - Assurbank doing thrift saving only
Dummy - Assurbank doing both commercial banking & thrift saving
Dummy - Conglomerate doing life insurance only
Dummy - Conglomerate doing property-liab. insurance only
Business diversification variables
Insurance product mix HHI
Banking product mix HHI
Insurance geographic business HHI
Log ( number of bank branches and offices )
Insurance distribution system variables
Insurance horizontal distribution dummy
Insurance vertical distribution dummy
Leverage variable
Capital to assets ratio
X-efficiency variables
Cost X-efficiency - Life insurance
Cost X-efficiency - Property-Liability insurance
Cost X-efficiency - Banking
Revenue X-efficiency - Life insurance
Revenue X-efficiency - Property-Liability insurance
Revenue X-efficiency - Banking
Profit X-efficiency - Life insurance
Profit X-efficiency - Property-Liability insurance
Profit X-efficiency - Banking
Year dummy variables
Year 2003
Year 2004

Cost Scope Economies
<1>
t stat.
Coefficient
5.1188
5.91 ***

0.4482
214

0.2325
0.1570

0.4271
0.3495
0.0755

1.6671

0.0537
0.0073

0.2160
0.0415
-0.3447
-0.0031

0.2235
-0.1033

0.4321

0.1506

2.97 ***
2.07 **

2.32 **
2.31 **
0.59

4.54 ***

0.70
0.07

1.49
0.32
-2.89 ***
-0.12

1.69 *
-0.91

2.74 ***

6.33 ***

Revenue Scope Economies
<2>
t stat.
Coefficient
-3.7674
-6.34 ***

0.1772
214

0.0737
0.0561

0.5299
1.9393
0.2079

0.2432

-0.0200
0.0174

0.1373
-0.0255
-0.1004
0.0159

0.0135
-0.0596

0.0954

0.0693

2.77 ***
2.05 **

5.18 ***
3.51 ***
3.33 ***

1.96 **

-0.77
0.50

2.83 ***
-0.56
-2.55 **
2.08 **

0.30
-1.48

1.77 ***

9.25 ***

Profit Scope Economies
<3>
t stat.
Coefficient
-3.9126
-7.27 ***

-0.4231
214

-0.2755
-0.1412

-0.7758
-0.3641
-0.1249

-2.1069

0.0488
0.1500

-0.2691
-0.0679
0.3720
-0.0409

-0.1468
-0.6623
-0.3106
-0.0599
0.0825
0.5763
-0.5877
-0.5175

-0.6826
-0.1349

-0.1967

*
*
**

**

-2.87
-1.55

-2.90 ***
-1.82 *
-0.73

-4.61 ***

0.48
1.12

-1.35
-0.44
2.31 **
-1.25

-0.69
-2.31
-1.41
-0.28
0.44
1.66
-1.72
-1.94

-4.52 ***
-0.84

-6.29 ***

Cost Scope Economies
<4>
t stat.
Coefficient
5.2104
6.51 ***

0.4482
214

0.2461
0.1557

0.6218
0.2595
0.0922

1.6650

-0.0198
-0.0592

0.0893
0.0270
-0.4286
0.0222

0.3293
0.7024
0.4867
0.1730
0.1802
-0.4800
0.5222
0.6693

0.2618
0.1210

0.1562

*
**
***

**
***
***

3.37 ***
2.21 **

3.22 ***
1.65 *
0.67

4.80 ***

-0.25
-0.58

0.60
0.22
-3.51 ***
0.88

2.15
3.33
2.90
1.10
1.34
-1.81
1.98
3.24

2.39 **
0.91

6.88 ***

Revenue Scope Economies
<5>
t stat.
Coefficient
-4.0153
-6.96 ***

0.1772
214

0.0725
0.0551

0.5832
2.1479
0.1919

0.1850

-0.0213
0.0038

0.1651
-0.0133
-0.0898
0.0179

-0.0164
0.0333
0.1199
-0.0741
0.0221
-0.1919
0.1362
0.1316

0.0779
0.0971

0.0717

2.90 ***
2.15 **

5.92 ***
4.08 ***
2.97 ***

1.57

-0.82
0.12

3.33 ***
-0.31
-2.29 **
2.37 **

-0.30
0.49
2.25 **
-1.32
0.47
-1.92 *
1.33
1.85 *

2.17 **
2.26 **

10.04 ***

Profit Scope Economies
<6>
t stat.
Coefficient
-4.3025
-8.25 ***

Table 24. Scope Economies Regression Analysis - Joint firms (N=214)
This table provides the regression results for financial conglomerates joint producing banking and insurance products. A truncated Tobit model is used. The dependent variabe for the regression <1> and <4> is cost scope economy score; the dependent
variabe for the regression <2> and <5> is revenue scope economy score; the dependent variabe for the regression <3> and <6> is profit scope economy score.
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